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SHOULD A LIBERAL STATE BAN THE BURQA?: ABSTRACT
This thesis concerns the problem of whether a liberal state should – for liberal reasons – ban the 
wearing of the  burqa in public. The core of the problem is that liberalism appears to pull in two 
opposed directions on this question. On the one hand, liberals strongly support religious tolerance 
and the burqa is seen by many, including most of those who wear it, as a religious commitment; and 
even if it is not a religious commitment it may still be a personal choice, and liberals strongly 
support enabling personal choice. On the other hand, liberals are committed to supporting equal 
rights and freedoms for both sexes, and the gender asymmetry of the burqa (women wear it, men 
don’t) combined with the fact that habitually covering one’s face in public is liable to cause 
disadvantages in personal, social and professional life, look like good reasons for opposing it; 
moreover liberals value personal autonomy, which may be compromised if the burqa is worn in 
response to cultural pressure. The issue thus exposes a tension within liberalism.
A central element of my approach is the disentangling of a number of connected but separate 
strands of the problem. Thus I consider: different conceptions of liberalism and how they affect the 
response to the question; whether paternalism on grounds of welfare can be justified within 
liberalism and if so whether it would justify intervention in the specific case of the burqa; the value 
of personal autonomy within liberalism and whether a concern to safeguard or promote it could 
justify a burqa ban; the problem of adaptive preference and whether a socially influenced choice 
counts as a genuine preference; the role of multiculturalism in liberalism and to what extent it could 
justify exemptions; gender issues and feminism; the problem of coerced wearing of the burqa; and 
the problem of how likely it would be that a ban, even if justified in principle,  would prove 
efficacious in achieving its end. 
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The conclusion to the thesis is that banning the burqa in a liberal state is unlikely to be justified. It 
could not be justified in terms of the welfare or autonomy of the individual who voluntarily wears 
it. It could only be justified on the grounds of harm to others. It might, for example, theoretically be 
justified if coerced wearing of the burqa were widespread. This would be regrettable, however, as it 
would override the free choice of those who wore it voluntarily. Empirical evidence that such 
coercion was occurring would be necessary; and such a ban could only be justified if there were no 
other, equally efficacious and better targeted means of preventing coercion. 
My aim is to bring some clarity to this often heated and confused debate, and to supply clear 
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1.1 What is a burqa? 
The topic of this thesis is whether a liberal state should ban the burqa. Let me begin by clarifying 
the terms of the question. I use burqa throughout as a generic term for any garment worn by Muslim 
women –  more  accurately,  Wahhabist  women –  which  covers  the  face,  primarily  for  religious 
reasons (either because it is regarded as a religious obligation, or as a conscious demonstration of 
piety), although it may also be worn for cultural or political reasons. The  niqab,  therefore, also 
comes under my remit. There are differences between the burqa and the niqab, indeed: the burqa is 
a more enveloping one-piece garment, which in some versions also covers the eyes with gauze that 
can be seen through from the inside but not the outside. The niqab is a face-veil which leaves a slit 
for the eyes; it is usually worn with a headscarf and long robe. Both types of garments, however, 
cover women’s faces. That is the key point. Garments which cover only the hair, such as the hijab, 
are not  relevant  to my argument.  There may be other  names for garments worn by women in 
different parts of the Islamic world. If they cover the face, then my arguments apply to them; if not, 
not.  
1.2 What is a liberal state?
There  are  many conceptions of  liberalism.  My argument  however  is  not  tied to  any particular 
conception. I explore different conceptions of liberalism in Chapter Two in some detail, but here I 
need only state that the overall argument employs a broad concept of liberalism which encompasses 
competing conceptions.  I adopt the following definition of the minimal requirements of liberalism 
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from Jonathan Quong, which all liberals, of whatever stripe, would accept:  
a) Persons are free and equal, at least from the political point of view. Persons are free in the sense of being 
rational agents, capable of practical reasoning, with plans and projects for their own life, and with the capacity 
to understand and respond to moral reasons. Persons are equal in the sense that each person has the same 
fundamental moral status: there are no natural superiors or inferiors among us.
b) All sane adults have certain basic rights and liberties which include at least some form of freedom of thought 
and conscience, freedom of expression and association, rights to democratic participation and other political 
rights that are essential or important for a functioning democracy, a right to bodily integrity and freedom from 
assault, a right to private property (however property is justly distributed), as well as equal rights under the rule 
of law.
c) The protection of these rights and liberties should be one of the main functions of any legitimate state.
d) Even if these rights are viewed as defeasible, they have a certain priority in our political reasoning, and are 
not easily defeated by conflicting considerations.
(Quong 2011: 14-15). 
2. Why Focus on a Liberal State?  
There are two reasons why the issue of the burqa is of especial relevance and interest to liberal 
states. One is a contingent reason, tied to a specific place and time. The other is a more general and 
timeless reason.
2.1 The French ban and the ECHR judgement
The contingent reason is that it happens to be a fact, in the early years of the twenty-first century, 
that burqa-wearing is on the rise in western liberal states. This raises questions about secularism, 
security,  transparency,  communication,  multiculturalism and feminism which liberal  states must 
address.  Some liberal states have already addressed these questions by passing laws to ban the 
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wearing of the burqa in public: France in 2010, Belgium in 2011. The French ban was contested by 
an unnamed citizen known as ‘S.A.S’  in the European Court of Human Rights, in 2014.  The 
French  government  offered  three  arguments  for  the  ban: respecting  human  dignity,  furthering 
gender equality, and fulfilling the requirement of living together (‘vivre ensemble’). 
By fifteen votes to two, the court upheld the ban as legal. Not for all three reasons, however. 
In fact only one of the reasons carried the day. The court found in favour of the French state because 
the ban was motivated by the requirement of ‘vivre ensemble’  which was linked to the legitimate 
aim of the ‘protection of rights and freedoms of others.’ But the other stated aims,  of furthering 
gender equality and respecting women’s dignity, were not accepted as justifications for the ban  (see 
ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraphs 119-
121).
This ruling was echoed three years later, when two Belgian citizens similarly contested 
the Belgian ban in the European Court of Human Rights in 2017. The court again upheld the 
ban, on the same grounds that it furthered the aim of a certain idea of living together (see 
ECHR Press Release 241 in the case of  Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, 11/02/2017).  
2.2 The ECHR rejection of the gender equality defence
The requirement to safeguard gender equality would certainly count as a liberal reason for a 
ban. Political equality of citizens regardless of sex is a fundamental liberal principle. It is also a 
principle  enshrined  in  the  French  constitution.  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights’ 
judgement did not oppose this as a reason in principle, stating that the Court ‘does not doubt 
that gender equality might rightly justify an interference with the exercise of certain rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’]’; but goes on to add that:
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The Court takes the view, however, that a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a  
practice that is defended by women – such as the applicant – in the context of the exercise of the rights 
enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that individuals could be protected on that 
basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms. 
   (ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraph 119)
In other words, as long as the practice is voluntary, freely adopted and defended by the women 
concerned, then the state has no right to ban it; to do so would ride roughshod over the very 
rights and freedoms it was duty-bound to protect. 
This seems, on the face of it, persuasive. Liberals do of course believe in gender equality 
and wish to enable, promote and safeguard it, which entails a commitment to preventing unfair 
discrimination against women, providing legal protection against coercive behaviour by men, 
and ensuring that women are well-informed about their rights. But liberals do not believe that 
equal outcomes are to be imposed. If a woman freely chooses to occupy the domestic sphere, 
or to be deferent and obedient to her husband, then that is no concern of the liberal state. And 
similarly, if a woman freely chooses to habitually cover her face in public, even though this 
may disadvantage her in various ways as compared to men, the liberal state has no right to 
intervene on the grounds of preserving gender equality.
There, are, however, two important factors which the ECHR did not consider. One is the 
question of how free such a choice really is. The woman who makes it defends it, naturally 
enough: but to what extent was her choice the result of cultural pressure? (And how much 
cultural pressure is acceptable?) In short, how can we be sure that what is claimed to be a 
personal choice is not really an adaptive preference – that is to say, the acceptance of a sub-
optimal option because the other options appear even worse? This may not be an insuperable 
objection, but it needs to be considered. I discuss adaptive preferences in Chapter Seven, and 
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in Chapter Nine I look at the issue of socially influenced and disadvantageous choices. 
The second factor is the extent to which one woman’s personal choice may impact on the 
choices of others. If some burqa-wearing is coerced (we lack clear empirical evidence of this, 
but if  it were occurring), then the willing burqa-wearers might unwittingly be facilitating this 
coercion. This also is a question deserving of consideration. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 
Eleven.  
2.3 The ECHR rejection of the human dignity defence
The human dignity defence rests on the claim that habitual burqa-wearing in public offends 
against  the  dignity  of  the  wearers.  Even  if  they  do  so  voluntarily,  they  are  demeaning 
themselves;  and  therefore  the  state  may  for  paternalistic  reasons  intervene  to  protect  the 
personal  dignity of  its  citizens.  The European Court  of Human Rights did not accept  this 
defence, stating: 
  [T]he Court takes the view that, however essential it may be, respect for human dignity cannot legitimately 
justify a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places. The Court is aware that the  
clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of those who observe it. It would point out, however, 
that  it  is  the  expression  of  a  cultural  identity  which contributes  to  the  pluralism that  is  inherent  in  
democracy. It notes in this connection the variability of the notions of virtuousness and decency that are 
applied to the uncovering of the human body. 
 (ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraph 119)
The ECHR thus points to a core liberal value in its rejection of this defence: the value of 
pluralism. Pluralism, to be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, stems from the fact that 
human beings, both individually and as members of cultural groups, can and do differ about 
what makes for a good life – which would of course include notions of human dignity. As the 
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political liberal Jonathan Quong puts it in Liberalism Without Perfection: ‘Because we disagree 
about what makes life worth living, it would be wrong for the government to take sides on this 
question’ (2011: 2). 
It is true that perfectionist varieties of liberalism allow for the exercise of paternalism in 
order to safeguard or promote what are taken to be universal goods. As I shall argue in Chapter 
Four,  some degree  of  perfectionism  and  hence  paternalism  is  difficult  to  avoid  within 
liberalism. However, allowing the state to decide what counts as a dignified way to appear in 
public seems a step too far in the direction of extreme paternalism, as I shall argue in Chapters 
Five and Six, where I consider the issue of state paternalism and liberal restrictions upon it.
2.4 The ECHR acceptance of the ‘vivre ensemble’ defence
The requirement of living together falls into two parts. The first is the protection of the public 
from harm by securing public order. That is not a uniquely liberal requirement. But it perhaps 
carries  particular  importance  for  liberal  states:  the  liberal  commitment  to  equal  rights  for 
citizens means that  all  citizens are to be protected equally from harm, which may not be the 
case with non-liberal states which recognise different levels of rights for different groups of 
inhabitants. The ECHR agreed that in principle the requirement of protecting citizens from 
harm by securing public order would be a legitimate aim of the state. However, they pointed 
out that this specific requirement was not mentioned in Paragraph 8 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which the French government had 
used in support of the ban: and moreover, 
the Government did not refer to it either in their written observations or in their answer to the question put 
to them in that connection during the public hearing, preferring to refer solely to the “protection of the  
rights and freedoms of others”
(ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraph 117 ).
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For this reason, the ECHR did not consider the public order requirement as a justification for 
the ban, and it is left unanswered whether in this case it is a legitimate justification or not. My 
own view is that this would certainly be a sound liberal justification for a ban  if there was 
evidence that face-covering did threaten harm to individuals by, for example, facilitating crime 
or terrorism. But that is an empirical question. I consider the question of direct harm to others 
in Chapter Eleven; but to anticipate, I do  not believe there is evidence that burqa-wearing has 
led to increases in crime or terrorism in France or other western liberal states. 
Having put public order considerations to one side, the ECHR goes on to consider the 
other part of the vivre ensemble requirement: ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
And it is on this final point that they find in favour of the French state:
The Court takes into account the respondent State’s point that the face plays an important role in social  
interaction. It can understand the view that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish 
to see practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into question the possibility 
of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable 
element of community life within the society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching 
the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier. 
(ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraph 122 ).
The question here is the extent to which habitual public face-covering impinges on the lives of 
others. Preventing or obstructing an open and healthy ‘community life’ would count as a diffuse 
form of  harm, in  which no individual  is  directly  harmed but  social  life  for  everyone becomes 
impoverished. There is an important discussion to be had here about what norms of civility and 
transparency are necessary for open interpersonal relationships in the public sphere; and also to 
what extent such norms could be imposed by law. I discuss this question in more detail in Chapter 
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eleven; but, to anticipate again, I think the legal  imposition of such norms goes against the liberal 
ideal of individual freedom, and may be counter-productive. 
2.5 Other bans and restrictions on burqa-wearing
Two Belgian citizens similarly contested the Belgian ban in the European Court of Human Rights in 
2017, and again the court upheld the ban, on the same grounds that it furthered the aim of a certain 
idea of living together (see ECHR Press Release 241 in the case of  Belcacemi and Oussar v. 
Belgium, 11/02/2017).  
Bulgaria also banned public burqa-wearing in 2016, citing security concerns (Reuters World 
News, 20/09/2016).  In 2015 the Netherlands put into law a partial ban, whereby face-covering is 
not  permitted  in  public  buildings  or  on  public  transport,  but  is  still  permitted  on  the  street 
(Agerholm,  Independent,  29/11/2016).  These  are  all  liberal  democracies,  which  have  advanced 
liberal  reasons  for  their  bans  or  restrictions  on  burqa-wearing.  Other  European  liberal  states, 
however, have so far not followed suit, and some liberals have critiqued the bans for restricting 
those personal rights and liberties which liberalism ought to protect (Nussbaum 2012). Yet even in 
those liberal states where it is not banned, burqa-wearing causes frequent controversy and has been 
the subject of numerous court cases and tribunals. For example, in 2006 a British Muslim woman, 
Ms. Azmi, who was suspended from her post as a primary school teacher, took the school to an 
appeals tribunal alleging unfair discrimination. The tribunal found in favour of the school, although 
Ms.  Azmi  was  awarded compensation  for  the  way  the  dispute  was  handled  (Wainwright,  The 
Guardian, 20/10/2006). In 2010, Judge Shauna Dean in a court in Perth, Australia, ruled that a 
witness, ‘Tasneem’, must remove her niqab to give evidence in a fraud trial, despite her protests and 
representations from the prosecution team who called her as a witness  (The Times, 19/08/2010). In 
2013, Whipps Cross Hospital in East London ruled that all employees must remove face-coverings 
when treating patients; the imam of a local mosque spoke out against the decision (Burr, Waltham 
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Forest Guardian, 26/09/2013). The issue, then, is a live one for liberal states.
2.6 A dilemma for liberalism
The more general reason why the burqa issue is of particular relevance to liberal states is that the 
burqa poses a dilemma for liberalism which it does not pose for other political positions. ‘Should a 
theocratic state ban the burqa?’, for example, is not an interesting question. The answer simply 
depends on what kind of theocracy. If it is an Islamic, Salafist theocracy, then of course not. If it is a 
fundamentalist  Christian or Hindu theocracy, then of course.  ‘Should a (Christian) conservative 
state ban the burqa?’ The likely answer would be yes, on the grounds that burqa-wearing would not 
be in line with the culture, history and traditions of such a nation, and conservatives by definition 
value and defend their culture, history and traditions. Whether a Marxist or self-styled Marxist state 
should  ban  the  burqa  is  more  of  a  moot  point.  Marxist  ideology does  not  entail  any specific 
commitment to religious tolerance and the burqa does not appear to advance the cause of the class 
struggle or  of  economic equality,  so there is  no principled reason why it  should not.  Probably 
whether a Marxist state banned it or not would depend upon expediency rather than principle.  In 
most cases, then, simply naming the type of state gives a strong clue to the line that state would take 
on the burqa. 
But for a liberal state the issue is less clear-cut. The burqa is a religious symbol and is 
perceived by many if not most of those who wear it as a religious obligation. Liberalism entails a 
strong commitment to religious tolerance. This is where the whole tradition of western liberalism 
begins. As Russell Blackford puts it (citing Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh in support), religious freedom 
‘is the prototypical liberal freedom, a cornerstone of modern political rights’ (Blackford 2012: 1). 
Historically this is true. One of the foundational texts of liberalism is John Locke’s  Letter 
Concerning Toleration of 1689 (Locke ed. Walters 2013), which argues that the practice of religion 
should not be under the control of the state but a matter for individual conscience (with certain 
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exceptions justified by an appeal to state security). Since then the idea of individual freedom has 
widened in liberal states to include non-religious beliefs and practices: freedom of expression of 
political dissent and of unpopular or controversial views, freedom to make experiments in living, 
freedom to pursue different forms of sexuality, and so on. It could be argued – and in Chapter Two I 
do so argue – that religious freedom ought not to merit special status as compared to those other 
freedoms.  Nevertheless  religious freedom, as  well  as  being  no  less important  than those  other 
freedoms,  is  still,  symbolically,   a  cornerstone of  liberal  rights,  and liberals  are  bound to take 
seriously any threat to it.  
On the other hand, liberalism also entails a commitment to gender equality. The fact that the 
burqa is worn only by women, and could impose disadvantages on the wearer, at the very least 
looks like a cause for liberal concern. There is also the issue of ‘living together’ which was accepted 
by the European Court of Human Rights as the decisive reason in favour of the bans in France and 
Belgium; the impact one’s freedom may have on other members of society is a legitimate liberal 
concern.  The issue thus highlights a tension between important liberal principles. 
Moreover, exploring reasons why a liberal state should or should not ban the burqa leads one 
into other disputed areas within liberalism: the role of paternalism, the value of autonomy, and the 
relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism. Modern liberal societies are rapidly changing. 
When exploring the burqa question we should remember that we are looking at a dynamic situation. 
It may be that in twenty years time burqa-wearing will no longer be a hot-button issue for liberal 
states.  But  questions  about  paternalism,  autonomy,  multiculturalism,  and  the  tension  between 
religion and feminism are likely to be disputed for as long as there are liberals to dispute them. 
3. Overview of the Argument
3.1 The argument  
The argument  of  my thesis  centres  on  whether  the  liberal  response  to  face-covering  per  se  is 
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adequate to deal with all the issues raised by burqa-wearing. The thin account given in Chapter 
Three, which focuses only on face-covering in general rather than burqas in particular, will later be 
fleshed out with contextual details, to ascertain whether  the liberal response to face-covering per se  
should be unchanged, or should be either less or more restrictive, when the type of face-covering is 
the Islamic burqa or niqab. Up until Chapter Eleven, I shall be assuming that the wearing of the 
burqa is voluntary. That is because I take it  as a given that  liberals would naturally be against 
coerced burqa-wearing. It is voluntary burqa-wearing that makes for the liberal dilemma.
3.2 Chapter 2: The burqa and religious liberty
In Chapter Two I defend my approach of focusing on the burqa as a practice of habitual face-
covering rather than as a religious practice. I do not deny that it is a religious practice, of course, nor 
that religious freedoms are important to liberalism. But I argue that they should not be privileged 
over other freedoms, and that focusing on religion risks obscuring the very specific problems that 
habitual face-covering raises. My position is that burqa-wearing can be defended on grounds of 
liberty  of  the  individual,  and  that  an  argument  from religious  liberty  is  neither  necessary  nor 
effective as a trump-card. 
3.3 Chapter 3: The liberal position on habitual public face-covering per se
Chapter Three explores the reasons why the human face is of such special significance, and why 
covering it raises issues that covering other parts of the body does not. I focus on the face’s role in 
identification, ethics, empathy and communication. I examine the issue in the abstract, deliberately 
omitting considerations of culture,  religion or gender asymmetry,  in order to arrive at  a  liberal 
baseline position on the practice of habitual public face-covering per se.   I conclude that although 
habitual face-covering in public may be disadvantageous to an individual, the liberal state would 
have no reason to ban it as long as it is voluntary, although restrictions on face-covering would be 
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justifiable  in  certain  situations.  The  ground  is  thus  prepared  for  consideration  of  whether  this 
baseline position will need to be modified in light of considerations of culture, religion or gender 
asymmetry. 
3.4 Chapter 4: Two types of liberalism
In  Chapter  Four  I  consider  whether  the  type  of  liberalism  espoused  makes  a  difference  in 
responding to burqa-wearing. I consider two varieties of liberalism often taken to be contraries: 
Political  Liberalism and Liberal  Perfectionism. I  argue that  they represent  extreme points on a 
continuum rather  than  a  dichotomy.  Liberals  at  any  point  on  the  continuum would  agree  that 
restricting liberty can sometimes be justified on  grounds of preventing harm to others. For liberals 
nearer the Perfectionist end of the spectrum there may also be paternalist reasons for restricting 
liberty. The three chapters that follow explore the place and scope of paternalism within liberalism.
3.5  Chapter 5: Paternalism
Here I consider whether a ban on burqa-wearing could be justifiable on grounds of the welfare of 
the burqa-wearer. I ask whether liberals could ever be in favour of paternalism in the first place. I 
argue that there is a place for paternalism within liberalism,  pace anti-paternalists like Jonathan 
Quong and Seana Shiffrin; but paternalism on grounds of the welfare of the burqa-wearer would not 
be  justified.  The  liberal  response  to  voluntary  habitual  face-covering per  se  need  not  yet  be 
modified. 
3.6  Chapter 6: The burqa and personal autonomy
Here  I  consider  a  special  case  of  paternalism,  likely  to  be  favoured  by  liberals  towards  the 
perfectionist end of the spectrum: that is, paternalist action by the state in order to promote personal  
autonomy. My argument is that as long as the burqa-wearer has second-order autonomy (that is, as 
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long as she chose to wear the burqa autonomously in the first place, and as long as her choice is 
revocable) then despite any loss in first-order autonomy (that is, loss of autonomy in the conditions 
of day-to-day life),  the liberal  state has no justification for intervening. The liberal  response to 
voluntary habitual face-covering per se still need not be modified. 
3.7 Chapter 7: Adaptive Preferences
Here I consider the problem of adaptive preferences. If burqa-wearing is the result of a preference 
formed in response to social pressures and constraints, can it be said to be truly voluntary? I argue 
that  burqa-wearing  is  an  adaptive  preference  but  is  not  necessarily  non-autonomous;  and  that 
providing the  choice to  wear  a  burqa was formed under  social  conditions compatible  with the 
flourishing of the individual, and providing wearing it does not make it impossible for the wearer to 
flourish (according to her own idea of flourishing), and provided that she is free to stop wearing it at 
any time, liberal states should tolerate the practice. However, in cases where burqa-wearing and the 
attendant conditions prevent the flourishing of the individual, this would be what Serene Khader 
(2011) terms an Inappropriate Adaptive Preference, or IAP, and the liberal state would be justified 
in taking measures to free women from it. For reasons of sensitivity and pragmatism such measures 
might well stop short of an outright ban, however.
3.8 Chapter 8: Multiculturalism and the burqa
In  this  chapter  I  examine  first  whether  liberalism is  compatible  with  multiculturalism,  i.e.  the 
granting of cultural group rights by the state. I accept the form of multiculturalism put forward by 
Will Kymlicka, in which group rights can be legitimately granted by the liberal state as long as this 
does not entail oppression or injustice to any members within the group. I also discuss theories of 
recognition, i.e. the need to accord cultural groups acknowledgement and respect rather than mere 
tolerance. I accept the argument in principle but maintain that liberalism imposes limits on how far 
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recognitional policies should go. The question is whether,  in the case of the cultural practice of 
burqa-wearing, either  group  rights  or  recognition  would  justify  loosening  or  removing  the 
restrictions entailed by the liberal response to face-covering per se. In other words, should the right 
to wear a burqa be accommodated, rather than temporarily suspended, in situations where security, 
identification or communication are paramount? I argue that, although some cultural practices do 
merit  accommodation,  that  is  not the case for burqa-wearing.  The liberal  response to voluntary 
habitual face-covering per se need not yet be modified. 
3.9  Chapter 9: Gender and the burqa
In this chapter I consider gender asymmetry of the burqa – women wear it, men do not – and ask if 
that  causes  problem for  the  liberal.  I  consider  and  accept  Susan  Moller  Okin’s  argument  that 
multicultural policies and the rights of women in minority cultural groups may conflict, and that if 
they do conflict  it  is  the multicultural  policies which the liberal  should reject.  The question is 
whether or to what extent the burqa adversely affects the rights of women (still assuming that the 
burqa is worn voluntarily). If burqa-wearing is bad for women then there is a case for a more 
restrictive approach than the  abstract  liberal  position on face-covering  per se.  A ban might  be 
justified, even if the burqa-wearing is claimed to be voluntary. I consider Clare Chambers’ argument 
that where a practice is a) the result of strong social influence and b) disadvantageous to the person 
following the practice, then there is a liberal justification for a ban. I argue that this approach needs 
to be treated with caution. The social influence would have to be irresistible and the disadvantages 
very  severe  and  irrevocable  before  action  would  be  justifiable.  Reprising  the  argument  from 
adaptive preference, I argue that whether state intervention is justified should be decided on a case-
by-case basis; and moreover that intervention could take more nuanced and effective forms than an 
outright  ban.  The  liberal  response  to  voluntary  habitual  face-covering  per  se  need  not  yet  be 
modified.
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3.10  Chapter 10: The burqa and offence 
In this chapter I consider Joel Feinberg’s Offence Principle: the principle that if a practice causes 
severe,  prolonged and unavoidable offence to the senses or sensibilities,  there would be liberal 
grounds for banning it. I accept the argument in principle, and consider some ways in which the 
burqa might be thought offensive. I argue that none of them is so severe as to justify a ban. The 
liberal response to voluntary habitual face-covering per se need not yet be modified. 
3.11 Chapter 11: Harm and the burqa
In this chapter I put aside the assumption that burqa-wearing is voluntary and ask what the liberal 
response should be if significant numbers of women are coerced into wearing the burqa. I argue that 
if this were so, then a ban could be justified on the grounds of preventing harm to the coerced; if 
there were no other way of preventing the coercion that was at least equally efficacious. 
3.12 Chapter 12: Conclusion
Here I consider the question of efficacy and of possible unintended consequences of a burqa-ban. I 
explore whether there are  other,  more imaginative and efficacious ways of preventing coercion 
(supposing it to be occurring); and argue that, even if a ban is the most efficacious means at present, 
this could be thought of as a stopgap solution until a more nuanced solution, targeting only the 
coerced wearers while sparing the voluntary wearers, could be found. I end by summarising  my 
conclusion: 
a) assuming that burqa-wearing is voluntary, a burqa-ban would not be justified on liberal 
grounds, but it would be justifiable to require temporary removal in certain situations
b) but if a significant proportion of burqa-wearing is coerced, then a general ban would be 
justified, if no other equally efficacious means of preventing coercion could be found.
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CHAPTER TWO
 THE BURQA AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
The Argument
In  this  chapter  I  defend my approach of  not  viewing this  as  primarily  a  question  of  religious 
freedom. Focusing on religion tends to have the effect of making this a question about whether one 
is pro- or anti-religion, or pro- or anti-Islam, which easily slides into accusations of bad faith and 
prejudice, and is a distraction from the issue of the  effects of habitual face-covering on a liberal 
society.  I  acknowledge the importance of  religious freedom in the  growth and development  of 
liberal theory and practice, but argue that it should no longer be seen as of more significance and 
value than other freedoms. 
1. Why Religious Liberty is Not Central to my Approach
Many will see the question of whether burqa-wearing should be banned as essentially an issue of 
religious liberty. Peter Baehr and Daniel Gordon, for example, have argued that ‘The most powerful 
basis for opposing bans is to defend religious freedom’ (2013: 273). They do not mean to suggest 
that religious freedom should or must trump the social obligations of citizenship; only that no other 
argument will do so. 
I must part company from Baehr and Gordon. In the first place, I strongly incline to what 
they characterise as the French view, that religious freedom ought not to be privileged over other 
freedoms.  I  argue  for  this  below.  Moreover,  I  contend  that  there  are  other,  more  compelling 
arguments against a ban; and these arguments depend on taking seriously the liberal commitment to 
the liberty of the individual. I argue for this throughout. 
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I do not dispute, of course, that the burqa is of religious significance (though many Muslims 
argue that it ought not to be; see Sardar 2016). My view, however, is that a focus on its religious 
significance means the debate tends to get bogged down in arguments about whether one is pro- or 
anti-religion or, more specifically, pro- or anti-Muslim (as though either ‘religion’ or ‘Islam’ were a 
monolith). The burqa then comes to be seen as a symbol of Islam and arguments centre on the 
supposed anti-Islamic agenda of those who support  a ban.  For example,  in  The New Religious 
Intolerance  (2012) Nussbaum sees burqa-bans as part of a wider phenomenon of intolerance of 
Islam; and Myriam Hunter-Henin, in an article vehemently opposing the legality of the French ban, 
has stated that the Act (along with an earlier Act of 2004, banning wearing of the hijab in schools) 
is ‘the legal expression of the French sensitivity to the presence of Islam in the public sphere’ 
(2012: 615). This could conceivably be true for some of those in the Assemblée Nationale who 
voted for the law, or for some members of the French public who supported it, but it by no means 
follows that it was the only, main or true justification. It may be said that the Act clearly targets 
Muslims because it is only (female) Muslims who habitually cover their faces in public. However, 
in the first place it is only rather fuzzily true that it is Muslim women who habitually cover their 
faces. More accurately it is  Wahhabist women, a strict, conservative Saudi interpretation of Islam 
which is not followed by the majority of French Muslims. But then perhaps the Act discriminated 
against Wahhabist women? That is the de facto effect, but the arguments advanced by the French 
government in favour of the ban centred on face-covering rather than Wahhabism.  My approach 
here will be to evaluate arguments on their merits rather than attempt to call out the hypothetical 
agenda behind them. 
A further point: emphasis on the burqa as a religious obligation invites comparisons with 
other religious practices, which takes us away from what ought to be the central point: the effects of 
burqa-wearing, both on the individual wearer and on a liberal society. Other religious obligations, 
such as fasting, observing dietary laws, not working on holy days, or wearing clothing or ornaments 
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of religious significance  such as  hijab,  turbans,  crucifixes  etc,  may cause  tensions  and require 
negotiations, but they do not raise the  same questions as the burqa for they do not involve the same 
effects. They do not entail habitual public face-covering. As I argue in the next chapter, this has 
specific and unique effects on others and on the wearer. 
Habitual public face-covering could potentially cause problems both for the wearer and for a 
liberal society. I cover these problems in the chapters that follow. But if they can be addressed 
without the need for a blanket ban (as, subject to certain conditions, I argue is the case) then the 
issue of religious freedom need not even arise. Liberal states should not ban things that do not need 
banning, whether they are religious practices or not. Most discussions of religious freedom concern 
the right to exemptions from laws that come into conflict with religious obligations (such as the 
compulsory seatbelt  law clashing with the obligation of male Sikhs to wear turbans:  see Barry 
2011).  If,  however,  there  is  no law against  habitual  public  face-covering,  then  the  question of 
exemption to it is does not come up. 
Of course, even without such a law, there may be situations in which temporary removal of 
the face-covering could be required (for example, classrooms or courts of law). Here there might be 
tensions  between  burdens  on  others  and  religious  obligations,  and  arguments  about  specific 
exemptions – but to  start  with those cases, each of which would have its own unique features, 
before having established that the default position is no blanket ban, is putting the cart before the 
horse. 
If, on the other hand, the problems for liberal societies could  not be addressed without a 
blanket ban, then there is a prima facie case for one. For the right to religious freedom to overturn 
that case, a claim about the special or privileged status of religion would seem to be required. It is 
this  claim,  that  religious  freedom  is  of  special  value  and  significance  as  compared  to  other 
freedoms, that I do not accept. But before giving my reasons, let me first explain the position of 
religion within liberalism, and why it might be thought to be special. 
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2. The Historical Importance of Religion to Liberalism 
In Chapter I noted the historical role of religion in the political philosophy of liberalism. This point 
is  worth  reiterating.  Religion,  and  specifically  Christianity,  has  been  highly  important  in  the 
development  of  liberalism,  if  not  essential  to  it.  Larry  Siedentorp,  in  Inventing  the  Individual 
(2015),  makes  a  persuasive  case  that  the  liberal  ideas  of  individual  rights,  representative 
government, liberty of conscience and the equal worth of all human beings are direct consequences 
of Christian belief. Cécile Laborde, in  Liberalism’s Religion  notes that: ‘The notion of religion is 
central  to  the historical  elaboration  of  Western  liberalism,  from the  European wars  of  religion 
onward’ (2017: 1).
The liberal commitment to tolerance first appears as a commitment to religious tolerance, as 
in Locke’s foundational liberal text of 1689, A Letter Concerning Toleration. A commitment to state 
religious tolerance leads directly to a secular state (see Blackford 2012, Freedom of Religion and 
the Secular State).  Thus religion – or Christianity,  at  any rate – was ultimately responsible for 
secularism. 
Since Locke’s time the liberal commitment to religious tolerance has widened to include 
tolerance  of  heterodox  political  views,  unconventional  lifestyles,  different  sexualities,  etc. 
Nevertheless, religious freedom remains central and symbolically important to the liberal view.
3. Claims for the Specialness of Religion
Some writers, such as Sarah Song (2007) and Martha Nussbaum (2008) have argued that religious 
freedom is a special case. Nussbaum sees religious freedom in terms of freedom of conscience (she 
does  not  maintain  that  only  religion  raises  issues  of  conscience,  but  regards  religion  as  the 
paradigmatic case). She writes: 
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Conscience  is  precious,  worthy  of  respect,  but  it  is  also  capable  of  being  wounded and  imprisoned.  The 
tradition [of America’s religious equality] argues that conscience... needs a protected space around it within 
which people can pursue their search for life’s meaning
(2008: 19)
Jocelyn Maclure also claims that religion is a special case and that exemptions demanded for 
religious practices carry greater weight than exemptions demanded for other cultural practices.   He 
suggests that religion is different from other areas of life for which exemption claims or demands 
for special treatment can be made, because ‘religious beliefs are a special type of belief that, as 
such, require special protection’ (2011: 268). He characterises religious beliefs as meaning-giving 
beliefs and commitments which are central to one’s identity. Such beliefs are tied up to one’s sense 
of self-esteem and moral integrity, and the more this is so, the greater the need for legal protection 
of those beliefs (2011:  268). 
Michael McConnell offers a further argument in favour of the unique importance of religion. 
In  his  view,  although conventional  wisdom has  it  that  pre-modern  religious  world-views were 
oppressive  and inimical  to  freedom,  and that  ‘secularization was an essential  ingredient  in  the 
cultural background for liberal democracy’,  the truth is the other way round: ‘religion, and strong 
protection for  religion [are]  best  understood as  allied with commitment  to freedom in general’ 
(2010:  943). For McConnell,  then, freedom of religion guarantees freedom from over-intrusive 
state intervention, acting as a bulwark against state oppression. 
4. A Claim against the Specialness of Religion
The position argued for here is that we need not invoke the specialness of religion to show that a 
liberal state should not ban the burqa. The liberal commitment to freedom of individual choice is 
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enough, alone, to make that case. And if it were not, the specialness of religion would not be a 
trump-card anyway. 
First, although historically freedom of religion was the parent of other freedoms (freedom of 
expression,  freedom  of  association,  freedom  to  make  experiments  in  living  and  so  on),  to 
acknowledge this fact  is to say nothing about whether religion merits  any special  status today. 
Religion’s temporal priority does not imply lexical priority. 
Other liberal freedoms operate within limits. The right to free expression, for example, is 
limited by laws on libel and on incitement to racial hatred. Like other liberal freedoms, freedom of 
religion too must have its limits.  
McConnell’s  argument  that  freedom of  religion  was  an  important  defence  against  state 
oppression was no doubt true in eighteenth century America. But there is no reason today to think 
that it is the only or the best bulwark against an over-intrusive state. Obviously a liberal state should 
guarantee religious freedom. But it  is not obvious that this is more important than guaranteeing 
other freedoms, such as freedom of expression. 
Nussbaum is particularly concerned with defending religious freedom, which she sees as 
currently under threat. But religion is just one example – a salient one, certainly – of freedom of 
conscience,  and Nussbaum’s argument would apply equally to other,  non-religious cases where 
moral conscience is at stake. 
Jocelyn Maclure’s argument also  establishes only that meaning-giving beliefs which are tied 
to one’s sense of self-esteem and moral integrity have a greater need for legal protection than other 
beliefs.  Maclure  does  not  establish  that  all  religious  beliefs  held  by  all  believers  are  equally  
meaning-giving in this way. Nor does he establish that no non-religious beliefs are meaning-giving 
in this way. Indeed he concedes that some non-religious beliefs, such as pacifism or vegetarianism, 
may be meaning-giving and tied up with self-esteem and a sense of morality (Maclure 2011: 269). 
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Therefore religious beliefs form part of a wider category of freedom of conscience. It is the fact that 
they are in that category, not the fact that they are religious, that is supposed to make them special. 
Cécile Laborde, in her book  Liberalism’s Religion  (2017),  makes the case that liberalism 
should work with a ‘disaggregated’ notion of religion; that is to say, that religion should not be 
considered  a  single  category  for  the  purposes  of  political/legal  decisions,  but  should  be 
disaggregated ‘into a  plurality of different interpretive dimensions’ (2017: 2). This reworking of the 
role of religion in liberal theory
...implies that religion is not uniquely special: whatever treatment it receives from the law, it receives in virtue 
of features that it shares with nonreligious beliefs, conceptions and identities.
(Laborde 2017: 3)
In  Secularism and Freedom of Conscience  (2011), Maclure himself, writing with Charles Taylor, 
also  acknowledges  that  religious  beliefs  are  not  the  only  type  of  beliefs  that  require  to  be 
accommodated under a principle of freedom of conscience. It is those beliefs which give meanings 
to one’s life (as distinct from mere preferences) that deserve accommodation and these include but 
are not limited to religious beliefs: 
...core beliefs and commitments, including religious ones, must be distinguished from other  personal beliefs 
and preferences because of the role they play in individuals’ moral integrity.
(Maclure and Taylor 2011: 76)
This position, with which I am in agreement, states that  there is no distinction (relevant to the 
question of accommodation) between religious beliefs and other meaning-giving beliefs. Laborde 
uses the term ‘Identity-protecting commitment’ (IPC) for a commitment which is ‘manifested in a 
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practice, ritual, or action (or refusal to act), that allows an individual to live in accordance with how 
she  thinks  she  ought  to  live’ (2017:  203-4);  and  of  course  both  religious  and  non-religious 
commitments can be IPCs. 
Moreover, there is no bright line distinguishing beliefs which are meaning-giving and those 
which are not, but rather a continuum of beliefs ranging from those which are unconnected or 
tangential to one’s sense of moral integrity, through those which are moderately connected to it, to 
those which are connected to it very strongly indeed. Maclure and Taylor acknowledge this when 
they say, ‘The more a belief is linked to an individual’s sense of moral integrity... the stronger must 
be the legal protection it enjoys’ (2011: 76). 
When deciding whether an exemption or special treatment should be accorded to a meaning-
giving practice which is a matter of conscience, the liberal state has to apply the same tests as it 
would  to  any demand for  exemption  or  special  treatment.  Laborde  rules  out  even considering 
exemptions for IPCs which are ‘morally abhorrent’; they are to be rejected out of hand (she offers 
ritual infanticide as an example) (2017: 207-9). If the practice is morally acceptable in itself, or 
perhaps morally ambivalent (Laborde 2017) then one must proceed to weigh up the consequences 
of granting the exemption.  Is  the practice harmful? Does it  impose unacceptable,  unreasonable 
burdens on others? The specialness of the belief or practice does not bypass the need to consider 
those questions. Maclure and Taylor give the example of Jehovah’s Witness parents in Canada who 
for religious refused to allow their very sick child a blood transfusion; the hospital overrode their 
wishes and gave the treatment, and the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the hospital’s decision. 
Maclure and Taylor endorse this judgement, because ‘respect for the parents’ rights was obviously 
too great an infringement on the right to life of a minor, namely, their child’ (2011: 101).
This is a life-or-death situation, but in less extreme dilemmas, too, the right of religious or 
other  meaning-giving  beliefs  has  to  be  weighed  against  the  consequences  to  others  of 
accommodation. In particular, public laws which are there for good reasons are not to be set aside as 
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lightly as one would set aside a mere custom or convention . As Cécile Laborde has argued:
A democratic law which serves a legitimate public purpose should not routinely be discarded as an arbitrary 
customary rule, and exemptions to it should not be allowed, even if it generates disproportionate burdens on 
members of minorities. I see no rationale, for example, for granting religious groups exemptions from the civil 
law of marriage and filiations...
(2008: 96)
I  conclude  that,  although  freedom  of  conscience  may  sometimes  be  a  good  reason  for 
accommodation,  religious conscience is not more special than other types of conscience. Not all 
religious  believers  take  their  religion  with  equal  seriousness;  and  non-religious  matters  of 
conscience  can  be  taken  as  seriously  as  religious  matters  of  conscience.  Moreover,  moral 
conscience does not automatically get a free pass. The consequences for others, in terms of harms or 
serious burdens, have to be weighed against the right to follow one’s conscience.
In the case of the burqa, therefore, requests for exemptions in institutions where the rules 
would normally require faces to be uncovered would have to be backed by:
 a) evidence that  burqa-wearing was for that  individual strongly linked to their sense of 
moral integrity (merely stating that it was a religious requirement would not be enough). This might 
seem a difficult thing to establish, but as Laborde points out, ‘[s]incerity tests are commonly used 
by judges in all areas of law’ and ‘[j]udges have, in practice, not found it hard to identify clear cases 
of religious fraud’ (Laborde 2017: 207); 
b)  a  convincing  case  that  keeping  the  face  covered  would  not  cause  harms  or  impose 
unreasonable burdens on others. 
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We should note that other kinds of demand for accommodation, not just those based on religious or 
moral conscience, must also satisfy the second of those conditions.  In Chapter Eight I explore the 
issue of multiculturalism, and how the right to  recognition (acknowledgement and respect for the 
cultural  identity  of  minority  groups)  could  back  demands  for  accommodation.  Here,  too, 
recognition must be limited by the requirement not to cause harms or impose unreasonable burdens 
on others. 
But this is to anticipate. It is first necessary to establish what the baseline liberal position on 
habitual public face-covering should be, before considering complicating factors. 
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CHAPTER THREE




I  consider what  the liberal  position on habitual  public  face-covering  per se  should be.  I  use a 
stripped-down scenario, shorn of religious or cultural context, as a thought experiment. The aim is 
to see what response to face-covering per se liberal principles generate in the abstract. I argue for a 
baseline position in which habitual public face-covering, provided it is voluntary, is to be tolerated; 
but certain situations might require  temporary removal of the face-covering.This is a preliminary 
step; later chapters will explore whether that response still applies when cultural factors are given 
their due. (In fact, I shall be arguing that the abstract liberal response to voluntary habitual public 
face-covering per se is surprisingly durable.) 
                  1. What is so Special about the Human Face? 
1.1 View of a visiting extra-terrestrial 
A visiting extra-terrestrial  would find it  noteworthy that  in public,  in  all  societies,  humans are 
allowed to cover their bodies, limbs and hands and feet, and obliged to cover their genitals, but that 
the covering of the face is rare, and problematic. The extra-terrestrial would observe that the face is 
nearly always on show in public, except for temporary coverings required for protection in certain 
situations (welders’ masks,  motorcycle-helmets,  surgeons’ masks etc),  and that  individuals  who 
cover their faces outside of such situations tend to be viewed with suspicion: bandits, assassins, 
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bank-robbers and others of sinister intent often cover their faces, and in the films, plays and books 
that humans create such sinister characters are frequently depicted in this way. The extra-terrestrial 
would observe that photographs of faces (not other body-parts) are routinely used for many forms 
of identification – passports, driving licences, staff passes and so on. The extra-terrestrial would 
also observe that the face occupies a prominent position in the arts across millennia and across a 
wide range of cultures: from ancient Egyptian sculptures and paintings, to Greek and Roman busts 
and statues, tribal masks from all over Africa and South America, heads cast in brass and bronze 
from the Kingdom of Benin, representations of the face in Japanese art and in the European genre of 
portraiture; to representations in literature where, especially in the novel form, detailed descriptions 
of faces are frequent; to celebrations of the face in song (‘I’ve Just Seen a Face’, ‘Baby Face’, 
‘You’re Beautiful’, ‘The First Time Ever I Saw your Face’ etc). In films and television programmes 
close-ups linger on faces,  and the faces of famous stars are instantly,  globally recognisable.  In 
advertisements, joyful or amazed faces are used to advertise all manner of products. In the houses of 
Earth people photographs of family members’ faces are often on display, and many people carry 
photos of loved ones’ faces around in their wallets. Would-be daters post pictures of their faces on 
dating websites. 
The extra-terrestrial would note that no other part of the body is so frequently on display, 
and would conclude that the face must be of special significance to human beings: that covering it 
up is different in important ways from covering other parts of the body. And the extra-terrestrial 
would be right. 
The face occupies a special, transcultural importance in human society in a number of key 
ways. Emmanuel Levinas states, in  Totality and Infinity, that ethics begins with the face-to-face 
encounter: ‘the onset of the other, as the expression of the face... opens a “me” to goodness’ (Bergo, 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,  Fall 2017). Levinas’s is a phenomenological account which 
I do not follow here; but a similar conclusion can be reached through a more scientific approach. 
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The face is far more significant for human beings than for other species. Other animals focus 
on the face to a much lesser extent or not at all. A peahen is  more interested in looking at the tail 
than the face of a peacock. Dogs are more interested in scent than in visual appearance of any kind. 
It  is  only among the primates  that  the face is  important,  and among primates  none have such 
expressive, mobile, distinctive faces as humans, or rely on them so heavily for communication. 
Human babies learn to recognise faces early in life.  Research by Michelle de Haan and 
Charles  A.  Nelson  quotes  studies  which  suggest  that  infants  can  recognise  the  mother’s  face 
‘shortly after birth’ (1997: 187). The research paper, ‘Recognition of the Mother’s Face by Six-
Month-Old  Infants:  A Neurobehavioural  Study’ recorded  ERP  (event-related  potentials  –  i.e. 
‘transient changes in the brain’s electrical activity’) when infants were shown videos of the faces of 
their  mother’s  faces  and  those  of  strangers;  the  results  showed  that  the  infants  distinguished 
between the mother’s face and strangers’ faces, but perceptual analysis took slightly longer when 
the face of the stranger was similar to the mother’s (1997: 209).
There is a whole region of the brain devoted to face recognition, the fusiform face area 
(Kanwisher et al 1997). It is so good at its job that it often causes us to see faces in places where 
they are  not:  clouds,  tree bark,  pizzas etc.  This  in  itself  tells  us  that  there must  be something 
important to us about other people’s faces: so complex and costly a mechanism would not evolve 
without a pay-off, although it is still unclear exactly when this mechanism evolved or what specific 
selection pressures led to its evolution (Burke and Sulikowski, 2013).
1.2 Why the human face is important: identification and communication
There are at least two reasons why the face is so important. One is that it is the swiftest and most 
reliable means of identifying a person. Except for the faces of identical twins, each human face is 
unique. Identifying other individuals is vital for a species as social and as complex as homo sapiens. 
A glance at another’s face is enough to fix them in your social world: are they family? Friends? 
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Enemies? Strangers?  Before a word has been spoken you know your relationship with them, what 
duties you owe them or they owe you, and what kind of treatment you can expect from them or they 
from you. 
Second, faces express emotions. Darwin theorised in  The Expression of Emotions in Man  
and  Animals  ([1872]1965)  that  the  most  basic  human  expressions  are  universal,  and  many 
subsequent studies have supported the theory (Ekman 2015). It  is true that  some have disputed 
Darwin’s theory;  the psychologist Lisa Feldman-Barrett has argued that facial expressions are not 
universal  but  depend  for  their  meaning  on  contextual  clues  and  thus  are  culturally  dependent 
(2014). Even if Feldman-Barrett’s objection holds up, however – and it is disputed by Ekman and 
others (2014) –  it  would remain true that facial expressions convey emotions in given cultural 
contexts.  
A glance at another’s face tells you not merely who they are and what their relationship is to 
you, but also tells you what mood they are in and what you can expect from them, or what is 
expected from you. For social  animals like ourselves,  recognising the emotions of others,  (and 
being able to express our own emotions knowing they will  be understood) is vital.  Seeing that 
someone is angry gives us a cue as to how to respond; we might get ready to defend ourselves, or 
hasten to mollify them. Seeing that someone is sad or in pain might make us want to alleviate their 
suffering; being able to convey our own sadness or pain might call forth much-needed help for 
ourselves. It has been found that facial expressions are the most effective triggers to empathy – far 
more effective than speech. Facial mirroring – imitating the expression of the face of the person 
before you – is often used unconsciously to convey empathy, triggered by mirror neurons in the 
brain (Iacoboni 2008). 
The face, then, clearly signals to us that other people have emotions, needs, interests.  Ethics 
necessarily involves paying due attention to the emotions, needs and interests of others. If this is 
granted, then Levinas is at least partially right when he says that ethics begins when we look into 
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another’s face. Contemplation of another’s face can tell us what they are thinking and feeling, and 
this can be a trigger for ethical  impulses.  It  is  for this reason that  charitable organisations use 
photographs of the faces of starving, sick or otherwise suffering individuals, especially children, in 
their appeals for donations. 
The face is not the only trigger to ethical impulses. The voice is another. But the voice is not 
normally an alternative to the face as a signifier. They normally work in concert. And if there is a 
discrepancy between them – if the voice utters cheerful words while the face looks in pain – it is 
generally the face we trust. 
Moreover, the face is a constant signifier, always there to be looked at, not turned on and off 
like the voice. Thus the face can reveal not just static emotions but a continuous play of them. In 
social  intercourse with another person we are able to  monitor  their  facial  expressions,  whether 
consciously,  semi-consciously  or  unconsciously,  and  can  update  and  modify  our  own  speech, 
behaviour and facial expressions accordingly. This facility makes it possible for face-to-face ethical 
behaviour to be fine-tuned as one goes along. (Of course the face is helpful in this way not just for 
good ethical impulses but for bad ones too, from teasing to torture.) 
Faces  communicate  not  only  emotions  but  also  age,  health  and  well-being.  It  is  often 
possible to tell from a glance at someone’s face that they are tired or unwell. This, too, acts as a 
trigger for ethical impulses.
But the face’s role in ethics is not merely that of a trigger. It is worth noting that humans 
have extraordinarily good memories for faces. We easily conjure up faces in the imagination or in 
dreams. Nor do most people have difficulty recognising a face they have seen before, even if only 
fleetingly, though recalling the name that goes with it tends to be harder. (Lack of facility in this 
area is noteworthy enough to merit a medical name: prosopagnosia: see McNeil and Warrington 
1993:  1-10).  The  face’s  role  in  ethics  is  thus  not  confined  to  face-to-face  encounters.  The 
recollection of someone’s face helps to mark them out as an individual, a subject and the object of 
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ethical impulses. 
I do not claim that we can only behave ethically towards people whose faces we have seen. 
But it  is  plausible  to  suggest  that  our life’s  experience of having recognised and responded to 
thoughts and feelings expressed in others’ faces gives us the understanding, empathy and motivation 
to treat unseen others as deserving recipients of ethical consideration. We attribute faces to them, 
one might say. It seems far less plausible that a lifetime’s experience of having recognised and 
responded to thoughts and feelings expressed in others’ faces has nothing at  all to do with our 
ethical consideration of unseen others. 
For these reasons, covering one’s face in public on a habitual basis is very different indeed 
from covering one’s feet, hair, or any other body part.
1.3 Three qualifications
There are three qualifications to add. The first is that neither identification nor gauging of emotion 
by the face is guaranteed to be reliable. ‘There’s no art/ To find the mind’s construction in the face,’ 
says King Duncan in Macbeth (Shakespeare [c. 1606] 1987: 1002), and it is true that one can look 
friendly while harbouring hostile thoughts, or interested while bored, etc. It  is even possible to 
disguise one’s face and pass for someone else, as shown by the existence of actors and impostors. 
Still, such deceptions would not be possible if the face were not usually a reliable guide. And an 
alert face-reader can often detect dissembling. 
The  second  qualification  is  that  the  face  is  not  the  sole  means  of  identification,  or  of 
conveying feelings and thoughts. This can also be achieved very efficiently through speech. Blind 
people,  after  all,  succeed in  identifying people and do not  have emotionally stunted lives,  nor, 
clearly, are they incapable of ethics. We are able to conduct satisfactory telephone conversations 
without (usually) being deceived or puzzled about the identity of the caller, nor do we (usually) find 
ourselves in doubt about the emotional state of the person at the other end. 
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Nevertheless, blindness is  not optimal either for recognising others,  or for gauging their 
emotions. While it is possible to convey and detect great subtlety in speech, from word-choice, 
intonation,  stress  and  so  on,  communication  would  nearly  always  be  enhanced  by  facial 
expressions. Indeed it is noticeable that blind people use a range of facial expressions themselves, 
which convey information to a sighted audience. Presumably this would not be the case if everyone 
was blind, i.e. if we were a blind species. Then faces and facial expressions would not be of the 
smallest importance. But then we would have evolved very differently and our cultures would have 
developed very differently, and the extra-terrestrial would carry home a very different report. 
Finally, it is also true that, as much as would be lost by habitual public face-covering, there 
might be compensatory advantages for the individual. They might prefer not to be stared at; they 
might prefer not to be judged on their looks or to attract unwanted sexual attention. If an individual 
decided for these reasons to habitually cover their face in public, however, they would disadvantage 
themselves in certain important respects, and would be likely to inconvenience other people. That is 
not to justify a ban, but to reiterate the point that habitual public covering of the face is a highly 
significant act with consequences for the self and others. 
1.4 More than a sartorial issue 
Clearly it is disingenuous of opponents of anti-face-covering laws to claim that it is all a lot of fuss 
about how people dress, an excessive reaction to ‘a piece of cloth’. It is not a sartorial issue. This 
can be seen if we imagine that concealing the face could be achieved by some other means than 
covering  it  with  material.  Suppose  there  were  some  kind  of  scrambling  device  that  caused  a 
shimmering haze to hover in front of a person’s face (without impeding their vision), so that others 
could not identify them or make out any facial expression. This would raise exactly the same issues 
as face-covering by means of clothing. 
If a person were forced to cover their face in public at all times that would be a serious 
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harm.  I  argue  this  in  some detail  in  Chapter  Eleven.  At  this  point  I  note  that  it  would  cause 
difficulties in communicating emotions and state of mind, making it impossible, for example, to 
smile at others; and it would inhibit empathy from those around, causing the facially covered person 
to be overlooked and unconsidered, leading to social isolation. It hardly needs to be said that a 
liberal would be strongly against coercing somebody to cover up in this way. But voluntary facial 
covering is a different matter. 
Two  thought  experiments  below  aim  to  explore  how  the  liberal  state  should  react  to 
voluntary face-covering by citizens. I have stripped the scenarios of all cultural or religious context, 
to identify what the liberal response should be to the practice per se.
1.5  Thought experiment 1: the lone face-coverer 
              Suppose that  there were no such thing as the burqa; no religious or cultural  custom of women 
covering their  faces in public.  Now suppose that  an individual  person (their  sex is  immaterial) 
decided to wear, habitually, a garment that completely covered their face. Their reasons for doing so 
do not matter. Perhaps as suggested above they do not like being stared at or judged on their looks; 
perhaps they are morbidly sensitive about their appearance; perhaps they wish to cultivate an aura 
of mystique. But in this thought-experiment there is no culture or tradition within which such a 
practice is normal. It is simply the personal preference of an individual (we will refer to them as the 
Lone Face-Coverer). How should a liberal state respond?
There does not seem to be any prima facie reason why a liberal state should respond at all. 
Liberals generally oppose restricting the liberty of individuals unless their actions are demonstrably 
harmful to others. It is not clear how the Lone Face-Coverer is harming anybody else by concealing 
their face. They might make others feel puzzled, frustrated or uncomfortable: but such transient 
feelings can hardly be characterised as harm. Perhaps some people might object that not being able 
to see the face-coverers’ face caused offence; and indeed as I argue in Chapter Ten, following Joel 
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Feinberg (1985),  there  are  occasions when prevention of  offence would be a  legitimate  liberal 
reason for banning a practice. However, the offence in this case seems neither severe, persistent or 
inescapable enough to justify a ban (a conclusion argued for in greater detail in Chapter Ten). 
More seriously, the Lone Face-Coverer would disadvantage themselves. They would be cut 
off from a great many normal social interactions, unable to communicate through facial expressions 
and therefore more likely to be overlooked and ignored. Certainly, as claimed above, if one were 
forced to cover one’s face at all times in public that would be a serious harm. But this is not the case 
with the Lone Face-Coverer, who has chosen voluntarily to cover their face. Liberals are suspicious 
of paternalist policies, and though I will argue in Chapter Five for a Liberal Paternalist Principle, 
which permits intervention where restriction of liberty is small and the benefits great, this would not 
seem to be a case for it. Banning someone from covering their face, which would affect how they 
appear  in  public  all  the  time,  is  a  large  restriction  of  liberty.  Their  behaviour  would  certainly 
disadvantage them, but it is not life-threatening or health-destroying, and it is not irrevocable. The 
Lone Face-Coverer could uncover whenever they liked. The liberal state therefore would not have 
any reason, either from the Harm Principle, the Offence Principle or from paternalism, to prevent 
the Lone Face-Coverer from covering their face. 
Habitual  public  face-covering  could,  however,  cause  inconvenience  to  others  on  certain 
occasions. There might be situations where for reasons of security, identification or communication, 
the Lone Face-Coverer would be requested to temporarily uncover. Banks, for example, have rules 
requiring customers to remove motorcycle-helmets as a precaution against  robbery. If the Lone 
Face-Coverer was requested to unmask and refused to do so, the liberal state should support the 
right of the bank to see its customers’ faces in the interests of security, against the right of the 
customer to stay masked. Requiring unmasking in such a case is not treating the Lone Face-Coverer 
unfairly. They would be following the same rule as everybody else. Moreover, the rule is clearly 
there  for  a  sensible  reason.  The  Lone  Face-Coverer  has  no  reason of  their  own,  other  than  a 
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personal preference, to demand an exemption. And personal preference is not a good enough reason 
for exemption from a rule. If it were, then the very idea of having rules would be imperilled.
Matters would be different if the Lone Face-Coverer could offer a substantive reason for 
exemption,  based on some relevant  fact  about  their  personal  circumstances.  If  the  Lone Face-
Coverer had severe scarring or a facial disfigurement which they were too self-conscious to expose 
in public, that could justify special treatment, and some other means of identification could be used. 
There  would  be  a  reasonable  case  for  exemption  based  on  Unequal  Impact;  the  rule  about 
uncovering would impact more harshly on this person than on others, for a reason over which they 
had no control.  Even then it  is  by no means clear that  the bank would be  obliged to grant an 
exemption. Other factors would need to be weighed. Allowing the Lone Face-Coverer to frequent 
the bank with their face covered could open the way to others imitating the Lone Face-Coverer, and 
entering the bank unchallenged with the intent to rob it. 
Parallel considerations apply for other institutions where security, identity or communication 
are important, such as law courts, airports, hospitals, schools and so on. The liberal state, therefore, 
would support the right of institutions to require temporary unmasking, (absent legitimate claims 
for exemption, which would have to be weighed on a case-by-case basis).  Apart from that, the 
liberal state has no reason to concern itself if an individual citizen wishes to cover their face while 
going about their daily business. The existence of the Lone Face-Coverer would provide no liberal 
justification for a general ban on public face-covering. 
1.6 Thought experiment 2: the face-coverers
                   Let us now imagine that the example of the Lone Face-Coverer catches on. Soon there are hundreds 
or thousands, or tens of thousands of Face-Coverers.  Let us assume there is still no religious motive 
for  covering  up.  The  Face-Coverers  do  it  from  personal  preference.  Perhaps  it  is  a  fashion 
statement. They include men and women in equal numbers. Is there any call now for the liberal 
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state to intervene? 
The Face-Coverers would face all the same problems as the Lone Face-Coverers, with two 
additional ones. First, the Face-Coverers would experience difficulty in recognising  one another, 
and in gauging each others’ emotional states. Thus communication, and hence some forms of ethical 
behaviour, among the Face-Coverers themselves would be hampered. Second, the Face-Coverers 
would be likely to  encounter greater  suspicion and mistrust  from the  unmasked portion of  the 
population than the Lone Face-Coverer did. 
This brings us to the effect on others. The same problems arise for others as they did for the 
Lone Face-Coverer, but they would be multiplied by the number of people covering up. Concerns 
about security would be greater. Nor would those concerns be irrational; for the greater the number 
of  people  who were  masked,  the  greater  the  likelihood that  one  or  some of  them could  have 
nefarious  intent.  Moreover  the  existence  of  the  Face-Coverers  would  make  it  possible  for 
opportunists  to imitate the Face-Coverers in order to commit crimes. 
How should the liberal state respond? First, we can continue to rule out a ban on paternalist 
grounds. The disadvantages of face-covering are still not so great as to justify the major restriction 
on liberty of forcing someone to uncover. As before, such disadvantages are neither permanent nor 
irrevocable. If any of the Face-Coverers find their regime too personally disadvantageous, then they 
can always make the decision themselves to give it up. 
But could a ban be justified on grounds of preventing harm to others? Not on the grounds of 
feelings of annoyance, mistrust or insecurity that unmasked people might have. Negative feelings 
do not qualify as harms. And although I  shall  later argue (Chapter Ten) that  the prevention of 
serious, intense and prolonged offence could be a good reason for a liberal state to ban a practice, 
the transient annoyance or mistrust occasioned by passing a facially-covered person in the street 
does not qualify as serious offence. One can dislike or disapprove of facial covering, of course. But 
disliking or disapproving of someone else’s behaviour or lifestyle gives liberals no right to suppress 
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it. 
But suppose the existence of the Face-Coverers led to an increase in serious crimes. Then a 
ban might be justified. It would depend on how events played out. If it turned out to be the case that 
the  existence  of  the  Face-Coverers  led  to  a  marked  increase  in  robberies,  assaults,  rapes  and 
murders by masked criminals (whether by the regular Face-Coverers themselves or by impostors), 
and if that increase could be definitely linked to the practice of face-covering, then there would be 
solid  grounds for a ban. This would be hard on the law-abiding portion of the Face-Coverers. Their 
contribution  to  the  crime-rise  would  be  unwitting.  Nevertheless  a  ban  would  be  justified,  as 
preventing much greater harms than not being able to satisfy the preference to cover one's face in 
public (the arguments for this conclusion are presented in detail in Chapter Eleven) . 
Whether there would actually be any such crime-rise is an empirical question. In the absence 
of a crime-rise a liberal state would seem to have no grounds for a ban. As before, though, the 
liberal state should still support the right of institutions to require temporary uncovering of the face 
for reasons of security, identification or communication. 
2. A Question of Technology
It might be that technological innovations would make the need for such temporary uncoverings 
less frequent. Technologies such as iris-recognition, voice-recognition,  etc,  could be used in some 
cases where identification was required. A liberal state should not support the right of institutions to 
require temporary unmasking for the sake of it,  when other, equally efficacious and convenient 
methods of confirming identity, ensuring security or allowing communication were available. But 
they would need to be equally efficacious and convenient. That would have to be judged on a case-
by-case basis. 
Here is  a  final  dilemma to consider.  Imagine that  a new kind of  X-ray spectacles were 
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invented, which allowed wearers to see straight through any facial coverings (to avoid red herrings 
about inappropriate use, let us also suppose that the spectacles come equipped with a block which 
prevents the wearer from ogling other parts of the body). In this case, officials in banks, courts, 
airports, schools, and so on would not require temporary unmasking. The officials could wear the 
new X-ray spectacles. Indeed, perhaps everyone could wear them, not just officials. Would that 
solve all the problems? Or is that a violation of the rights of the Face-Coverers? 
Let  us  distinguish  between  a)  officials  wearing  the  x-ray  spectacles  and  b)  ordinary 
individuals wearing them. Officials who wore them would be doing so to enable them to carry out 
their job, with its requirements of being able to identify and/or communicate with the public. That is 
a legitimate reason, which ought to outweigh personal preferences. The x-ray spectacles would 
simply be a substitute for requiring temporary unmasking (which a liberal state would support), and 
one might think a more acceptable form for the Face-Coverers (they do not have the inconvenience 
of doffing and re-donning their burqas, and no one but designated officials can see their faces). 
When we turn to b), the case is different. Ordinary members of the public who wore the x-
ray-spectacles just because they were frustrated at not being able to see the Face-Coverers’ faces 
would be doing so from personal preference. But the Face-Coverers too want to exercise a personal 
preference: not to have their faces looked at. If we weigh the two preferences against each other, the 
preference of the Face-Coverers should win out. A Face-Coverer’s face does, after all, belong to 
them. If they do not like being stared at, or judged on their looks, or attracting unwanted sexual 
attention, or if they have any other reason for covering that seems good to them, that is their own 
affair.  For  a  non-official  to  use  x-ray  spectacles  to  see  a  Face-Coverer’s  face,  simply  from 
preference, is an unwarrantable invasion of privacy. We might think that the Face-Coverers have an 
extreme notion of privacy, but then it is their privacy, not ours. 
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3. Summary of the Liberal Position on Face-Covering per se
                   To sum up: a liberal state should support the right of individuals to cover their face in public from 
personal preference; with two provisos. 
One,  that  in  cases  where  institutions  asked  for  temporary  unmasking,  for  reasons  of 
identification,  security  or  communication,  the  liberal  state  should  support  the  right  of  those 
institutions to require it  (absent any sound reason for exemption, with personal  preference not 
counting as a sound reason). 
Two, if it should turn out to be the case that face-covering became widespread enough to 
facilitate a rise in anonymous actions which caused serious harms, then a liberal state would be 
justified in banning it. But the justification for the ban would be to remove the harms, not based on 
any objection in principle to face-covering. 
None of this is to suggest that liberals would or should like or approve of habitual 
voluntary face-covering. They are free to dislike and disapprove of it and to say so. But they must 
tolerate it  (with the provisos above) because that  is  what being a liberal  entails.  This position, 
arrived at without any consideration of religious or cultural  issues,  turns out to be the same in 
essentials  as  that  argued  for  by  Russell  Blackford  in  the  case  of  burqa-wearing,  in  Freedom, 
Religion and the Secular State (2012).  
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CHAPTER FOUR
WHAT KIND OF LIBERALISM?
The Argument 
In this chapter I aim to establish three main points. 
First, that there are two main types of liberal theory, best thought of as opposite ends of a 
spectrum,  rather  than  two  sides  of  a  dichotomy:  the  types  being  Political  Liberalism  and 
Perfectionist Liberalism. 
Second, that both types of liberal state could theoretically be justified in banning the burqa 
on the grounds of preventing negative impact on others. This is not to argue that either type of 
liberal state would be so justified. That would depend on whether there was any negative impact, 
and if there was, on its severity and extent. 
Third, that a perfectionist state (or one towards the perfectionist end of the spectrum) could 
theoretically be justified in banning the burqa on paternalist grounds. No such justification is open 
to a political liberal state. 
1. The  Liberalism of John Stuart Mill
One of the most influential of liberalism’s founding texts is John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, published 
in  1859.  Mill  is  commonly regarded as  a  perfectionist  liberal  (Donatelli  2006).  However,  On 
Liberty  contains elements of both types of theory. Mill argues, on the one hand, that ‘[t]here is a 
limit to the legitimate interference with collective independence’ ([1859] 2005: 7; my italics); and 
again that
the sole end for which mankind are  warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
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action of  one of their  number is self-protection. That the only purpose for  which power can  rightfully be 
exercised over a member of a civilised community, is to prevent harm to others.
([1859] 2005: 13; my italics)
These principles are based on what is just or rightful, not on the likely beneficial effects to follow if 
they were put into practice, and thus form the basis for a theory of political liberalism. 
Mill does also believe that putting these principles into practice would lead to beneficial 
consequences for individuals and for society. His argument in favour of freedom of thought and 
expression is based on the claim that allowing heterodox opinions to be published gives people ‘the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth’, should a heterodox opinion be right; and, should it be 
false, gives them the benefit of ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by 
its collision with error’ ([1859] 2005: 21). Moreover, a society in which not only diverse opinions 
but diverse modes of life are permitted allows every individual to develop in their own way, which 
is desirable because
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a 
tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces 
which make it a living thing.
(Mill [1859] 2005: 72). 
And again: 
It is not by wearing down into uniformity, but by cultivating and calling it forth... that human beings become a 
noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by 
the same process human life becomes rich, diversified, and animating.
(Mill [1859] 2005: 76). 
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This emphasis on the beneficial effects of liberty, according to a comprehensive idea of what is 
good – the ideal of individualism – could form the basis for a theory of liberal perfectionism. 
Mill himself, however, did not see these two elements of his theory as potential rivals, nor 
distinguish between them. The one was a natural and inevitable consequence of the other: allow 
everyone as much freedom as is just, and a diverse society of fully realised individuals with rich 
existences follows. Subsequently, however, the two elements have diverged, and developed into the 
competing theories of political liberalism and perfectionist liberalism.
2. Political Liberalism
2.1 The political liberalism of John Rawls
The fullest account of political liberalism is given by John Rawls in his book Political Liberalism 
(2005). Political liberalism is an attempt to answer the question: 
how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain 
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?
(Rawls 2005: 4)
This encapsulates three essential ideas of political liberalism: i) Society is to be ‘just and stable’; ii)  
Citizens are to be ‘free and equal’; and iii) pluralism of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is to be 
tolerated. 
Together  these  three  ideas  commit  political  liberalism  (PL)  to  neutrality regarding 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The  politically liberal state must make no attempt to favour 
one reasonable comprehensive doctrine over another. 
What  counts  as  a  reasonable  comprehensive  doctrine  is  crucial  in  determining how the 
political  liberal  responds  to  the  practice  of  burqa-wearing,  and  so  the  term  repays  closer 
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examination.  The  words   reasonable  and  comprehensive play  different  roles.  Comprehensive  
(meaning covering every aspect of life in a unified, interrelated system of values and beliefs) is not 
an entrance requirement for tolerance. It is a permission. The claim is that  even if a doctrine is 
comprehensive it is eligible for tolerance. This sets the bar high, for competing doctrines which are 
comprehensive are likely to disagree at more points, and more fundamentally, than those which are 
not comprehensive. If reasonable comprehensive doctrines are to be tolerated, then reasonable non-
comprehensive doctrines – those which are composed of an unsystematic patchwork of values – 
are to be tolerated a fortiori. That non-comprehensive doctrines are not excluded from tolerance is 
made clear by Rawls’ own model case of an overlapping consensus, in which one of the three 
parties to the consensus is not comprehensive: it is
not  systematically  unified:  besides  the  political  values  formulated  by  freestanding  political  conception  of 
justice, it includes a large family of non-political values. It is a pluralist view...
(Rawls 2005: 145).  
The  term  reasonable,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  entry  requirement.  Only  doctrines  which  are 
reasonable merit tolerance. Rawls identifies a comprehensive doctrine as reasonable if it has three 
features: it is an exercise of theoretical reason, i.e. it is a coherent system of compatible values 
covering the major aspects of human life; it is an exercise of practical reason, in that it provides the 
wherewithal for singling out and balancing values in cases of conflict; and it is based on a tradition 
of thought, evolving only slowly (Rawls 2005: 59).  
Two points need to be made. The first is that of these three features, only the first two are 
prescriptive.  Doctrines have to be exercises of theoretical  and practical  reason, or they are  not 
reasonable. But the third feature is descriptive. A reasonable comprehensive doctrine ‘tends to’  
evolve slowly (Rawls 2005: 59, my italics), but it is not necessary for its reasonableness that it do 
so. Moreover non-comprehensive doctrines may not be based on established traditions of thought at 
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all, and may spring into being and develop rapidly, yet still be reasonable. 
The  second  point  is  that  Rawls’ definition  here  says  nothing  about  the  content of  the 
doctrine.  However,  a  crucial  limitation on content  is  entailed  by  Rawls’ requirement  that  such 
doctrines be held by reasonable persons; that is, by those who 
desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can co-operate with others on terms all 
can accept 
(2005: 50). 
This entails a commitment to reciprocity: reasonable persons ‘insist that reciprocity should hold 
within  that  world  so  that  each  benefits  along with  others’ (Rawls  2005:  50).   The  reciprocity 
requirement rules out doctrines held by those who consider certain others to be natural inferiors, 
whose interests can be given less or no weight. It would rule out a doctrine which endorsed slavery, 
for example; and it would rule out a doctrine which held that women’s interests count for less or are 
more easily set aside than those of men. 
The question is how competing reasonable comprehensive views can co-exist in a society 
that remains just and stable, and in which citizens remain free and equal. The first stage of the 
answer is that each comprehensive view is to be guaranteed tolerance by the politically liberal state, 
but not enforced. To take Rawls’ own example (2005: 138), it is reasonable, in his sense of the term, 
to hold the principle of extra ecclesiam nulla salus (outside the church there is no salvation), and 
the liberal state would intervene to prevent persecution or discrimination against those who profess 
that belief. But the liberal state must not enforce that belief (by fining people for not attending 
church, for instance). For it  is equally reasonable to disbelieve it.  As Rawls notes, declining to 
enforce such a belief does not mean the liberal state denies its truth (2005: 138). It should express 
no view on the matter. The point is that it would be unreasonable to enforce truth-claims on which 
reasonable people disagree. 
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2.2 The overlapping consensus
That is only the first part of the answer to Rawls’ question. State-enforced tolerance is a  modus 
vivendi,  but not necessarily a stable one. The competing parties have as yet no reason to refrain 
from imposing their own doctrine on the others if they had the power to do so. Rawls’ answer to this 
is that over time an overlapping consensus can and should develop, via the intermediate stage of a 
political  consensus.  In other words,  each competing party will  go beyond merely submitting to 
state-enforced  tolerance  and  will  come  to  endorse  and  feel  allegiance  to  a  liberal  political 
conception of justice, one that lies outside their own comprehensive doctrine and under which all 
citizens  are  treated  as  reasonable,  free  and  equal  (Rawls’ favoured  candidate  for  this  role  is, 
naturally enough, his own conception of justice as fairness). Rawls’s contention is that ‘[g]radually, 
as the success of political cooperation continues, citizens gain increasing confidence and trust in 
one another’ (2005: 168); and thus the overlapping consensus is formed.
The overlapping consensus (OC) is not  merely a  convergence  of doctrines, like a central 
Lego block,  to  which  different-coloured bricks could be  attached from different  sides,  without 
actually touching each other. Although parties to the OC may each hold comprehensive doctrines 
which are in competition with one another, they must also share reasons for accepting a consensus 
based on principles of justice that treat all citizens as fair, reasonable and equal. This sharing of 
reasons is why the consensus is overlapping; it is not an assemblage of non-touching  Lego bricks, 
but the sweet spot of a Venn diagram. 
There are other views of the type of consensus necessary for a liberal polity. Gerald Gaus 
and Richard Vallier argue for a convergent consensus, where signatories need not share any of the 
same reasons, but need only have mutually intelligible reasons (Gaus and  Vallier, 2009). Thus, 
some people might sign up to the consensus as card-carrying political liberals; others might sign up 
because they have religious authority for the belief that there should be no compulsion in religion 
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(Koran 2:256, trans. Arberry 2008); still others might sign up simply because, having had cause to 
cooperate with those holding conflicting doctrines, they have developed goodwill towards them, 
and have no wish to suppress the sincere if wrong-headed doctrines of their friends. These reasons 
would be mutually intelligible, but no one reason unites all three parties. And in this case there is no 
clash  between the  reasons.  They simply  do  not  touch.  However,  I  think  it  can  be  shown that 
intelligibility is not a satisfactory criterion and that mere convergence is not enough for a stable 
liberal polity. 
 Let us imagine a person, or group – let us call them the Give-’Em-Enough-Rope Tendency 
– joining the OC because they believe that it allows unbelievers to persist in their unbelief and 
hence end up in hell,  which is  where they deserve to be.  1This emerges from a sincerely held 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine and supplies a firm reason for signing up to the OC. Moreover it 
is easily intelligible and leads to a convergent consensus. 
But it does not feel quite right that a group should join the convergent liberal consensus for 
such deeply illiberal reasons. Consider another version of the Give-’Em-Enough-Rope tendency, 
who locate their pay-off in this world rather than the next. Imagine an extreme sect accepting the 
OC for precisely the opposite reason to that urged by Rawls: they join the consensus not because 
they believe it makes society stable, but because they believe it makes it unstable. They are certain 
that a pluralist society carries within it the seeds of its own destruction. Therefore they embrace the 
OC with real enthusiasm, because it appears to guarantee that in the long run decadent pluralistic 
societies will collapse, riven by internal dissensions, and leave the way clear for the sect to establish 
their  theocracy.  Let  us  be clear  that  they do not  accept  the OC as a  faute  de  mieux;  they are 
convinced that it is the surest way, ultimately, to achieve the kind of society that their god wants, 
though that  might  not  happen in their  own lifetimes.  Again,  this  is  intelligible  and leads to  a 
convergence. But the reasons leading to that convergence are so divergent that it does not seem to 
1I am reminded of the story about an old-time Scottish hellfire preacher, who declaimed in a sermon: ‘And after death, 
the sinners and the unbelievers will be tormented in the sulphurous fires of hell, and they will cry out and say “Lord, 
Lord, we didnae ken!” And the Lord will reply: “Well, ye ken noo!”’
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qualify as a consensus.
The Rawlsian political liberal would urge that the entry requirement for the OC is that the 
comprehensive doctrines of joiners must  be held by  reasonable persons;  that  is,  by those who 
‘desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can co-operate with others 
on  terms  all  can  accept’  (Rawls,  2005:  50).  Neither  version  of  the  Give-’Em-Enough-Rope 
Tendency values a social world of free and equal citizens for its own sake. They value it only as a 
means  to  an  end.  The  reasons  one  joins  the  OC  do  matter,  after  all.  They  require  a  shared 
commitment to the ideal of a society of free and equal individuals.
Moreover,  when political  questions are deliberated in such a polity,  arguments advanced 
must appeal to what Rawls called public reason: that is to say, they offer reasons that ‘are reasons 
that reasonable persons as free and equal citizens, drawing on their favoured reasonable political 
conception of justice as well  as general  rules of enquiry and reasoning, sincerely believe other 
citizens will share as reasons from the point of view of free and equal citizenship’ (Watson and 
Hartley, 2018, p. 40). For example, suppose in deliberations about whether the burqa ought to be 
banned in public, one party contended that it should not be banned because that would override 
personal liberty of religion and expression, while another party to the debate agreed that it should 
not be banned, but for a different reason:  that woman ought not to be allowed out uncovered in 
public. Their views converge as far as the law goes, and are mutually intelligible. But only the first 
is a public reason, ie one which assumes and relies on a commitment to free and equal citizenship. 
The objection might be made that Rawls offers no evidence that his hope that many different 
doctrines would happen to agree on a liberal political conception of justice is warranted. Jurgen 
Habermas has critiqued Rawls on this point, arguing that he does not  provide a justification for his 
political conception of justice which shows that people ought to accept it (Habermas in Finlayson 
and Freyenhagen (eds.), 2011: 25-45).  
This dispute will be left in abeyance here. Jonathan Quong’s position, discussed in Section 6 
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below, seems to offer a way out of the difficulty. But whether a deeper justification for the OC is 
requisite or not, it is at any rate possible that an OC on a liberal political conception of justice could 
develop, and Rawls’s schema has empirical  evidence in its  favour.  There already exist  broadly 
liberal societies, such as Great Britain and the USA, in which religious and cultural groups holding 
radically conflicting doctrines seem content to co-exist and to accept the liberal political conception 
of justice which embraces them all. Such societies are only stable to the extent that there genuinely 
is an overlapping consensus, of course. It is always possible that groups within such societies may 
exploit the overlapping consensus as a stalking horse, pretending to sign up while seeking ways of 
overthrowing the liberal political conception of justice. Still, such societies appear to be holding up 
well so far; and Rawls’ view that people will eventually come to accept and endorse the political 
values of the state they live and breathe and work and socialise in does not seem psychologically or 
sociologically implausible on the face of it, even if no state in the world has yet realised the project 
completely. 
2.3 The priority of right over good 
Another key feature of PL is that it requires what Rawls terms ‘the priority of right’ over the good 
(2005: 173). This means that PL is concerned only with securing institutions and laws which are 
just. It must not try to impose or encourage lives which are good, because reasonable persons will 
disagree as to what counts as a good life.  As Jonathan Quong puts it: 
the state should make no judgements about the goodness of citizens’ lives. It should instead be concerned only 
with justice: with the just distribution of freedom, resources, and other advantages between citizens, ensuring 
that each is given a fair chance to develop and pursue his or her own conception of the good life.
(Quong  2011: 1)
This conception of liberalism sets a high value on pluralism. Indeed its purpose is to accommodate 
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pluralism. It is taken as axiomatic that there will be competing conceptions of the good and that it is 
not the place of the state to favour any one over any other. Below I shall argue that some idea of the 
good is necessary even to PL. But the goal of PL would be to keep that idea as thin as possible. 
2.4 Necessity of some form of harm principle 
Under PL each citizen would be at liberty to pursue their own conception of the good. But for this 
to be possible, the state would sometimes need to restrict liberty to prevent harm to others. This was 
expressed by Mill in a formulation which has come to be called the Harm Principle:
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others 
(Mill [1859] 2005: 13). 
The Harm Principle is a limiting principle. It delimits the area of justification according to which a 
government may intervene to restrict the liberty of citizens. As Richard Vernon notes, ‘Mill’s stress 
falls heavily on the exclusive aspect of his statement – we cannot impose legislation on you for your 
own good’ (1996:625).  Moreover, not every case of harm would justify state intervention. As Mill 
says: 
[I]t must by no mean be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others can 
alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases 
and individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to 
others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining.
(Mill [1859] 2005: 114-115)
So harm is not in itself a criterion for when the state may intervene and when it may not. Not all 
cases of harm justify intervention. The point is that whenever state intervention to restrict liberty is 
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justified, it can only be on the grounds of preventing harm to others. 
Rawls claims that Mill’s liberalism is comprehensive: it urges a comprehensive view of the 
good life, one of individuality (Rawls 2005:  375n). Mill is thus a Comprehensive Liberal. But he 
does not advocate that the state should actively seek to promote individualism. His Harm Principle 
is a principle of pure Political Liberalism. Mill states:
[A person’s] own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant [for exercising power over that 
person against their will]. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to 
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others it would be wise or even right
(Mill [1859] 2005: 13)
This  would  prevent  the  state’s  attempting  to  coerce  citizens  into  the  individuality  which  Mill 
himself  so prizes.  It  is  a cast-iron prohibition against  imposing any comprehensive doctrine on 
anyone. PL requires such a principle. For without some form of harm principle, pluralism would not 
be possible. A political liberal need not use the term ‘Harm Principle’ (as Rawls does not); perhaps 
they would say that the requirement of a just distribution of freedom does all the necessary work. 
For if my freedom includes the freedom to harm you, that lessens the amount of freedom available 
to  you;  which  is  unjust.  Or  perhaps  they  would  say  that  the  requirement  that  comprehensive 
doctrines be reasonable would rule out comprehensive doctrines which caused harm to others. For 
if my doctrine entitles me to harm you, while not granting you the same entitlement against me, 
then it offends against the principle of reciprocity; which is unreasonable. 
In any case, the recognition that preventing harm to others is a legitimate reason for the 
exercise of state power state takes care of two essential concerns of PL: my freedom to pursue my 
conception of the good life must not be allowed to prevent you pursuing your conception of the 
good life; and I must not interfere with your freedom to pursue your conception of the good life, 
unless it prevents me pursuing mine. 
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 Mill’s formulation of his principle, however, requires modification. He says that preventing 
harm to others is the  only  rightful reason for the exercise of state power, which is unnecessarily 
limiting even by his own lights. In Chapter V of On Liberty Mill states:
[T]here are many acts which, being injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted 
but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners and, coming thus within the category of offences 
against others, may rightly be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency...
([1859] 2005: 119)
This suggests that preventing offence to others, as well as harm, may also be a legitimate reason for 
the exercise of state power. Mill also appears to countenance soft paternalism when he says that it 
would be justifiable to forcibly prevent someone crossing a bridge which they did not know to be 
unsafe (2005: 117). A pure Political Liberal would be reluctant to countenance paternalism, but (as I 
argue in the next chapter) it is not so easy to rule out tout court. Given that (as argued below) there 
is  a  continuum between PL and perfectionism,  a  more  open and flexible  version of  the  Harm 
Principle would be useful, such as the one put forward by Joel Feinberg: 
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing 
(eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is 
probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values.
(1985: 26)
This principle is less restrictive than Mill’s in that it does not make preventing harm the sole reason 
for penal legislation which would restrict the liberty of the individual. This formulation of the 
principle also makes explicit that if there are other equally effective means available to prevent 
harm, they should be preferred to penal legislation. The principle in this form is acceptable to both 
political liberals and perfectionists and it is the formulation I employ when considering the issue of 
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harm to others in Chapter Eleven. 
3. Political Liberalism and the Burqa
How then would PL respond to the practice of burqa-wearing? 
The first point to note, or to reiterate, is that PL could not countenance compulsory burqa-
wearing. If a  woman is compelled by her husband or relatives to cover her face in public, against 
her will, then she is neither free, nor equal with her male relatives. Nor could a comprehensive 
doctrine which stated that women, but not men, must have their faces and bodies covered in public 
(whether  they like  it  or  not)  be  termed reasonable.  Coerced burqa-wearing  is  a  harm.  Forcing 
someone to cover her face infringes her liberty, makes her socially isolated,  shuts down career 
opportunities, causes physical discomfort, may lead to Vitamin D deficiency and associated health 
problems, etc etc. The politically liberal state would have a clear warrant and duty to put a stop to 
coerced burqa-wearing. 
With voluntary burqa-wearing, however, the picture looks different. If the politically liberal 
state has a duty to intervene when a woman is forced to cover up, it has a duty, at least prima facie, 
not to intervene when she chooses to cover up. The same principle is at stake. Citizens should be 
allowed to pursue their own conception of the good. The politically liberal state is not there to 
enforce or encourage any one conception of the good above others. It must allow citizens to make 
their own choice about that. The political liberal must support the right of any woman to wear a 
burqa of her own free will. Unless the practice causes harms to others. This proviso will be looked 
at in detail in Chapter Eleven. The point to note here is that PL could  only  support banning the 
voluntary wearing of the burqa on grounds of a harm principle. Whether it actually does cause harm 
to others, and whether a legal ban supported by penalties would be the best  means of reducing or 
eliminating the harm, are empirical questions. 
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4. Perfectionist Liberalism 
4.1 The doctrine of perfectionism 
The  major  alternative  within  the  tradition  of  liberalism  to  Political  Liberalism is  Perfectionist 
Liberalism. Perfectionism is a moral theory, or perhaps tradition, found in Plato and Aristotle and 
running through Kant, Hegel and Marx, to contemporary writers such as Joseph Raz and Thomas 
Hurka. According to Hurka  perfectionism is a moral theory that: 
starts from an account of the good human life, or the intrinsically desirable life. And it characterizes this life in 
a distinctive way. Certain properties, it says, constitute human nature or are definitive of humanity—they make 
humans humans. The good life, it then says, develops these properties to a high degree or realizes what is 
central to human nature. Different versions of the theory may disagree about what the relevant properties are 
and so disagree about the content of the good life. But they share the foundational idea that what is good, 
ultimately, is the development of human nature. 
(Hurka 1993: 3)
Perfectionism in this broad sense is not necessarily liberal. Indeed it may be inimical to liberalism if 
the good life is narrowly interpreted and if it is the role of the state to promote the good life. Plato’s 
Republic ([c. 380 BCE] 2008) is perfectionist but it is not liberal. 
Our concern here, however, is with liberal perfectionism. Liberal perfectionists hold that:
It is at least sometimes permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage particular activities, ideals or 
ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical claims.
(Quong 2011: 27)
Joseph Raz states the point in more extreme terms:  
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It  is  the goal  of  all  political  action to  enable  individuals  to  pursue valid  conceptions of  the good and to 
discourage evil or empty ones
(Raz 2009: 133). 
4.2 The path from political liberalism to perfectionist liberalism
 The two approaches appear to be alternatives. Yet there is a clear path from one to the other. Even 
if one’s conception of political justice is restricted purely to very basic principles about what rights 
citizens should have, one has to make assumptions about what kind of rights are suitable – which 
depends on a theory, however skeletal, about what is good for people. Rawls himself in A Theory of  
Justice acknowledges the need for a ‘thin theory of the good’ in order for rational choosers to have 
any basis for choice. He imagines that choosers in the Original Position would have such a thin 
theory: 
Other things equal, they prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, and a greater rather than a smaller 
share of wealth and income. That these things are good seems clear enough... I have also said that self-respect 
and a sure confidence in the sense of one’s own worth is perhaps the most important primary good
(Rawls 1999:  348). 
But this  inevitably  opens  the  possibility  of  thickening one’s  theory  of  the  good.  If  it  is  ‘clear 
enough’ that wider liberty and a greater share of wealth as well as self-respect and a sense of self-
worth are good, then why not include other goods whose goodness is also clear enough? One might 
add that, other things equal, citizens would prefer longer lives rather than shorter;  better health 
rather than worse;  sufficient food rather than insufficient, and so on. Martha Nussbaum, from a 
position of political liberalism, argues for ten basic Capabilities that a liberal state should provide 





3. Senses, Imagination and Thought,
4. Emotions,
5. Practical Reason (including liberty of conscience),
6. Affiliation (A: capability for social interaction, friendship and freedom of assembly; and B: protection against 
discrimination on grounds of sex, race, caste etc)),
7. Other Species,
8. Play, and
10. Control Over One’s Environment
        (Nussbaum 2001: 78-80).
It is true that these are Capabilities – they should be made available, so that all citizens are capable 
of benefiting from them, but there is no obligation for any citizen to do so. But the fact that it is 
these Capabilities and not others that are to be made available implies that these are good things for 
human beings to have.  Nussbaum did not intend to move towards perfectionism. She intended 
simply to provide an improved framework for thinking about how economic policies can improve 
the  lives  of  those  in  developing  countries,  and  especially  women,  because  ‘the  normative 
approaches  characteristic  of  utilitarian  economics  are  inadequate  guides  to  public  policy’ 
(Nussbaum 2001: 299). Nevertheless the capabilities approach moves liberalism in a perfectionist 
direction simply because it fills in more of the ingredients requisite for a good life. Nussbaum might 
contend that she has not really moved very far along the spectrum because the precise ways in 
which each capability is to be satisfied remain open. Nussbaum distinguishes capability (what a 
person may do) from functioning (what they actually do)  and argues that 
if we were to take functioning itself as the goal of public policy, pushing citizens into functioning in a single 
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determinate manner, the liberal pluralist would rightly judge that we were precluding many choices that citizens 
may make in accordance with their own conception of the good, and perhaps violating their rights. 
(2001: 87)
For example, although the capability to play is one of Nussbaum’s ten essentials, an individual ‘may 
prefer to work with an intense dedication that precludes recreation and play (2001: 87). For this 
reason, ‘[]where adult citizens are concerned,  capability, not function, is the appropriate political 
goal’ (Nussbaum 2001: 87). Therefore:
...for political purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for capabilities and those alone. Citizens must be left free 
to determine their own course after that. The person with plenty of food may always choose to fast, but there is 
a great difference between fasting and starving, and it is this difference I wish to capture 
(Nussbaum 2001: 87).
Nevertheless, Nusssbaum’s ten capabilities supply a much fuller account than Rawls’s ‘thin theory 
of the Good’. Moreover, simply making the capabilities available makes it more likely that they will 
be taken up and used – that is the point of them, after all. Providing a certain set of capabilities 
encourages certain functionings. Nussbaum herself says: 
There are some ways of life  that people find deeply satisfying, and that probably do not involve unacceptable 
levels of indignity or capability inequality, which are likely to cease to exist in a regime of choice, simply 
because of social pressure, and the availability of alternative choices 
(2001: 236). 
The capabilities approach does embody a view, not of one particular model good life, but a fairly 
well-defined set of them. And indeed Nussbaum herself says that any theory of universal norms, if 
it is to have content at all, ‘will say that some objects of desire are more central than others for 
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political purposes, more necessary to a human’s quality of life’ (2001: 112). So by providing the 
capabilities for those objects of desire and ruling out others, the capabilities approach has moved at 
least some distance along the spectrum in the direction of perfectionism.
And  why  stop  at  ten  capabilities?  Jonathan  Wolff  and  Avner  De-Shalit  in  their  book 
Disadvantage take Nussbaum’s ten Capabilities and add four more to make fourteen:
11. Complete independence (ability to do as you wish without dependence on others)
12. Doing good to others
13. Living in a law-abiding fashion
14. Understanding the law.
(Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007: 190-91)
Nor does there seem any reason to stop at fourteen. Dispute about candidates for the list could 
continue. One could bring parameters to the dispute by stipulating that the more nearly universally 
valued the good, the better a candidate it is. On that basis, one might want to say that maximal 
development of intelligence should be on the list. Intelligence is near-universally valued. So the  
state would have a right, if not a positive duty, to pass laws, pursue policies and establish and 
regulate  institutions  with  the  aim  of  providing  citizens  with  the  capability  to  develop  their 
intelligence. One might also press a case for including happiness. Or personal autonomy, which 
Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom takes as the foundation for a fully-developed perfectionist 
position. 
4.3 Raz’s perfectionist liberalism
Raz makes the case for a liberalism which is non-individualist – i.e. it is not concerned with the 
securing  and  protecting  of  individual  rights,  but  with  collective  goods.  Raz’s  belief  in  some 
collective goods as intrinsically desirable springs from his belief that personal autonomy is 
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intrinsically desirable (see Raz 2009: 203). For personal autonomy requires a range of acceptable
options, and ‘[a]t least some of the social conditions which constitute such options are collective 
goods’ ( Raz 2009:  205).  As examples of collective goods, Raz offers a society which has a legal 
profession, and medical and architectural professions, or a society which recognises homosexual 
marriage. 
Such collective goods are not to be thought of as rights. Once collective goods exist, rights 
proceed from them: if I live in a society with recognised marriage, then clearly individuals have a 
right to get married; and moreover it is not hard to make a case that this should include the right to 
same-sex  marriage,  absent  any  justification  for  withholding  a  right  from  homosexuals  which 
heterosexuals enjoy. But it sounds odd to say that I have a right to live in a society with recognised 
marriage in the first place: for there is no one against whom could I claim that right, or who would 
be failing in their duty if it were not provided. 
Raz’s brand of liberalism, therefore, is not primarily concerned with what rights individuals 
have. That question comes in secondarily. Primarily, Raz’s liberalism is concerned with providing 
the conditions for personal autonomy. Raz views personal autonomy as intrinsically valuable.  And 
therefore it is intrinsically valuable that there be a range of collective goods – including the basic 
collective good of living in a society in the first place (Raz 2009: 206),  since ‘[t]he provision of 
many collective goods is constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy’ (2009: 207). 
Raz’s  liberalism is  perfectionist  in  two ways.  First,  he  holds that  personal  autonomy is 
ultimately and intrinsically valuable for human beings. Let us call this Claim 1. 
Second, he holds that  personal autonomy ‘is valuable only if exercised in pursuit  of the 
good’ (Raz 2009: 381). That is Claim 2.    
 If  both  of  these  claims  are  true,  Raz’s  liberal  perfectionism must  follow,  and  we  find 
ourselves moving further away from PL. I examine the strength of Raz’s two  claims below. Let us 
note here that Raz’s perfectionism would generate a different response to the question of whether a 
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liberal state should ban the burqa. Banning it in order to prevent harm to people other than the 
wearer is still an available option for the liberal perfectionist, as it is for the political liberal. (Raz 
himself endorses a form of harm principle, as a requirement for protecting personal autonomy – see 
Raz, 2009: 401). In addition, however, the liberal perfectionist could countenance other grounds for 
a ban, arising from Raz’s Claims 1 and 2, above.
 Raz argues that the state should secure the conditions for personal autonomy, which means 
making a range of acceptable options available. But not all options will be deemed acceptable. As 
Raz puts it, ‘some options one is better off not having’ (2009: 408).  Suppose that the wearing of the 
burqa  substantially  compromised  one’s  autonomy.  This  falls  foul  of  Claim  1.  For  the  liberal 
perfectionist there would be a strong prima facie case for banning it. 
Moreover, even if it could be shown that a burqa-clad woman retains her autonomy (on the 
grounds  that  wearing  it  is  a  conscious,  authentic  choice  which  she  continues  to  endorse),  a 
perfectionist might still argue that the state should not allow it, if it falls foul of Claim 2. Raz’s 
perfectionist moral pluralism allows that many forms of life are good, but holds that some ‘are 
worthless and demeaning, and... political action may and should be taken to eradicate or at least 
curtail them’ (Raz 2009: 133). A case might be made that a life lived behind a burqa is worthless 
and/or demeaning. I am not making that case. But liberal perfectionism allows for the possibility 
that if such a case were made, a ban would be justified.
To sum up, while a political  liberal  has only one possible reason for banning the burqa 
(preventing  harm to  others),  a  liberal  perfectionist  has  three:  a)  Preventing  harm to  others;  b) 
Encouraging autonomy; c) Discouraging worthless/demeaning ways of life. 
The question is whether Raz’s two claims are true. These claims will be examined in detail 
in Chapter Six, on autonomy. At this stage I wish to make just two points about Raz’s Claim 2. 
First,  it  implies  the  possibility  of  constant  change  in  the  options  offered,  encouraged, 
withheld or discouraged by the state. The consensus on what counts as a good life changes over 
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time. A liberal perfectionist in Victorian Britain might well have been against the institution of 
homosexual  marriage,  and  indeed  the  decriminalisation  of  homosexual  activity,  deeming  such 
activity  to  be  ‘evil  or  worthless’.  Today’s  liberal  perfectionist  takes  a  different  view.  Liberal 
Perfectionism is therefore dynamic in a way that PL is not. This is not to saddle the perfectionist 
with moral or cultural relativism. Changes may be for the better, constituting moral progress. 
The second point to make about Claim 2 is that it entails acceptance of paternalism. Raz 
himself makes the point: 
One way in which the autonomy-based doctrine of freedom advocated here deviates from some liberal writings 
on the subject is in its ready embrace of various paternalistic measures
(2009: 422). 
In Raz’s perfectionist liberalism, it is the duty of the state to provide citizens with options which it 
deems good, and to discourage them from pursuing options which it deems evil or worthless. If 
citizens  disagree  with  the  state  about  what  options  are  good,  then  they  will  be  the  objects  of 
paternalism.  I  discuss  Jonathan Quong's  charge that  Raz’s  perfectionist  liberalism is paternalist 
below, and examine the general permissibility of paternalism in greater detail in Chapter Five. First, 
though, I explore a third liberal position, a halfway house between Rawls and Raz, which accepts 
Raz’s Claim 1 but ditches his Claim 2: Ben Colburn’s theory of autonomy-based liberalism. 
4.4 The Halfway House of Autonomy-based Liberalism
In his book Autonomy and Liberalism, Ben Colburn makes the case for liberalism ‘as the political 
philosophy that  is  committed  to  the  promotion  of  individual  autonomy’ (2010:  1).  His  aim is 
twofold. 
First, he wants to ‘bring order to [the] chaos’ that is liberal theory (2010: 1). What liberalism 
means is contested both among liberal theorists and by their opponents, and Colburn aims to bring 
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clarity to the debate by deriving liberalism from one simple principle: a commitment to promoting 
individual autonomy. 
Second, he aims to provide a guide or lodestone for liberal state policy. Asking, ‘Will this 
measure promote individual autonomy or not?’ provides liberal policy-makers with an evaluative 
tool. 
Colburn  defines  individual  autonomy  as  ‘the  capacity  to  decide  for  ourselves  what  is 
valuable in life, and to shape our lives in accordance with that decision’ (2010: 2). This is a useful 
definition, clear, concise and in line with established philosophical usage, and I am happy to adopt 
it, although I have some further considerations to add in Chapter Five. 
Colburn thus endorses Raz’s Claim 1 – that personal autonomy is ultimately and intrinsically 
valuable for human beings – and like Raz believes that it is the task of a liberal state to encourage 
autonomy.  However,  Colburn  does  not  endorse  Raz’s  Claim  2.  His  theory  is  explicitly  anti-
perfectionist. He sums up his position in the following two claims:
The Autonomy Claim: The state ought to promote autonomy.
Anti-perfectionism: The state ought not in its action (intentionally) to promote any value.
(Colburn 2010:  43)
One wants to object  that  the two claims appear  to contain the seeds of a  contradiction.  For if 
autonomy is a value, then the state ought not to promote it,  according to the second claim; yet 
according to the first claim, that is precisely what the state ought to do. 
Colburn’s way out of the contradiction is to argue that autonomy is a second-order value: a 
value about values. (Recall Colburn’s definition of autonomy: the capacity of individuals to choose 
for themselves what is valuable.) But anti-perfectionism is to be understood as concerned with first-
order values – i.e the values that individuals choose for themselves.  And so, 
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Since autonomy is a second-order value, it is consistent both to endorse anti-perfectionism (so understood) and 
to say that the state should promote autonomy
(Colburn 2010: 57). 
Understood in this way, the two claims are not only non-contradictory, but Colburn argues that the 
one entails the other. Colburn calls this the Equivalence Claim: ‘anti-perfectionism implies that the 
state ought to promote autonomy, and vice versa’ (2010: 57). Colburn offers the following formal 
argument for the Equivalence Claim:
1. If anti-perfectionism is true, it must be justified.
2. If the state ought to promote autonomy, then anti-perfectionism is true.
3. Any justification for anti-perfectionism implies that the state ought to promote autonomy.
4. (From 1 and 3): If anti-perfectionism is true, then the state ought to promote autonomy.
5. (From 2 and 4): The state ought to promote autonomy if and only if anti-perfectionism is true.  
(2010: 57-8)
Clearly it is premisses 2 and 3 that do the heavy lifting. Colburn argues for the truth of premiss 2 by 
considering the case of Harriet, who has decided that the valuable thing in life is to play Bach’s 
Cello Suites consummately well, and if she can live according to this value her life goes better. But 
this does not mean that the state should promote cello-playing, because cello-playing ‘is valuable 
only for those,  like Harriet,  who consider it  valuable’ (2010: 59).  The state  could not promote 
autonomy by promoting cello-playing.  It  could only promote autonomy by promoting people’s 
abilities or opportunities to decide for themselves what is valuable. 
Colburn then considers a possible objection to Premiss 2. What if the state did not, itself, 
decide  what was valuable, but promoted values which individuals had already decided on? Thus, 
suppose Harriet has decided that it is valuable to play the cello well, and so the state gets on with 
promoting that value for her  (e.g. by texting her exhortations to practise, allowing her to claim tax 
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expenses on money spent on music lessons and recordings, etc). This runs into insuperable practical 
difficulties. If the state tries to promote Harriet’s values for everyone, then it rides roughshod over 
the autonomy of the great majority who do not share Harriet’s values: and if it tries to help every 
single citizen by promoting differing values directly to each individual – cello-playing for some, 
attendance at football matches for others, the study of philosophy for others, group-sex for others 
etc  –  that  would  be  a  logistical  nightmare.  The  state  would  need  to  provide  personalised 
exhortations  and  the  appropriate  facilitating  conditions  for  every  citizen  and,  given  that  what 
individuals value often changes, would need to keep itself continuously informed on what each 
citizens’ values  currently  were,  which  would  inevitably  involve  ‘drastic  violations  of  privacy’ 
(Colburn 2010: 59).  There is the additional point, not made by Colburn, that it seems redundant to 
promote values to individuals which they have already endorsed for themselves.
Colburn adds that as well as the practical difficulties of the state’s promoting values decided 
on by individuals, it  would be illegitimate in principle. From the point of view of second-order 
autonomy, the value of cello-playing is de dicto – that is, it is valuable only because Harriet says it 
is. But for Harriet herself, cello-playing is valuable de re – for its own qualities. Therefore (Colburn 
says) to translate Harriet’s first-order value into the terms of a second-order, generalised value is to 
risk mistranslation: 
at best we turn an unrestricted generalization into a value claim that is indexed to a particular individual at a 
particular time, and at worst we will translate a true sentence into one that is false
(2010: 60). 
Colburn’s argument works well with the example of cello-playing. Wanting to be an expert cello-
player is very much the kind of value one chooses for oneself and it is a value that it is not widely 
shared. Suppose, however, we take a value that is widely shared.  ‘Harriet values being in good 
health.’ Because the vast majority of people would prefer to be in good health than not, there is a 
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closing of the gap between its de dicto and its de re values: it is valuable not just because Harriet 
says it but because millions of other people do so too; and they agree on this because good health is 
something that normal human beings value for its own qualities.  If the state were to promote good 
health, by providing facilities for fitness and relaxation,  emphasising sport and exercise in the 
school curriculum,  regulating the food industry to restrict the use of unhealthy ingredients, keeping 
the public informed about medical matters and providing easy access to screenings and medical 
treatments, and so on, such a programme would not run into the practical or logistical problems that 
promoting individuals’ hobbies, enthusiasms or career-choices would run into, neither would it 
require drastic violations of privacy. The truth of Colburn’s Premiss 2, then, is not demonstrated by 
the example of Harriet and her cello. 
Colburn’s Premiss 3 – ‘Any justification for anti-perfectionism implies that the state ought 
to promote autonomy’ – could only be proved true if all other justifications for anti-perfectionism 
were shown to be false. As Colburn concedes, that is an unending task. His method is to rule out the 
four leading alternative candidates: relativism, pluralism, scepticism and neutrality. The approach is 
to show that each of these alternative candidates  either  fails to give a plausible reason for anti-
perfectionism or does so by dint of a covert appeal to the Autonomy Claim. There is no necessity to 
go through them all, but we can take his treatment of neutrality as exemplary.
Colburn’s characterisation of the neutrality argument, based on Rawlsian political liberalism, 
is as follows: ‘if it is to be legitimate, a state must be neutral, and if it is to be neutral, it must be 
anti-perfectionist’ (2010: 65). 
Legitimacy requires neutrality because if the state were not neutral, then it would make laws 
and policies based on a comprehensive doctrine with which some citizens would disagree.  Colburn 
contends  that  this  is  a  problem because  of  Rawls’ belief  that  persons  are  free  and  equal  and 
possessed of two ‘moral powers’: ‘a capacity for justice and a capacity for a conception of the good’ 
(Rawls 2005: 19). Imposing a comprehensive conception of the good on unwilling citizens fails to 
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respect the latter of these two powers: which is no different from failing to respect their autonomy. 
In other words, neutrality is required because it guarantees citizens’ autonomy; and if it did not do 
so, then there would be no reason for requiring it. 
Unless someone comes up with alternative grounds for anti-perfectionism – and Colburn 
does seem to have dealt with all the obvious candidates – then Premiss 3 is true. 
However, if Premiss 2 is not true – and as I have argued, the example of Harriet and her 
cello is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is – then it would not be  the liberal state’s  sole duty to 
promote autonomy.  It might be the liberal state’s duty to promote autonomy and other values as  
well.  Once one has already made the break with PL by stipulating the promotion of one value, 
autonomy, as the state’s raison d’etre, why not others, such as health?  Or perhaps the state should 
promote happiness,  or intelligence. It  is not obvious that  these are less universally valued than 
autonomy. 
Colburn would no doubt reply that, to the extent that  the state performs other duties,  it 
becomes less of a liberal state. It is the commitment to autonomy which makes it liberal; and it 
would be less liberal to precisely the extent that it sought to promote other values. 
There are two points to make in answer. One is that if a liberal state’s duties really are 
limited to promoting the value of autonomy to its own citizens, this is a pinched kind of liberalism 
which few actual liberals would wish to accept in practice. It rules out any form of beneficence from 
the state, other than autonomy-promotion to its own citizens.  Such a state would have no duties 
towards creatures which were incapable of full autonomy – brain-damaged people, or non-human 
animals. As Martha Nussbaum has argued in Frontiers of Justice, a liberal state has duties towards 
those with lesser autonomy, and towards those who are members of other,  less fortunate states 
(Nussbaum 2007).  Nor would a Single-Value-Autonomy-Based-Liberal  State,  as I  shall  term it, 
sanction state-organised relief for disaster-stricken foreign countries, or  policies to preserve a clean 
environment, natural beauty spots or historic buildings for future generations.  These policies fall 
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foul of Single-Value-Autonomy-Based Liberalism not merely because they are not concerned with 
promoting autonomy, but because they could actually restrict it. It  is still  a recognisably liberal 
position to hold that the state should promote autonomy, but that it may promote other values too; 
and  that  these  values  could  occasionally  conflict  with  autonomy.  But  if  that  is  so,  Colburn’s 
Equivalence Claim is not sound, because Premiss 2 would be untrue. The state’s promotion of 
autonomy only entails anti-perfectionism if the state must not promote any other values.  
The  second  point  is  that  even  if  we  were  to  accept  Single-Value-Autonomy-Based 
Liberalism, autonomy does not subsist in a vacuum. It is inextricably related to other values. I 
discuss this in more detail in Chapter Six, but here let us note that maximal personal autonomy 
might require physical health: chronic illness could skew one’s notions of what is valuable (George 
Orwell pointed out in his essay ‘Politics vs. Literature’ that if you are suffering from tooth-ache or 
sea-sickness it is impossible to appreciate that  King Lear  is a better play than  Peter Pan (2000: 
384).   It  is  also  difficult  to  be  autonomous  without  good  mental  health.  One  cannot  be  fully 
autonomous if one is suffering from depression. Maximal autonomy, moreover, requires a fully-
developed intelligence. The more intelligent one is, the more options one will be aware of, and the 
better able to judge between competing values, and the sounder one’s apprehension will be of the 
likely consequences of living one’s life in accordance with one set of values rather than another. 
Therefore, even a state which was strictly Single-Value-Autonomy-Based would find itself 
in practice having to promote a range of values besides autonomy. It is true that these values would 
not  be  promoted  for  their  own  sake,  but  because  they  promoted  autonomy.  Nevertheless,  the 
policies of such a state would in the majority of cases be indistinguishable from those of a more 
perfectionist state. 
On the  issue  of  the  burqa,  however,  there  is  one  clear  distinction  to  be  made  between 
Colburn’s autonomy-based liberalism and Raz’s liberal perfectionism. Whereas the Razian would 
sanction banning the burqa on three separate grounds, the Colburnian would ban it only on two: a) 
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Preventing harm to others;  and b)  Encouraging autonomy.  The potential  Razian third reason – 
discouraging worthless or demeaning ways of life – is not available to the Colburnian. 
5. Quong’s Re-Statement of Political Liberalism
In  Liberalism Without Perfection  (2011), Jonathan Quong argues against basing liberalism on the 
value of autonomy, or indeed any other value or set of values. Liberalism makes possible or gives 
rise to values such as autonomy. But it is not a liberal state’s duty to favour one value or set of 
values above others. Quong explains his thesis thus: 
Liberal societies are crucially characterised by pluralism or disagreement regarding what makes a life good, 
valuable or worthwhile. Disagreement about the nature of human flourishing is a deep and permanent feature of 
free societies. This fact, when combined with the thesis that governments must be able to justify their actions to 
citizens,  yields  the  conclusion  that  governments  must  refrain  from  acting  on  the  basis  of  any  particular 
conception of  what makes for a valuable,  flourishing or worthwhile  life.  Because we disagree about what 
makes life worth living, it would be wrong for the government to take sides on this question. Instead, the 
government should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms 
within which citizens can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives.
(2011: 2).
If Quong is right, then many standard justifications of laws and policies become inadmissible (2011: 
4).  Making  recreational  drugs,  gambling  or  prostitution  illegal  on  the  grounds  that  they  are 
disvaluable would not pass the test of ‘public justification’, because not everyone would agree they 
were disvaluable (2011: 4). And: 
Attempts to restrict or alter the way the Amish or other orthodox religious communities raise their children that 
are justified by claims about the value of autonomy in a human life similarly fail to be publicly justifiable
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(Quong 2011: 4). 
By the  same reasoning,  a  state  ban on burqa-wearing  could not  be  justified by the  claim that 
wearing it limits or destroys autonomy. Perhaps the wearer does not value autonomy. And it is not 
the state’s business to tell her that she ought to do so.  
Quong’s  re-statement  of  PL is  generally  faithful  to  Rawls,  but  differs  from him in one 
important way. Quong has a different conception of the role played by the overlapping consensus. 
His is an  internal  conception of liberalism. On this view, pluralism arises because of liberalism; 
pluralism is not a pre-existing problem which liberalism arrives to solve.  Therefore, he does not 
seek to justify why one should be a liberal in the first place, but aims rather to understand ‘what 
kinds  of  arguments,  if  any,  citizens  already  committed  to  certain  basic  liberal  norms  can 
legitimately offer to one another’ (201l: 5). Basic liberal norms are abstract values such as ‘the idea 
of persons as free and equal, or a general commitment to fairness in the distribution of goods or 
advantages among citizens’ (2011: 5). 
Thus the role of the overlapping consensus in Quong’s conception of PL is different from 
that implied by Rawlsian PL, which Quong terms ‘the common view’. The common view regards 
the subject  of  the  OC as being a  principle  or  principles  of  justice.  But  this  leads to  a  serious 
difficulty when it comes to debate about constitutional questions, which are supposed, in PL, to be 
settled by public reason.  If different citizens hold the same principle or principles, but for different 
reasons, there is no common ground for them to argue on: they will simply appeal to incompatible 
reasons. 
Quong  dramatises  this  with  a  thought  experiment  (20011:  172).  Suppose  we  have  a 
Politically  Liberal  state  in  which  there  are  two  Comprehensive  Doctrines.  The  first  of  these 
doctrines  (CD1)  supports  Rawls’ two  Principle  of  Justice  for  reasons  a  and  b.  The  second 
Comprehensive Doctrine (CD2), on the other hand, supports the Principles of Justice for reasons c 
and d. 
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Now suppose that ‘our political society faces some constitutional question which pits the 
first principle against the second’ (2011: 172). Quong’s imagined scenario is that the government is 
considering a scheme called the Occupational Policy, which would require
restricting people with specified scarce talents to a limited range of occupational choice at average wages for 
three years after they receive their first post-secondary degree... Restricting people with valuable and scarce 
talents in this way will, let us assume, ensure greater overall productivity, and also ensure that the additional 
resources generated can be distributed to the least advantaged
(2011: 172.) 
This policy is in line with Rawls’ second Principle of Justice – the principle of fair and equal 
opportunities, and of removing inequalities which do not benefit the worst-off or are not acceptable 
to them  – but offends against the first Principle, which guarantees equal liberty for all, subject to 
the usual constraints (see Rawls, 1999, Chapter Two). Those citizens who endorse CD1 believe the 
First Principle should have priority over the second, and so they reject the Occupational Policy. But 
those who endorse CD2 disagree. They think that the Second Principle should have priority over the 
first. Of course, those in the CD2 camp are not just disagreeing with CD1, but with John Rawls, 
who states that that the First Principle should have lexical priority over the Second. But so what? 
The OC, in the common view, does not require that people accept the same principles for the same 
reasons. In fact the point of the OC, on this view, is precisely that it does not. Citizens who uphold 
CD2 have their own, non-Rawlsian reasons for accepting the Two Principles, and those reasons 
dictate the opposite prioritisation. But that means that upholders of CD1 and CD2 have nothing to 
say to each other on the subject of the Occupational Policy. Neither can offer a justification that the 
other would accept. 
Quong’s response to this problem is to state that the subject of the OC should not be a 
principle, or principles, at all. Rather, it should be ‘the fundamental idea of society as a fair system 
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of co-operation among free and equal people’ (2011:190). This, then, would form the bedrock of 
agreement upon which a liberal society rests. 
Moreover in Quong’s account, the purpose of the OC is not the same as in the common 
view. For in the common view, the OC acts as a justification for the principles which are the subject 
of the consensus: ‘These principles must be reasonable – look, people agree on them’.  As Quong 
points out, this view leads to a dilemma: 
a) either the overlapping consensus is superfluous within political liberalism, since reasonable people will by 
definition  endorse  the  (correct)  political  conception  of  justice,  or  b) the  overlapping  consensus  is  not 
superfluous, and people could (in the second justificatory stage) reject the political conception without being 
unreasonable
(2011: 167). 
If we go with the second horn of the dilemma, then people of illiberal views would be justified in 
rejecting  a  political  conception  of  justice purely  in  virtue  of  rejecting  it.  For  if  the  OC  is 
justificatory, one can vitiate its power to justify by the expedient of not signing up to it. As Quong 
says, ‘If we want to preserve the liberal content of our theory, it is essential that such people are 
excluded from the constituency of the overlapping consensus’ (2011: 167). 
Quong’s theory avoids this dilemma; and appears also to avoid the difficulty of legitimacy 
raised by Habermas (2011) referred to above. In Quong’s account, the purpose of the OC is not to 
justify the content of the consensus. Its purpose is to supply the necessary basis for public reason. 
Without a shared commitment to the fundamental idea of persons as free and equal citizens, there 
would be no common ground to stand on when deliberating rival principles. 
In Quong’s version of PL, one begins with an overlapping consensus. Only those who sign 
up to  it  are  included in the constituency of reasonable persons.  This  avoids the uncomfortable 
problem referred to in Section 1, where the Give-’Em-Enough-Rope Tendency might sign up to the 
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Overlapping Consensus for the illiberal reason that it will enable unbelievers to go their sinful way 
and  be  roasted  after  death  in  hell  for  eternity.  In  Quong’s  theory,  one  cannot  sign  up  to  the 
Overlapping  Consensus  for  the  wrong  reason.  The  reason  is  dictated  by  the  subject  of  the 
Consensus: a belief in  ‘the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of co-operation among free 
and equal people’ (2011: 190). 
Quong’s development  of his position involves a full  reply to perfectionist  critics  of PL, 
especially Joseph Raz. I focus on one area of his argument against Razian perfectionism since it is 
the most relevant to the burqa question – that is, the charge of paternalism. 
 Quong argues that perfectionism entails paternalism. It is true that Raz has a version of the 
Harm Principle which is supposed in certain cases to rule out paternalist actions. In his version, 
harming others means limiting or damaging their prospects, which diminishes their autonomy, so 
the state is entitled to use coercion to prevent harm (Raz, 1985: 416). But it is not entitled to use 
coercion to prevent morally repugnant actions which do not harm others, because coercion is a blunt 
instrument and will limit people’s autonomy in more than just the targeted area; putting someone in 
prison does not just prevent them carrying out the morally repugnant activity but all other activities 
as well (Raz, 1985: 418-19). 
As Quong points out, however, Raz rejects state coercion of morally repugnant but non-
harmful actions merely for contingent reasons. It happens to be a fact that using coercive measures 
to discourage citizens from pursuing bad options tends to cut off good options as well (Quong, 
2011: 54). But Quong does not agree that the Harm Principle should rest on this contingent fact. He 
considers the possibility, perhaps not technologically distant, of inserting a chip in someone’s brain 
that would prevent bad (but not harmful) options. Not only would Raz seem to have no reason to 
object to the insertion of such a chip, the logic of his position seems demand that perfectionist states 
put money into scientific research so that this scheme can be realised as soon as possible. That way, 
citizens can be coerced away from bad options without having their good options cut off too, which 
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is what Raz wants. Yet this seems to have profoundly illiberal implications. 
Quong holds that  in such a case the Millian Harm Principle should apply, and the state 
would have no right to insert the chip. His own argument for the Harm Principle is that 
it is fundamentally justified by an appeal to the moral status of persons... it ensures that citizens are not treated 
in a certain type of paternalistic fashion, one which demeans their moral status as free and equal persons.
( 2011: 56)
The possibilities of technologically facilitated intervention in citizens’ lives are only likely to grow 
in the future. Raz’s position invokes the threat  of unlimited state interference in citizens’ lives, 
obliging them to choose from a menu of state-approved good options. Quong’s objection to this 
possibility seems compelling.
At the same time, however, Quong’s root-and-branch rejection of paternalism is difficult to 
sustain. He argues that paternalism is ‘presumptively wrong because of the way it denies someone’s 
moral status as a free and equal citizen’ (2011: 74). I explore paternalism in greater detail in the next 
chapter. Here I simply make the claim, to be substantiated later, that paternalism need not deny a 
person’s moral status as a free and equal citizen. There is a distinction between moral paternalism, 
which aims to  prevent  someone acting in  a  morally  repugnant  way,  and  practical paternalism, 
which aims to prevent someone acting in a way which is likely to damage their health, ruin their 
prospects or end their life prematurely. The former does indeed deny a person’s moral status as a 
free and equal citizen, and is presumptively wrong; the latter does not, and is not. 
6. The Political Liberal-Perfectionist Liberal Continuum
Framing the disagreement between PL and Perfectionism as a simple dichotomy is misconceived. 
As argued in Section 4 above, any liberal state must operate with some general theory of the good, 
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if it is to have any basis for enacting laws and pursuing policies. Moreover, the Harm Principle (in 
either its Millian or Feinbergian version) involves a normative notion of the good. If we define loss 
of life or limb, or of bodily integrity, or of liberty as harms, then we must be claiming that the 
possession of those things is good. 
Of course there are degrees. Some liberals would argue for a very slender theory of the good 
indeed,  others  for  a  thicker  one.  This  suggests  that  the  apparent  disjunction  between  PL and 
perfectionism is really a continuum. As we saw above, Quong defines perfectionism as the view 
that  ‘It  is  at  least  sometimes permissible  for a liberal  state to promote or discourage particular 
activities, ideals or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value’ (my italics) 
(2011:  27). 
But this produces a skewed division between the two. PL is defined as the view that the 
liberal state must  never promote or discourage particular activities, ideals or ways of life on such 
grounds. Then perfectionist liberalism lumps together a whole range of views, from the view that 
the state should  hardly ever promote or discourage activities, ideals or ways of life on grounds 
relating to their intrinsic value, to the view that it should seldom do so, to the view that it should 
occasionally do so, to the view that it should sometimes do so, to the view that it should frequently  
do so, to the view that it should so as much and as often as feasible. 
Yet the view that the state should hardly ever promote or discourage activities on grounds 
relating to their intrinsic value is much closer to the view that it should never do so, than to the view 
that it should do so as much and as often as is feasible. Characterising the relationship between PL 
and perfectionist  liberalism as a  sharp dichotomy obscures the common ground between close-
together views. The pure political liberal who believes that the state should promote or discourage 
activities on grounds of their intrinsic value 0% of the time is far closer to the liberal who thinks the 
state should do so 1% of the time than to the liberal who thinks the state should do so 100% of the 
time. Yet in Quong’s terms, both the 1-percenter and the 100-percenter are classified equally as 
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perfectionists.  The image of a continuum is more helpful. Thus, we can imagine Rawls and Quong 
at one end of the continuum, Colburn about halfway along, and Raz at the far end. 
My own view is that a position somewhere near the middle is usually optimal, avoiding the 
dangers of under-intervention at one end and over-intervention at the other. The pure PL position 
rejects paternalism or at least looks upon it with strong disfavour. As I argue in the next chapter, 
however, the anti-paternalist position is not easy to maintain consistently. There are situations when 
paternalist intervention is justifiable and ought to be welcome to the liberal. At the other end of the 
continuum there is the risk of a perfectionist state over-intervening in the lives of citizens, justified 
by a conception of the good which not all citizens accept, to a point where it is no longer liberal at 
all.  I consider this risk in Chapter Seven, when discussing the problem of adaptive preferences.  
However, my overall thesis does not depend on locating myself at any particular point on the 
continuum.  I  aim  to  consider  the  implications  of  the  burqa-question  for  a  plurality  of  liberal 
positions. 
I shall argue that even if one accepts the full Razian perfectionist position, banning the burqa 
on grounds of Claim 2 is problematic; and if one adopts Colburn’s halfway house, then banning it 
on Grounds of Claim 1 is still problematic; but there are possible justifications for a ban on grounds 





In this chapter I consider paternalist arguments for a burqa-ban. If the burqa had deleterious effects 
on the wearer’s life, then there may be reasons to ban it for the wearer’s own sake. 
Section 1 defines paternalism. There are two types of paternalist argument to consider: those 
based  on  concerns  about  well-being,  understood  in  quite  a  general  sense  (to  include  health, 
happiness, personal relationships and opportunities for fulfilment); and those based on concerns 
about personal autonomy. In this chapter I consider only the first. 
Liberals towards the PL end of the continuum would tend to dismiss all such arguments 
from a  principled  anti-paternalist  stance.  In  Section  2  I  examine  the  principled  anti-paternalist 
position and argue that it is untenable. 
Section 3 endorses Sarah Conly’s argument for at least some coercive paternalism, limited 
by what I term the Liberal Paternalism Principle – that is to say, paternalist policies may be justified 
where the restriction of liberty is small and the benefits gained or harms avoided are great. 
With  the  general  permissibility  of  paternalism  in  principle  established,  in  Section  4  I 
examine whether specific paternalist arguments for banning the burqa on grounds of well-being are 
persuasive. I shall argue that they are not. 
The paternalist argument for banning the burqa on grounds of preserving personal autonomy 
is a distinct and more complex case, and will be examined in Chapter Four. 
1. Paternalism Defined
The word ‘paternalism’ derives from a metaphor, implying a comparison with a father’s care for his 
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children. The comparison is with a good father, not an abusive, tyrannical or neglectful one: a father 
who makes and enforces decisions about what his children can and cannot do, in their interests, not 
his own, because are they not yet wise enough to make such decisions for themselves. Paternalism, 
then, is following a similar policy with regard not to children but to other adults. Thus, paternalist 
policies are:
restrictions on a person’s liberty which are justified exclusively by consideration for that person’s own good or 
welfare, and which  are carried out against his present will... or against his prior commitment
(Arneson 1980: 471)
Restricting the freedom of Muslim women to wear the burqa,  for their own good, against their will, 
would be a clear case of paternalism.
Arneson’s definition is a useful starting-point, but each of its three parts requires further 
comment.
 1). Restrictions on a person’s liberty in the case of a burqa-ban would be likely to involve 
legal prohibition backed by penalties. Burqa-wearing women could be fined, and if they persisted in 
defying the ban, perhaps imprisoned: the same approach as is  used to enforce the paternalistic 
banning of certain recreational drugs. The restriction could also be enforced by attempting to cut off 
supply, again as with drugs: importation and sale of burqas or niqabs could be made punishable by 
law.   
2).  I take the last part of the definition next as it can be dealt with more briefly than the 
middle one.  The clause against his present will...  or against his prior commitment narrows the 
definition unnecessarily. Amending it  to  irrespective of  that person’s will would encompass the 
cases where the restriction was not against the person’s will, as well as those where it was. The 
broader definition is no less clear, and is more faithful to the spirit  of the metaphor; fathers do 
restrict their children’s liberty for their own good, but not invariably against the child’s will. The 
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child may cheerfully accept that they cannot have another biscuit, or that it is time to go to bed, or 
that they must practise the piano for twenty minutes, or brush their teeth for two, and might prefer 
the security and predictability of being told what to do and what not to do. In the adult world, many 
or most people prefer being forced to insure their home or car, rather than risk the consequences of 
their own  lack of prudence if no such law was in place. It is possible that some burqa-wearing 
women might not object to a ban. It could remove a burden which, though assumed voluntarily, 
they were glad to be rid of without having to take personal responsibility. People’s desires and 
motivations are often mixed.  (It goes without saying that women who were coerced into wearing a 
burqa would welcome a ban – but that would not be paternalist, since it would be the restoration, 
not the restriction of a liberty.)
3). Finally, the clause for that person’s own good requires explication. For what is meant by 
somebody’s  own  good?  People  differ  about  what  counts  as  good.  Recognition  of  this  fact  is 
fundamental to liberalism. Yet even political liberals need a thin theory of the good. Without being 
as perfectionist as Plato we can identify goods which are effectively universal for human beings, 
and legislators have done so. The American Declaration of Independence of 1776 famously lists 
‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ as inalienable rights (Rosen and Wolff 1999: 391).   A 
more granular list of goods would still command very widespread agreement: one might cite health, 
family ties, friendship, and achievement in one’s chosen field as core ingredients of a good life. 
Details about what kind of health, family ties, friendships or achievements can be left blank. But the 
list is normative. Being healthy does not mean one is obliged to follow any particular diet or regime 
of exercise; still, health means being in good health, and there is wide and deep agreement about 
what that means. Other things being equal it is better to breathe freely than wheeze, to be fit than 
unfit, free from pain than in it, sighted than blind, hearing than deaf, or able-bodied than confined to 
a wheelchair. 
So I am claiming; but this simple picture is not uncontroversial. Cases of Body Integrity 
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Identity Disorder Disorder (BIID) test one’s intuitions here. BIID (also called transability) is:
 a rare condition characterized by an intense desire or need to move from a given state of ability to one of 
relative impairment, most often through amputation
(Reynolds 2016: 37). 
Chloe Jennings-White of Salt Lake City is a case in point. Jennings-White, though able-bodied, 
wears leg-braces and uses a wheelchair, and her ambition is to be a paraplegic. She would like to 
have spinal surgery to render her legs inoperative, but so far has not managed to find a surgeon who 
will perform the operation. She is a spokesperson for the BIID movement and has appeared on 
CNN television to talk about her desire.  
Ethicists are divided about how to deal with such cases. Sabine Müller in a 2009 article in 
The American Journal of Bioethics (cited in Reynolds 2016: 40) argued that it would be wrong to 
perform the surgery that Jennings-White desires; it would be treating the symptom rather than the 
disorder underlying it, and would offend against the medical principle of doing no harm to patients. 
According to Reynolds, of the seven published responses to Müller’s article, four agree with her 
while three support surgery for Jennings-White (Reynolds 2016: 40). Reynolds himself takes issue 
with Müller. He argues that Müller conflates being disabled with harm, which is ableist:  
as it  assumes, without evidence or argumentation, that the “standard” able-body is, ceteris paribus, in and of 
itself better than the non-standard, disabled body
(Reynolds 2016: 40). 
In turn I should like to take issue with Reynolds. First, the position of Müller and those who agree 
with  her  does  not  depend  on  conflating  being  disabled  with  harm;  it  depends  on  conflating 
impairment  with harm. Reynolds himself  is  alert  to this distinction:  ‘impairment’ describes the 
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condition while ‘disability’ refers to 
...the social ramifications of a given impairment, ranging from stigma to oppression to numerous forms of 
inaccessibility or unequal access
(Reynolds 2016: 39).
Müller’s position is not based on the stigma, oppression or accessibility problems that Jennings-
White would face if she were a paraplegic. In a world where there was no stigma or oppression  and 
no accessibility problems, it would still cause harm to Jennings-White to permanently paralyse her 
lower body. Being physically impaired is an objective condition. Yet as Tom Shakespeare puts it, 
‘Cultural Disability Studies writers may be keen to dissolve away the material effects of illness and 
impairment’ (2014: 66). For these theorists there is no objective condition of disability, only a 
socially constructed one. As Shakespeare points out, however, disabled people themselves who live 
with the reality of illness or impairment do not tend to see it that way. Shakespeare espouses a 
critical realist approach to disability, which takes account of both the physical reality of impairment 
as well as the socio-cultural aspects of how it is viewed, treated and experienced (Shakespeare 
2014). 
I agree with Shakespeare that impairment is real (and also that this fact does not provide a 
full explanation of the disability experience). That impairment is also a harm can be seen from the 
testimony of those suffering from impairments themselves, like Tom Shakespeare.  It is also implied 
by the fact that to inflict a permanent impairment upon another person who did not desire it would 
be a serious harm and a serious  crime; and it would not be ableist to regard it as such.  Neither is it 
ableist to seek to cure, treat or alleviate impairments; yet without a  normative model of health one 
would have no rationale for doing so, and no criteria for success. 
Yet Jennings-White  desires physical impairment. Does that mean it is not longer a harm? 
This would only follow logically if one were committed to the proposition that what one desired 
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was by definition never  harmful.  But  we cannot  simply equate  harm with ‘what  is  undesired’. 
Experience tells us that people are frequently mistaken about their desires. We get what we desire 
and are disappointed, or we get what we did not desire and are pleasantly surprised. This is not to 
argue that we should be indifferent to the suffering of  Jennings-White, as someone who feels she is 
trapped in an able body. But there are other ways of helping her, through therapy and support, rather 
than giving her an irrevocable impairment. 
The concept of harm is indeed a slippery one, which I examine in more detail in Chapter 
Eleven. Here I simply claim that it must be a normative concept. I further claim that the normative 
idea of health implied by the term ‘impairment’, along with normative ideas of other goods that the 
paternalist may seek to provide, is necessary to the paternalist project. No doubt the list of goods 
above  (health,  family  ties,  friendship,  achievement)  could  be  extended  and  refined.  But  some 
normative idea of what it means for a human being to have a good life is required by paternalism. 
To  summarise:  paternalism  is  the  restriction  of  an  adult  person’s  freedom  (enforced  by  legal 
penalties), for their own good (where this is understood as a normative, impersonal idea of good) 
irrespective of that person’s will. This is a neutral definition which contains no presupposition either 
for or against paternalism.  
     
2. The Antipaternalist Case Considered
2.1 The Antipaternalist Presumption
The pure Political Liberal view is that paternalist arguments for banning the burqa can be ruled out 
in advance, because paternalism is wrong in principle. This view is expressed in Mill’s version of 
the Harm Principle, discussed in the previous chapter: ‘[a member of a civilised community’s] own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant’ for the state’s exercising power over 
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citizens (2005: 13). 
On this view, paternalism is unjustified, not because in particular cases in the complex real 
world it is hard to be certain that it will work, but because it is unjustifiable in principle. Even if the 
opinions of others about what would make an individual better off or happier were correct, and even 
if their exercise of power over that individual was so finely-judged as to bring about exactly the 
desired outcome, with no undesirable  side-effects,  that  still  would not be sufficient warrant  for 
interference. 
This is an extreme PL version of anti-paternalism, to which Mill himself admits exceptions 
(considered later in this chapter). A slightly more moderate version holds that paternalism, though 
not ruled out by definition, always involves some sort of disvalue. This is the view of Jonathan 
Quong.  Quong  argues  that  paternalism  is  ‘presumptively  wrong  because  of  the  way  it  denies 
someone’s moral status as a free and equal citizen (2011: 74). Paternalism might still be justified 
where the benefits were very great. But the loss of liberty or autonomy is always regrettable; if the 
benefit could be produced without sacrificing liberty or autonomy, that would always be preferable. 
This position suggests the possibility of a continuum. In its mildest version it could be held by a 
paternalist  who believed that  loss of autonomy and/or liberty was only slightly regrettable, and 
frequently outweighed by gains in welfare. In its strongest form – the form endorsed by Quong – 
the loss of liberty and/or autonomy is regarded as so serious as to be avoided at almost all costs; 
very great and certain gains in welfare would be required to justify it. I call this strong form the 
Antipaternalist Presumption. 
2.2 The Antipaternalism of Seana Shiffrin
Seana  Shiffrin  argues  in  favour  of  the  Antipaternalist  Presumption  in  her  article  ‘Paternalism, 
Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation’ (2000). She defines paternalism  as behaviour 
which is:
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(a) aimed to have (or to avoid) an effect on B or her sphere of legitimate agency
(b) that involves the substitution of A’s judgement or agency for B’s
(c) directed at B’s own interests or matters that legitimately lie within B’s control
d) undertaken on the grounds that compared to B’s judgement or agency with respect to this interest or other 
matters, A regards her judgement or agency to be (or as likely to be), in some respects, superior to B’s.
(Shiffrin 2000:  218)
Shiffrin’s references to affecting B’s legitimate sphere of influence and matters that legitimately lie 
within B’s control might appear to rule paternalism out of court. However, Shiffrin  argues: 
I do not think that this account  definitionally  implies that paternalism is necessarily,  all  things considered, 
wrong because there might be cases where ‘rights (and other forms of legitimate control) may be disregarded 
when a great deal is at stake’; though others may argue that rights and other forms of legitimate control are 
insurmountable, per se, at least as against the paternalists's sort of reasons
(2000: 220 n.). 
She allows, therefore, some ‘logical  room for dispute’, but like Quong holds that paternalism is 
always ‘morally problematic’ (Shiffrin 2000: 220 n.) 
Shiffrin states that paternalism inevitably conveys ‘a special, generally impermissible insult 
to autonomous agents’ (2000: 207). Quong agrees, claiming that state paternalism involves ‘a lack 
of respect’ towards persons (2011: 105). As the metaphor implies, to treat an adult paternalistically 
is to treat them like a child. Paternalism substitutes the judgement of the government (or relevant 
authority) for the judgement of the person who is supposed to be benefited. 
Nor  would  it  be  a  defence  of  paternalism,  according  to  Shiffrin,  that  the  substituted 
judgement really was wiser than the judgement of the person benefited. Shiffrin offers the following 
example: 
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Suppose an interlocutor raises his hand at a talk. He is called upon and just as he haltingly begins to articulate 
his point, an excited, sympathetic colleague loses self-control and interjects: ‘Isn’t there a better way to put this 
point?’ She goes on to drown him out while cleverly and eloquently articulating his point. She takes over his 
question because she feels she has a better command of it than he does.
(2000: 217).  
     
Shiffrin uses this example to argue that such behaviour would count as paternalistic even if not 
intended to benefit the agent. The normal assessment of an onlooker would be that it is paternalistic, 
she claims, even if the aim was not to help the first speaker, but to speed up the discussion or to 
ensure  it  had  more  fruitful  results.  (It  is  for  this  reason  that  she  inserts  the  ‘matters  that  lie 
legitimately within B’s control’ clause in Part c) of her definition, as an alternative to ‘B’s own 
interests’). 
I do not agree with Shiffrin that this would be paternalistic whether or not A really wanted to 
help B. Adding in cases where the motivation is not for B’s own good attenuates the definition of 
paternalism (and makes it easier to argue against en bloc, which is what Shiffrin wants to do). If A 
interrupts B not in order to help him but for some other reason then I would call her intervention 
patronising, rather than paternalistic.  But let us leave that question to one side and suppose that A’s 
motivation genuinely is to help B out. In that case we can agree that her action is paternalistic in 
intention, and also that it is insulting.
It does not follow, however, that  all  such substitutions of judgement are equally insulting. 
That would depend on the situation and the relationships of the people involved. If A were a boss, 
lecturer,  lead  moderator  or  professor  rather  than  a  colleague,  B  might  feel  helped  rather  than 
insulted. It also depends on the equability of B. Not everyone reacts in the same way to having their 
judgement overruled. As Peter de Marneffe says in his paper ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, someone may 
feel insulted without having actually been insulted (2006: 80). The wrongness might be located in 
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the person who feels the sense of insult, rather than in paternalism. 
Moreover, even if it were conceded that every substitution of agent B’s judgement by a more 
authoritative or better-equipped agent A contained the seed of an insult, that is not specifically a 
problem for paternalism. As de Marneffe points out, non-paternalistic policies also substitute an 
authority’s judgement for an individual’s. A speed limit substitutes judgement whether imposed for 
paternalistic reasons (‘You judge that you will be safe driving at 90, but you are wrong’) or non-
paternalistic reasons (‘You judge that other people will  be safe if you drive at  90, but you are 
wrong’). If paternalistic laws are wrong on the grounds that they are insulting, then so are non-
paternalistic laws which aim to benefit people; which might end up meaning all laws, which is 
probably more than Shiffrin wanted to prove. 
2.3 Two Further Antipaternalist Arguments
de Marneffe also considers and rejects two further anti-paternalist arguments. 
One is that it is impossible to draw a line between justifiable and non-justifiable paternalism 
(an argument also made by Mill). de Marneffe points out that there is the same difficulty in drawing 
a line between justifiable and non-justifiable  non-paternalist policies. He offers the examples of 
libel laws and anti-discrimination laws, where the aim is not the good of the person prohibited but 
others whom their  actions affect  (2006: 88-89).  One draws a line between justifiable and non-
justifiable non-paternalist policies by weighing the reasons for and against it and going with the 
reasons one judges to be weightier. But that is equally possible in the case of paternalist policies.
The other antipaternalist argument considered by de Marneffe is Mill’s argument from the 
grounds of ‘the permanent interests of man as a progressive being’ - i.e. to progress we must make 
our own choices and experiments in living without interference. 
Without disputing the idea that we have interests as progressive beings, de Marneffe argues 
that not all paternalistic laws damage these interests. A law prohibiting bathers from swimming at 
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beaches with lethal currents does not stop them swimming in other rough waters or from taking 
risks in general, and does not ‘deprive us of valuable information about what kinds of life are 
choiceworthy’ (2006: 87). Clearly an excess of paternalism would stifle our interests as progressive 
beings. But some paternalistic laws, to the extent that they help to ensure the safety and security of 
citizens, could forward our interests as progressive beings. 
A familiar example is the compulsory wearing of safety-belts in cars. Before the law was 
passed in Britain in 1972,  drivers and passengers often omitted to wear seatbelts, and fatalities and 
serious injuries as a result of car accidents were much higher than they have been since. There is no 
sense in which this limits our interests as progressive beings. There is a sense in which it facilitates 
our interests as progressive beings, by helping us stay alive and in a condition to progress. 
     Here is a perfectly clear example of restricting people’s liberty against their will for their own 
good  (I  take  it  as  uncontroversial  that  being  spared  from  death,  paralysis,  serious  injury  or 
permanent scarring caused by going through a windscreen at high speed is a good). Those who take 
a principled antipaternalist  position must  explain why such an obviously beneficial  and widely 
accepted paternalistic law should be repealed; or, if they think it should not be repealed, they must 
explain why it is not paternalistic; or, if they can do neither, they should cease to be principled 
antipaternalists. 
Seana Shiffrin takes the second of these options; that is, she undertakes to show that at least 
some laws which restrict liberty of individuals and benefit those same individuals are not, despite 
appearances,  paternalistic.  For  it  all  depends  on  the  precise  nature  of  the  reasons  the  law  is 
instituted.  Her exemplary case is not the seatbelt law, but the Unconscionability Doctrine –  that is, 
the doctrine in contract law which ‘enables a court to decline to enforce a contract where terms are 
seriously one-sided,  over-reaching,  exploitative,  or  otherwise manifestly  unfair’ (Shiffrin,  2000: 
205). This doctrine is accepted by liberals, and society at large, and Shiffrin herself; it is also widely 
seen as paternalistic, because by it the state ‘unravels a voluntary agreement between responsible 
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agents’.  Shiffrin claims that ‘it is commonly cited to exemplify paternalism in the law’ (2000: 206). 
Since Shiffrin is antipaternalist,  and since she accepts the Unconscionability Doctrine, she must 
attempt to show that the doctrine is not, despite appearances, paternalist. 
Shiffrin argues that the Unconscionability Doctrine can be justified by the motivation behind 
it, which need not be paternalistic: ‘[T]he motive may be a self-regarding [my italics] concern not 
to facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative or immoral action’ (2000: 224); she calls this a ‘self-
regarding refusal’ (2000: 227), rather than an other-regarding refusal (to enforce the contract) based 
on a desire to benefit B. 
Thus  the  justification  for  the  Unconscionability  Doctrine  would  rest  entirely  on  the 
motivation of the agent. In Shiffrin’s view, the same act would be justified if the motivation was 
self-regarding, and (almost certainly) unjustified if the motivation was other-regarding. 
Shiffrin holds that the state can legitimately refuse to accommodate certain behaviours for 
self-regarding reasons. On this reading it might not be paternalistic to ban smoking, or to attach 
punitive taxation to cigarettes, or to deny smokers health care for their smoking-related diseases. It 
could be self-regarding: a case of the state’s saying, as it were, ‘We refuse to support this behaviour, 
not for the sake of smokers, but because we do not choose to facilitate or assist harmful actions’. 
Note that, although in this particular case one could frame an argument for not supporting smokers 
based on preventing the harm done to others (through passive smoking), Shiffrin’s argument does 
not require that added weight.  The state could apply the Unconscionability Doctrine, not to benefit 
others (there are no others involved), nor to protect B’s welfare, but because it chose not to soil its 
hands by enforcing an unfair contract.
Shiffrin’s final move is to limit the scope of self-regarding actions, laws or policies which 
deny accommodation. Before the state decides not to accommodate a choice, it should ask itself 
certain vital questions: 
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Is the decision highly personal and critical to one’s sense of self? Is it a highly personal [choice] involving the 
body? [Will] the denial of accommodation... engender significant harm or loss of agency?
(Shiffrin 2000: 248.)
The  law on  seatbelts  would  almost  certainly  get  through  such  an  interrogation;  and  therefore 
compulsory seatbelt-wearing could be justified as a denial of accommodation, without resort to 
paternalism. 
If Shiffrin’s argument is sound, it would permit or enjoin many of the same policies that a 
paternalist would urge. It is a similar tactical move to the doctrine of double-effect, first formulated 
by Thomas Aquinas in the  Summa Theologica  (MacIntyre, SEP, Winter 2014), and employed by 
many  Roman  Catholics  to  justify  medical  treatment  which  shortens  the  life  of  a  suffering, 
terminally-ill patient: if the treatment is designed to relieve pain but also has the effect of shortening 
life, so long as the relief of pain is the true motivation, then the treatment-administerer is not guilty 
of euthanasia. 
The difficulty is that there is considerable scope for dishonesty or self-delusion about this. 
The same difficulty attends Shiffrin’s approach. As Peter de Marneffe argues, just because a policy 
need not be motivated on other-regarding grounds is no evidence that it is not in fact so motivated 
(2006: 70).  It  seems odd that  a law making the wearing of seatbelts compulsory (for instance) 
should be motivated by the state’s  self-regarding desire not to accommodate risky behaviour by 
drivers. In the first place the state is not a self; it  is hard to see how it could be motivated by 
personal feelings such as a desire not to soil its hands. But even if one concedes that the state might 
be  thought  of  as  a  collective  self  and that  it  is  appropriate  to  impute  feelings  to  it,  it  is  still 
implausible that the real motivation behind the seat-belt law is simply that the state did not ‘want’ to 
accommodate the behaviour of seatbeltless drivers. The real motivation is that the law prevents 
fatalities and serious injuries to seatbeltless drivers. Put the two motivations side by side and it is 
obvious which is the stronger. Not only that, the weaker motivation is logically dependent upon the 
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stronger. The state would have no reason to wish not to accommodate risky behaviour, if the risky 
behaviour did not result in fatalities and serious injuries. ‘Well, but the fatalities and serious injuries 
entail financial and emotional costs on others’ (the State might reply). But it seems impossible to be 
confident that  this, rather than the welfare of the drivers themselves, is the true motivation for 
making seatbelts compulsory. Nor do the two motivations exclude each other. A paternalist could 
happily endorse both. An antipaternalist seems committed to the view that saving the lives of the 
drivers themselves adds nothing at all to the justification for having such a law. 
Shiffrin’s  project  of  reconciling  an  anti-paternalistic  position  with  support  for  (some) 
paternalistic-seeming laws thus seems problematic. As de Marneffe argues, one cannot prove that 
this reconciliation project  is impossible to achieve (2006: 90). There may be other,  better non-
paternalistic  reasons  than  those  identified  by  Shiffrin.  But  one  can  at  least  point  to  particular 
policies which are widely endorsed by both paternalists and anti-paternalists, and show that they 
seem to be better justified by paternalistic than by non-paternalistic reasons. 
To summarise: the Antipaternalist Presumption is rejected. Even if one concedes that restricting 
liberty or autonomy of an agent is always a disvalue, there seems no reason to pre-suppose that this 
disvalue will always or usually outweigh any benefits to the agent.
3. Weak/Strong and Soft/Hard Paternalism
3.1 Two distinctions
Within paternalism two distinctions can be made. They are between soft and  hard paternalism, and 
weak and strong paternalism. Soft paternalism is characterised by Gerald Dworkin as ‘ the view that 
the only conditions under which state paternalism is justified is when it is necessary to determine 
whether the person being interfered with is acting voluntarily and knowledgeably’ (Dworkin, G., 
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SEP Winter 2017).  Mill in On Liberty supplies a famous example of soft paternalism, although he 
does not use that term: forcibly preventing somebody crossing a bridge which they do not know to 
be unsafe (presumably it is impossible to warn them; perhaps they do not speak English). This 
would not infringe their liberty: ‘for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not 
desire to fall into the river’ (Mill 2005: 117). Hard paternalism, on the other hand, means preventing 
fully informed and voluntary actions for the agent’s own good. 
Weak paternalism legitimises restriction of liberty in cases where the agent has chosen the 
wrong means to achieve their ends. So, as Gerald Dworkin puts it, ‘if a person really prefers safety 
to convenience then it is legitimate to force them to wear seatbelts’ ((Dworkin, G., SEP Winter 
2017). Strong paternalism, on the other hand, would legitimise forcing a driver to wear a seatbelt 
even if they did not value safety over convenience; because in the view of the strong paternalist the 
driver is mistaken about the ends they should be pursuing.
Even those who support the Antipaternalist Presumption ought to accept both weak and soft 
paternalism. Such cases seem unproblematic. Mill accepts that the state or authorities have a right 
and duty to intervene in such cases. So, presumably, would Shiffrin and Quong. 
Soft  paternalism  substitutes  the  judgement  of  the  state  or  competent  authority  for  the 
judgement of a person whose judgement is acknowledged to be under-informed or impaired. There 
is nothing insulting or disrespectful about that. 
Weak paternalism does not violate liberty or autonomy. It may safeguard them. In the first 
place, such intervention can preserve the life or health of the agent, allowing them scope for liberty 
and autonomy in the future. Moreover, it does this only by compelling them to do what they would 
choose to do anyway, if they fully understood the best way to achieve their ends. 
Those of the Antipaternalist Presumption would require firm guarantees that, in the case of 
soft  paternalism, the agent’s judgement genuinely was under-informed or impaired, and that the 
restrictions  placed  on  them  genuinely  were  for  their  own  good;  and,  in  the  case  of  weak 
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paternalism, that the course of action (or non-action) imposed upon the agent genuinely was what 
they would choose for themselves, if they had a more accurate idea of how best to achieve their 
ends. 
A straightforward position is thus available to the antipaternalist: weak and soft paternalism 
are permitted, but hard or strong paternalism are not. 
One  problem for  this  position  is  that  it  rules  out  such  hard  paternalist  policies  as  the 
compulsory seatbelt law, considered in the previous section, which deliver benefits we would not 
willingly  forego.  Consideration  of  beneficent  hard  or  strong  paternalist  policies  which  do  not 
impose too great a cost in term of loss of liberty but deliver very substantial benefits may alone be 
enough to undermine the weak/soft-paternalism-only position. 
In the next section, however, I challenge it from another angle, by questioning whether there 
is an insuperable line between soft/weak and hard/strong paternalism.
3.2. Questioning the distinctions
Let us conduct two thought experiments, stemming from Mill’s example of soft paternalism –  that 
is, preventing an unwitting person from crossing an unsafe bridge. 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 1
Suppose we manage to stop the person from crossing the unsafe bridge and explain to them, by 
means of an interpreter, that it is in danger of collapse. Bu they reply that even though they now 
know the risk, they are willing to take it as they are late for a very important appointment. 
Now the bridge-crosser is informed about the condition of the bridge so the remit of the soft 
paternalist might be thought to be at an end. Yet perhaps the soft paternalist can still find reasons to 
detain them. Perhaps the bridge-crosser does not know exactly how much weight the bridge will 
bear; perhaps they do not even know, accurately, how much they themselves weigh; nor how likely 
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they are to die if the bridge does collapse. They are not in a position to evaluate the extent of the 
risk. Moreover, perhaps they do not know with certainty the consequences of being late for, or 
missing their appointment. And perhaps they are not fully aware of how their death would impact 
on those close to them. It would still seem to be within the purview of soft paternalism to detain 
them longer while remedying their ignorance on these matters. As long as one knew more about the 
facts  of  the  situation  than  the  bridge-crosser  (imagine  an  intervener  with  the  same  kind  of 
omniscience as the angel who saves the James Stewart character from drowning himself in  It’s a 
Wonderful Life) soft paternalism would justify one in detaining them, because in allowing them to 
cross the bridge in a state of comparative ignorance, one might be allowing them to take a course of 
action which they themselves, if more fully informed, would repudiate. There is thus a slippery 
slope from soft  paternalism to hard paternalism, for the intervener could continue to say (with 
justification as long as they were better informed than the agent), ‘I must prevent you from doing 
what you think you wish to do, because when you are fully informed, you will no longer wish to do 
it.’
There are two natural  blocks to this slippery slope.  One is that  in practice the state,  or 
relevant authority, would not necessarily be better informed than the agent. They might be worse 
informed. The other is that once the agent is fully informed, or as fully informed as possible, the 
role  of  the  soft  paternalist  is  at  an  end.  Nevertheless,  the  remit  of  soft  paternalism might  be 
extended much further than might first appear. 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 2
The following thought-experiment is designed to question the bright line between weak and strong 
paternalism. Suppose that the bridge-crosser, when informed of the state of the bridge, says: ‘Good 
– I now want to cross more than ever, because I have been planning to kill myself for some time, 
and this is the ideal opportunity.’
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Let  us  also  suppose  that  the  bridge-crosser  is  not  suffering  from any  mental  illness  or 
incompetency. They have made a settled, rational decision to end their life, for reasons that appear 
good to them. A weak paternalist ought to allow them to plunge to their death, for the bridge-crosser 
knows what  they want and they know how to get  it..  Yet  the weak paternalist  might  entertain 
worries  about  whether  their  choice  really  was  in  their  own  interests;  whether,  whatever  was 
troubling them, there might be some better means to address it than by suicide. The weak paternalist 
might feel impelled to try to stop them killing themselves at that point in order to buy them time to 
reconsider.  If the desire to die was the agent’s overriding will and purpose, and continued unabated 
for a long time, finally one might accept that this was not a case for any kind of paternalism, since 
keeping someone alive against their sincere and settled will is not for their own good. But most of 
us would think it justified to give strong paternalism a go and save their life at least once before it 
reached that stage, simply because of one’s normal duty of beneficence towards others. A duty of 
beneficence does not usually require us to prevent another person from carrying out their own will. 
But where their own will is self-destructive the duty of beneficence might require us to intervene. 
This is evident in cases where the agent is not fully competent (soft paternalism). But competent 
agents make mistakes too (Romeo taking poison because he thinks Juliet is dead, when she is only 
unconscious).  Minor mistakes are the agent’s own business. We refrain from interfering where the 
agent is capable of learning from their mistakes. But killing oneself is irreversible. If we do not 
intervene they will never have the chance to change their mind. 
     
3.4 An additional objection to the weak-strong distinction from Derek Parfit
The fact that an agent may change their mind – that what they desire now may be different from 
what they desire tomorrow and very different indeed from what they desire in a year or a decade – 
leads us into another problematic area. The distinction between weak and strong paternalism is 
based on a snapshot or cross-section of an agent at one moment in time, when they desire one 
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particular goal and a paternalistic intervener desires, on their behalf, another. But we are temporal 
creatures.  We live  and  change  through  time.  Just  as  a  child  may  resist  or  resent  paternalistic 
interference from a parent but be grateful for it in later life, so an adult might wish to reject an 
imposed goal but later come to accept it. 
Derek Parfit takes this line of thought much further in  Reasons and Persons  (1987).  He 
argues for a Reductionist view of the self – i.e. the view that selfhood is no more than physical and 
psychological  continuity  and connectedness  (there  is  no  ‘deep further  fact  (Parfit  1987:  312)). 
Since on Parfit’s view selfhood is a matter of degree – that is to say, the psychological and physical 
connectedness between past, present and future versions of a self can be expressed  (in principle) in 
percentage terms, rather than in the all-or-nothing relation of numerical identity –  it is possible to 
be  extremely  specially  concerned  about  myself  tomorrow  (a  self  to  whom  I  am  strongly 
psychologically connected) and considerably less specially concerned about myself in forty years 
time (a self to whom I comparatively weakly connected).
What, then, shall we say about acts of imprudence? On this view, imprudence should not be 
criticised as irrational. For ‘it cannot be irrational for me to care less [about my future self], when 
there will be less connectedness’ (Parfit 1987: 318). Instead, imprudence can be criticised from a 
moral direction. 
There are two ways of doing this. One is a Consequentialist criticism: my imprudence now 
harms my future self, which is wrong, in just the same way that other acts of mine which harm other 
people are wrong (and the less connected I am to my future self, the closer are such future-self-
harming to acts that harm others). 
The other way is to think of our acts as ‘agent-relative’ - i.e.  we have ‘special obligations to 
those to whom we stand in certain relations, such as our parents, children, pupils, patients, clients or 
constituents’ (Parfit 1987: 319). On this view, as we have a special relation to our future selves, so 
we have special obligations to our future selves.
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In either case, but especially on the Consequentialist view (which holds good even if one 
denies or refuses special obligations) a case for hard strong paternalism can be made, though Parfit 
does not spell this out. Just as it is legitimate to intervene to prevent individuals harming others, it is 
legitimate to intervene to prevent individuals harming their future selves, who, Parfit points out, 
cannot defend themselves (1987: 319). 
If the argument is sound, then the distinction between weak and strong paternalism again 
becomes blurred: the gap between what the agent wants and what they ought to want may well 
narrow as the agent slowly becomes a different person. Indeed, the distinction between paternalism 
and any kind of morality that seeks to prevent harm and foster good to others begins to melt away. 
Note that even if one does not go all the way with Parfit’s conception of personal identity, 
the general line of argument still destabilises the weak-only paternalist position. For whether my 
future  self  has  the same identity  as  my present  self  or  not,  my future  self  will  certainly have 
different ideas, goals and desires from my present self. It is, perhaps, an open question whether I am 
a different person from my childhood self. But that I have different ideas, goals and desires from 
that childhood self is a fact. That I am now grateful for (literal) paternalist intervention which I then 
resisted and resented is also a fact. Such changes of mind of mind do not cease when one becomes 
an  adult,  although  their  rate  slows  down.  An  intervention  that  I  resentfully  regard  as  strong 
paternalism now may look like weak paternalism a few years hence. 
4. The Paternalist Presumption
4.1 Conly’s Coercive Paternalism
Those who think of human beings as primarily rational agents, consistently able to make choices 
which will help them realise their well-chosen goals, will  not extend the remit  of weak or soft 
paternalism very far.  Sarah Conly, however, in her book Against Autonomy, argues that in general 
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human beings are poor judges of their own good. Therefore almost all paternalism is effectively soft 
paternalism.  Moreover  Conley  argues  that  human beings  are  poor  practical  reasoners,  too,  not 
skilled at working out how to get what they want, so that most paternalism is also weak. Her view is 
thus the opposite of the Anti-Paternalist Presumption. We could call it the Paternalist Presumption. 
Sarah Conly argues for what she calls Coercive Paternalism – the view that: 
We may,  and indeed are sometimes specifically  morally  obligated to,  force people to  refrain from certain 
actions and to engage in others’ [for their own good, as has been established by Conly’s preceding discussion of 
what paternalism means] 
(2013: 17-18). 
The argument runs as follows. Conly believes that the high value placed on liberty in the liberal 
tradition rests on a false claim about human rationality. 
[T]he ground for valuing liberty is the claim that we are pre-eminently rational agents, each of us well-suited to 
determining what goes on in our own life. There is ample evidence, however, from the fields of psychology and 
behavioural economics, that in many situations this is simply not true
(2013: 2).   
Conly is right that in many circumstances human beings are poor reasoners – not, indeed, compared 
to other animals, but compared to the standards of rationality we set ourselves. We are prey to a 
range of cognitive biases identified quite recently by psychologists and social scientists: we are 
irrationally influenced by the  way options are  framed;  our  calculations are  swayed by wishful 
thinking; we are poor at analysing risk; we over-value things we already have and under-value those 
we do not (the Endowment Effect); we are prone to making judgements based on stereotypes; we 
are more influenced by experience and anecdote than by statistics, and so on (see Kahneman, 2011). 
Allowing people maximal liberty, therefore, is simply allowing us ‘to struggle with our own 
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inabilities and suffer the consequences’, as Conly puts it (2013: 1). Those consequences may be 
life-wrecking or life-ending, as in Conly’s favoured example of smoking cigarettes. 
Conly identifies two standard responses to this problem. Liberals are not indifferent to harm 
caused by bad choices. What they seek to do is minimise that harm without coercion, by ensuring 
that citizens are  well-informed.  Thus, if citizens are fully informed about the dangers of smoking 
(by  health  warnings  on  cigarette  packets,  public  information  broadcasts,  posters  in  doctors’ 
surgeries etc), they are less likely to adopt the habit, or more likely to give it up. Such campaigns 
have had some success. But only some. Conly says: 
It’s true that a smaller percentage of the population smokes now than did before it was discovered that smoking 
causes cancer. On the other hand, more than 20 percent of the American population does smoke, despite the 
millions of dollars spent in schools and the unmissable warnings on cigarette packages.
(2013: 25) 
Smoking is  a  clear-cut  case.  As Conly points  out,  if  it  is  difficult  to  get  everyone to  respond 
appropriately to the fact that smoking is dangerous, how much more difficult would it be to get 
them to be alert to their own cognitive biases? Conly therefore rejects this approach. Giving people 
the right information is not enough, alone, to ensure wise choice-making.
An alternative is the libertarian paternalist approach, as advocated by Thaler and Sunstein in 
their 2003 paper ‘Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron’, and subsequently in their best-
selling  book  Nudge. Instead  of  or  in  addition  to  informing  people  about  the  consequences  of 
choices,  the  state  (or  relevant  authority),  makes  beneficial  choices  more  likely  by  exploiting 
people’s cognitive biases, in the way options are presented or framed in any given situation. An 
example  Thaler  and  Sunstein  give  is  putting  fruit  before  sugary  desserts  in  cafeteria  lines; 
customers are more likely to choose the healthy option if they encounter it first, and less likely to do 
so if they have to run a gauntlet of cakes and puddings first (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). 
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Conly has two criticisms of this approach. First, although it seeks to respect liberal belief in 
free choice by eschewing coercion, it uses manipulation instead. But manipulation obstructs free 
choice as surely as coercion, though more subtly. An anti-paternalist liberal would be against both 
in principle. Conly is against  neither in principle, but points out that  manipulation is often less 
effective than coercion. This is her second and main criticism of the Libertarian Paternalist position. 
Putting the sugary desserts last reduces the likelihood that they will be chosen. But they will still be 
chosen by some people, because ‘the option to err remains in place’ (2013: 32). 
Conly’s position of Coercive Paternalism allows removal of the option to err: 
Rather  than leaving us  to  sink or  swim, as  does liberalism,  or  engaging in  mental  manipulation,  as  does 
libertarian paternalism, the coercive paternalist will simply say some things are not allowed
(2013: 32).  
Let us apply these approaches to the burqa question (assuming for the sake of argument that burqa-
wearing could have harmful effects on the life of the wearer). The liberal position would be to 
inform its citizens loudly and clearly of the harmful effects and then leave the decision up to them. 
The  Libertarian  Paternalist  position  would  be  to  devise  policies  that  subtly  discourage  burqa-
wearing. And the Coercive Paternalist position would be to remove the burqa-wearing option by 
making it illegal. 
Note that this is a disagreement about means, not ends. All three positions would aim to 
reduce and, ideally, eliminate burqa-wearing, for the sake of the wearers (still supposing burqa-
wearing to have harmful effects). The difference lies in what means are considered permissible. 
Conly’s argument is that, human beings being what we are, only the coercive approach is likely to 
prove efficacious. 
Conly argues that her position is not as controversial as it may appear: 
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The paternalism I promote here is not a paternalism about ultimate ends; that is, I do not argue that there are 
objectively good ends, or objectively rational ends, or ends objectively valuable in any way, which everyone 
should be made to pursue. I am arguing for intervention in cases where people’s choices of instrumental means 
are confused, in a way that means they will not achieve their ultimate ends. If my subjective end is happiness, 
and I think playing the lottery will promote that, not because the suspense gives me some evanescent pleasure, 
but because I really think I have a reasonable chance of winning, I am mistaken about my means... [I]f we 
constrain action only to get the person to do what he would want to do if he were fully informed and fully 
rational, this may seem unproblematic.
If the position I am taking here is uncontroversial, I  am quite willing to have it be so: we could 
proceed with crafting paternalistic legislation!
(2013: 43)
Of course,  coercion is not always the most effective way of restricting self-harmful choices. In 
some cases manipulation,  because it  does not arouse opposition,  may work better.  In principle, 
though, I agree with Conly that coercive paternalism can be legitimate, and acceptable to liberals. 
There is no insuperable line between weak/soft and strong/hard paternalism.
4.2  The Liberal Paternalist Principle 
Yet there must be some limits to paternalism if anything of a liberal position is to remain. The 
limiting principle I propose is the Liberal Paternalism Principle: where the restriction of liberty is 
small,  and the gain in welfare great, then paternalism can be justified. Where the restriction of 
liberty is great, and the gain in welfare small, then paternalism cannot be justified. 
This is a rule of thumb – there is no precise way to measure smallness and greatness in such 
matters. But it  is clear that  restricting a person’s liberty in a well-defined area which does not 
intrude into every aspect of their life would count as a small restriction.  Saving them from death or 
serious injury would count as a great gain in welfare. 
Here  is  an  example  of  a  paternalist  policy  which  seems to  pass  this  test.  In  1998,  the 
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government  of  the  United  Kingdom passed legislation  to  restrict  the  pack size  of  paracetamol 
tablets to 32 tablets in pharmacies, 16 tablets in other retail outlets. The aim of the law was to 
reduce death by suicide; previously it had been possible to buy packs of 100 tablets, sufficient for a 
lethal dose. The result, according to research by the British Medical Journal published in 2013, was 
a 43% reduction in the number of deaths  by overdose in the 11.25 years since the law was passed – 
or 765 fewer deaths than would otherwise have been predicted (BMJ 2013; 346, accessed online 
16/01/2018). 
The restriction of liberty involved here is very small. People are still able to buy paracetamol 
for the purpose of pain relief. The only restriction is that they cannot buy bumper-sized packs. And 
the gain is very great. Hundreds of lives have been saved. This policy, then, is consistent with the 
Liberal Paternalist Principle. 
Where  the  gain  in  welfare  is  more  minor,  and/or  restriction  of  liberty  is  more  major, 
paternalist policies become harder to justify, until a point where justification is no longer possible. 
Imagine a law which stipulated that all persons should wear a padded suit when out in public, to 
protect them from bruising if they fell over. Here the restriction of liberty would be great and the 
harms  avoided  very  small.  Such  a  policy  could  not  be  justified  under  the  Liberal  Paternalist 
Principle.
5. Paternalism and the Burqa 
If  the Liberal  Paternalism Principle  is  granted we can proceed to ask whether  it  would justify 
banning the burqa. 
One paternalist argument is the argument from health. This is one of the most common and 
widely accepted types of paternalist argument. The restriction of pack-sizes of paracetamol and the 
enforcement of the wearing of safety-belts in cars have already been discussed. Such laws do not 
feel uncomfortable for a liberal to justify, as the damage to health avoided is very great, and the 
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restriction of liberty small. 
Applying this to the burqa, then: does burqa-wearing pose a serious threat to health? Martha 
Nussbaum notes that ‘one frequently hears the argument that the burqa is per se unhealthy, because 
it  is  hot  and  uncomfortable’ (2012:  129),  and  describes  this  as  ‘perhaps  the  silliest  of  the 
arguments’.  Certainly  as  she  presents  it  is  less  than  compelling.  As she goes on to  point  out, 
‘Clothing that  covers  the body can be comfortable  or  uncomfortable,  depending on the fabric’ 
(Nussbaum 2012: 129). In hot weather covering the body may be healthier than not, diminishing the 
risk of skin cancer. Moreover, being hot and uncomfortable is not a risk to health anyway. It is 
simply  being  hot  and  uncomfortable,  which  is  certainly  not  a  major  enough  harm  to  justify 
paternalist intervention. 
There are stronger versions of the argument, however, not considered by Nussbaum. Direct 
skin contact with the sun’s rays is our main source of Vitamin D, and habitual all-body covering 
leads  to  Vitamin D deficiency,  a  condition  that  causes  bone  abnormalities,  rickets  and muscle 
weakness. This fact might suffice to make a case for a paternalist burqa-ban, if a ban were the only 
way to remedy the matter. 
But it is not the only way. Burqa-wearers could remove the burqa in their own gardens or 
other  private  spaces  and  soak  up  some  sunshine.  Vitamin  D  supplements  in  tablet  form  are 
available.  A government concerned about Vitamin D deficiency in burqa-wearers could publicise 
the  condition  and  its  causes  and  consequences,  and  make  supplements  available  to  correct  it, 
without  recourse  to  the  blunt  instrument  of  a  ban,  which  has  many  other  effects  besides 
counteracting Vitamin D Deficiency.
It  is  also requisite  that  any paternalist  policies  pursued by a  liberal  state  be consistent, 
treating all citizens equally. Nussbaum argues that the arguments commonly advanced for a burqa-
ban are ethically inconsistent: 
105
All five [arguments] are made inconsistently, in ways that tacitly favour majority practices and burden minority 
practices. They are thus not compatible with a principle of equal liberty. Hence, in turn, they are not compatible 
with the idea of equal respect for conscience from which that principle springs
(2012: 105).  
As we shall see, I do not agree that all the five arguments discussed by Nussbaum are always made 
inconsistently. But Nussbaum is right to insist on ethical consistency as a requisite test for taking 
such arguments seriously, and she is also right that the argument from health fails to pass it. For the 
burqa is by no means the only form of clothing which can have adverse effects on health. Nussbaum 
asks: 
...would the arguer really seek to ban  all uncomfortable and possibly unhealthy female clothing? Wouldn’t we 
have to begin with high heels, delicious as they are? But no, high heels are associated with majority norms... 
and so draw no ire.
(2012: 130). 
Moreover, clothing which leaves large areas of skin exposed to the sun could lead to skin cancer, a 
more serious condition than Vitamin D deficiency, and no one is arguing for a bikini-ban.
But  perhaps  burqa-wearing  entails  other  losses  in  well-being,  besides  possible  health 
problems, which require paternalist attention? Wearing a burqa cuts one off from a great deal of 
social intercourse, making it impossible to smile at other people, for example. It prevents the wearer 
from feeling the breeze or the sun on her face. Another point to consider is whether burqa-wearing 
could adversely affect mental health. Communicating with facial expressions is so deep-rooted a 
human instinct that the inability to do so in public spaces might plausibly lead to mental health 
problems  such  as  loneliness,  stress  or  depression.  If  this  were  so  then  a  case  for  paternalist 
intervention might be justified. 
However, there seems to be no evidence to date that burqa-wearing does lead to mental 
106
health problems. Inability to express oneself via the face has not been found to cause mental health 
problems in those who suffer from Moebius Syndrome. Moebius syndrome is a rare congenital 
condition in which the sufferer is afflicted with permanent facial paralysis. Sufferers find social 
interaction difficult as a result. However, a 2009 study by Bogart and Matsumoto found that: 
People with Moebius syndrome reported significantly lower social competence than the matched control group 
and normative data but did not differ significantly from the control group or norms in anxiety, depression, or 
satisfaction with life.
(Bogart and Matsumoto, 2009)
If even sufferers from Moebius Syndrome do not suffer mental health problems as a result of not 
being able to communicate through facial expressions, it seems unlikely that burqa-wearers should 
do so. It  is true that people with Moebius report lower social competence; but since one of the 
purposes of the burqa is to reduce the incidence of social interaction, this would not seem to count 
as a problem for burqa-wearers. Besides, burqa-wearers have plenty of opportunity to communicate 
through facial expressions in private, with their own family or female friends, so there is no reason 
to suppose social competence in those situations would be reduced. 
Finally one might consider the effects that burqa-wearing has on life-chances. It drastically 
limits career opportunities. No woman wearing a burqa is going to get a job as a teacher, a doctor, a 
barrister, a TV presenter, a Member of Parliament, an actor or an athlete. But a monk or a nun in an 
enclosed order, or a recluse, also has drastically limited career opportunities. If burqas were to be 
banned on the grounds that they restrict life and career opportunities, then ethical consistency would 
require that becoming a monk a nun or a recluse should also be banned. 
Any possible risk to health or well-being brought on by voluntary burqa-wearing is more 
than matched by risks to health or well-being brought on by other types of activity and lifestyle – 
smoking, unhealthy eating, doing dangerous sports, etc – and ethical consistency would require that 
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if we want to ban the burqa for paternalist reasons we should ban those things too. 
Banning the burqa to safeguard health and well-being fails to meet the test of the Liberal 
Paternalism Principle. Preventing a devout Wahhabist Muslim woman from wearing a burqa is a 
major restriction of liberty, affecting every aspect of her daily life. To justify that the benefits would 
have to be very great. But though burqa-wearing might lead to some (remediable) health problems, 
and some discomfort, it certainly does not endanger life, nor impair vital functions. There are social 
and professional disadvantages, but not such as would prevent the burqa-wearer enjoying family 
life, friendships, and satisfactions and achievements within her community. In short, a burqa-ban on 
grounds of health and well-being would be a major restriction of liberty for fairly small benefits, 
and could not be justified by the Liberal Paternalism Principle. 
A paternalist ban on the grounds of supporting personal autonomy, however, is less easy to 
dismiss. This will be considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX
PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND THE BURQA
The Argument
This chapter considers Autonomy-based Paternalism: that is, paternalist action in order to secure or 
promote not welfare in general but personal autonomy. This form of paternalism has at first blush a 
paradoxical air. There seems something odd about the state’s propelling citizens towards autonomy, 
when the whole point of autonomy is that one decides for oneself what one values. However, the 
paradox is only apparent. For if persons have no autonomy to begin with, then paternalist actions 
cannot take it  away. Moreover, as Colburn has argued (see Chapter Four) if the state promotes 
second-order autonomy, then first-order autonomy is not inhibited, but enabled (Colburn 2010). 
In this chapter I argue for a conception of personal autonomy which is a) relational and b) 
content-neutral. I argue that autonomy should not be the sole value of importance to a liberal state. 
It would be the duty of a liberal state to protect or enable personal autonomy, but not to enforce it. 
The same would be true of other goods such as development of intelligence. This position is in line 
with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (2001). 
If it is the case that burqa-wearing is incompatible with personal autonomy, then the liberal 
state would have a justification for preventing burqa-wearing. However, I argue that burqa-wearing 
is  not  necessarily  incompatible  with  second-order  autonomy.  The crucial  factor  is  whether  the 
choice to wear a burqa is  revocable.  If it is, then second-order autonomy is preserved. Following 
Colburn  and  Nussbaum,  and  in  contrast  to  Clare  Chambers  (2008),  I  prioritise  second-order 
autonomy over first-order autonomy. Therefore,  as long as the choice of burqa-wearing can be 
revoked at any time by the wearer(s), the liberal state has no justification for intervening on grounds 
of autonomy-protecting paternalism. 
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1. Defining Personal Autonomy
Let  us  begin with a  brief  explanation of  the term  autonomy.  It  is  a  quality  which is  normally 
dependent on freedom, but is not synonymous with freedom. Freedom is a condition: the absence of 
relevant restrictions or of interference, as well as the presence of whatever resources are necessary 
to make acting freely feasible. Autonomy is a quality which enables a person to make a certain kind 
of use of that freedom. 
The basic definition of autonomy is simple.  It  means ‘self-rule’,  from the Greek  autos-  
meaning ‘self’ and -nomy meaning ‘rule’ or ‘law’.  Words often part company from their original 
meanings over the centuries,  but  in this case ‘self-rule’ still  captures the essential  sense of the 
concept.  An autonomous nation, for example, is one which rules itself, deciding upon its own aims, 
policies and laws. It is not a satellite nation, obedient to the dictates of another, stronger, controlling 
power. This usage is faithful to the original Greek meaning, when the word was used to denote the 
political independence of city-states (Dworkin, G, in Carter, Kramer and Steiner 2007: 333). The 
word has since extended its semantic reach to describe individual persons who rule themselves, 
deciding on their own aims, policies and laws.     
Kant regarded this quality as necessary to morality. A moral person is one who is ‘subject 
only to laws given by himself but still universal’ (Kant [1785] 2008: 40). He calls this principle ‘the 
autonomy of the will’ (Kant [1785] 2008: 41). Autonomy is the property of rational beings, and in 
virtue of it, one is a member of ‘the kingdom of ends’: i.e. a moral realm where everyone is to treat 
themselves  and  all  others  ‘never  merely  as  means  but  always  at  the  same  time  as  ends  in  
themselves’ (Kant [1785] 2008: 41). The characteristically liberal feature of this formulation is that 
all  rational beings are included under it. Personal autonomy was valued in the ancient world for 
kings and emperors, but not for slaves or the general populace. In Kant’s system, every rational 
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being is equally accorded the dignity of being an autonomous moral agent. It is true that Kant had 
some racist ideas (Allais 2016) and might not have admitted  all races to be fully rational; but this is 
a feature of his thinking that we can dispense with. The ideal of universal moral autonomy does not 
depend on qualification by race.
 The  importance  of  personal  autonomy  is  well  captured  by  Isaiah  Berlin  in  his 
characterisation of ‘positive liberty’ in his essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1998). Berlin explains 
positive liberty as that which is possessed and exercised by a person able to satisfy
the wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are [their] own, 
not by causes which affect [them], as it were, from outside... deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and 
not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if [they] were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of 
playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of [their] own and realising them
(Berlin, 1998, p. 203). 
Although Berlin invokes at least two other senses of positive liberty in the essay (see Swift 2001: 
52-68), this particular characterisation is an apt description of the idea of personal autonomy, and an 
explanation of why it is valued. It underpins an ideal of human dignity, attainable by all rational 
beings. As far as we know, no other creatures on earth are fully rational in the sense that humans 
are. Autonomy is thus something that is ‘distinctive and valuable about human life’ (Colburn 2010, 
p. 2). 
2. Autonomy-Based Paternalism
Paternalism is often held to be in direct opposition to personal autonomy. Marina Oshana describes 
autonomy as ‘the good that paternalism fails to respect’ (1989: 82), and in the majority of scenarios 
that is true. However, there is one type of case in which the two are compatible: where paternalist 
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policies are required to provide or promote personal autonomy. 
This sounds contradictory, but is not. Paternalism is easy to justify when its object has no 
autonomy in the first place, because then its exercise does not fail to respect autonomy (there is 
none to be disrespected). For instance, babies lack autonomy, and it is not merely justifiable but 
necessary that we act paternalistically towards them. It is this paternalist care which enables them to 
grow into individuals with personal autonomy. 
There is, then, a possible Autonomy-based Paternalist Argument for a burqa ban in a liberal 
state. If burqa-wearers lack autonomy, then  the state may be justified in restricting their liberty to 
wear burqas, irrespective of their wishes, in order to restore their autonomy. 
Whether the argument works depends on two questions. 1) Is it the goal of liberalism to 
promote personal autonomy? And 2) Is wearing the burqa incompatible with personal autonomy? If 
the answer to both those questions is ‘Yes’, then the Autonomy-Based Paternalist Argument could 
justify a burqa-ban.
To anticipate: in Section 4 below, I argue, contra Raz and Colburn, that it is not the sole goal 
of a liberal state to promote autonomy. Autonomy, though valuable, does not automatically have 
primacy  over  other  values.  However,  that  does  not  of  itself  invalidate  the  Autonomy-Based 
Paternalist Argument. It could be one of the goals of a liberal state to promote personal autonomy, 
as a valuable thing among others. 
In Section 6 I shall argue that in extreme cases – like the situation of a burqa-wearer in 
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan – a  ban could theoretically  be  justified on the  Autonomy-based 
Paternalist Argument. Although, of course, in that case there is no liberal state in place to enforce a 
ban. On the other hand, in liberal states where a ban could be enforced it would be far less likely to 
be justified. 
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3. The Value of Autonomy in Liberalism
The  controversy  for  liberals  is  not  over  whether  personal  autonomy  is  valuable,  or  whether 
everyone has an equal right to it. The answer to both those questions is yes. The controversy is over 
what place it should occupy in liberal theory: whether autonomy is a welcome side-effect of liberal 
principles, or the underlying justification for those principles.  
3.1 The side-effect view
On an extreme PL view, guaranteeing equal and extensive liberties for all is the only essential thing. 
Brian Barry (2011) is representative of this position. He argues that a liberal state has no duty to 
promote autonomy. On his view, personal autonomy is a side-effect of liberalism rather than  the 
justification for the liberal project, which rests simply on principles of equal freedom.  A liberal 
state should allow personal autonomy, but not promote it as an ideal:
...contemporary  liberals  can,  and  do,  regard  it  as  an  argument  for  liberalism that  a  liberal  society  makes 
individual autonomy possible. But that in no way commits them to the proposition that states should engage in  
the compulsory inculcation of autonomy – an expression whose strangeness calls attention to the peculiarity of 
the whole project.
(Barry 2011: 120).  
He does, however, concede that the philosophy of doing so would qualify as a form of liberalism: 
the ideal of autonomy ‘is not a violation of neutrality between conceptions of the good’ because 
‘autonomous people can have any substantive beliefs they like’ (Barry 2011: 123). But this is not a 
form of liberalism that he himself endorses. 
3.2 Autonomy as underlying justification
113
On this view, as we have seen, achieving personal autonomy for all is the sole reason one wants to 
guarantee liberties in the first place.  Joseph Raz’s version of this view is fully perfectionist, in that 
he argues autonomy ‘is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good. The ideal of autonomy 
requires only the availability of morally acceptable options’ (Raz 2009: 381). 
              As previously discussed (Chapter Three), Ben Colburn also argues for the primacy of 
autonomy, but without any such limitation of options: it is up to the individual to decide what is 
valuable in life (Colburn 2010). His view of liberalism is similar to the one that Barry accepts as a 
form of liberalism but does not endorse: the primacy of a content-neutral autonomy. 
3.3  A third way: Autonomy as a value but not an ideal 
The two approaches reviewed thus far are disjunctive. Either autonomy as an ideal is essential to the 
liberal project, or it is entirely unnecessary. But there is a third way, articulated by Clare Chambers: 
Barry, argues, rightly, that liberals do not need to be and perhaps cannot be committed to what he calls ‘the 
ideal of autonomy’. However, liberals must be committed to the value of autonomy
(Chambers  2005: 166).
Chambers argues that although the liberal state should not seek to inculcate autonomy in its citizens, 
it must value autonomy if it is to justify liberal institutions as the most just way of dealing with 
disagreement. Certainly liberal institutions could be justified in different ways, e.g. by appeals to 
peace or prosperity (Chambers 2005). But if a liberal maintains, as Barry does, that it would be 
unjust  to  inflict  criminal  penalties  on  those  who  reject  the  beliefs  of  their  community,  or  to 
discriminate  against  them in  other  ways  (Barry  2011),  this  implies  an  appeal  to  the  value  of 
autonomy. A non-liberal need not agree; a non-liberal might well hold that dissidents should be 
forced to conform by means of penalties. But that is precisely because such a non-liberal does not 
value autonomy. To a) support liberal institutions and b) hold that liberal institutions are the most 
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just way of dealing with disagreement is necessarily to invoke the value of autonomy. 
I agree with Chambers’ reasoning on this point. The upshot is that liberals ought to protect 
autonomy and to be prepared to intervene where it is compromised or denied. This does not commit 
one to autonomy as an ideal. The point is not that everyone should be autonomous, but that nobody 
should be prevented from being so. 
If  this  is  correct,  we have  established that,  at  the  least,  autonomy is  a  necessary value 
(though not necessarily the only necessary value) for liberals. We have not yet established that it is 
not an ideal as well. To argue that it is not an ideal, I make a comparison between autonomy and 
intelligence.
4. Autonomy and Intelligence 
4.1 The purpose of the comparison 
Intelligence  is  valuable  in  similar  ways  to  autonomy  and  for  similar  reasons.  Yet  it  sounds 
implausible that the ideal of a liberal state should be to secure maximal intelligence for all. 
This is not a knock-down argument against perfectionist liberals such as Raz. It is rather a 
perspective which makes thorough-going liberal perfectionism appear implausible, because a more 
natural and less demanding way of thinking about autonomy is to hand: we can think about it in the 
same way that we think about intelligence.   
There are three main ways in which intelligence is analogous to autonomy: both are personal 
qualities; both are valuable; and both are content-neutral. I shall discuss these one by one.
4.2 An objection forestalled
First, however, a likely objection should be forestalled. It may be said that intelligence itself is not a 
simple concept: there are disagreements about how to measure it or whether it is even measurable, 
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whether it is a single quality or a multi-dimensional set of qualities, and, if it is multi-dimensional, 
what are those dimensions? Do musical ability,  or a sense of humour,  count as dimensions? Is 
intelligence a state or a process? Is intelligent behaviour based on a settled disposition, or is it to be 
understood situationally – i.e. does one’s level of intelligence depend largely on the situation one is 
in, as social psychologists like Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett theorise is the case with personality 
(Ross and Nesbitt, 2011)? And then there is the venerable debate about whether, or to what extent, 
or in what sense intelligence is either innate or the product of environment. If intelligence is not a 
clearly-defined concept, then how effectively can it be deployed as an analogy? 
There are two answers to this challenge. The first is that, despite the controversies, there is 
enough of a working consensus on what counts as intelligent behaviour, or an intelligent person, to 
speak meaningfully about intelligence. But there is a second, more interesting answer, which is that 
the controversial nature of intelligence is itself another parallel with autonomy. Autonomy is also 
the subject of dispute, comes in a variety of related forms –  personal autonomy, moral autonomy, 
political  autonomy,  group  autonomy  –   is  hard  to  measure,  and  could  be  understood  either 
dispositionally or situationally. There is also room for  discussion about the extent to which having 
an autonomous character is the product of nature or nurture (though that aspect of the debate has 
been little explored). Just as it would be hard for a state to make maximising the intelligence of all 
citizens a primary goal, because intelligence is such a slippery concept, so, too, it would be hard to 
make maximal autonomy of all citizens a primary goal, for the same reason. 
Let us now turn to the three main points of the analogy, beginning with the point that both 
autonomy and intelligence are personal qualities. 
     
4.3 Personal qualities 
Freedom is  a  condition.  So are  other  goods which the state  can provide,  such as  security  and 
welfare. These are things one has, not things one does. Intelligence on the other hand is a personal 
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quality,  (or set  of qualities) rather than a condition. It  is reliant  on background conditions:  full 
flourishing  of  intelligence  requires  liberty  of  thought,  and  enabling  conditions  like  a  decent 
education system. The liberal state can, should and does provide those background conditions. But 
after that its job is over as far as intelligence is concerned; it has led the horse to water, but it is no 
part of its task to force the horse to drink. Some people may prefer to devote their lives to excelling 
at physical pursuits rather than spending their time studying, or they may prefer sitting in a pub to 
sitting in a library, and a liberal state has no reason to object.
The same considerations hold with regard to autonomy. Like intelligence it is not a condition 
but a personal quality, that one can be more or less skilled at deploying, and more or less disposed 
to deploy. 
Both intelligence and autonomy are matters of degree; neither is an all-or-nothing quality. 
Actually both are better thought of as sets of interrelated qualities. Personal autonomy requires at 
least three qualities: rationality; independence of mind; and motivation (one must  want to choose 
one’s own values and direct one’s own life). Not everyone will possess all these qualities to an 
equal degree. The perfectionist might respond that ideally everyone should possess them to the 
maximum  extent  they  are  capable  of.  But  that  suggests  a  rather  illiberal  programme  –  the 
interference with individual independence deprecated by Mill in On Liberty ([1859] 2005). Perhaps 
some people prefer a quiet,  unadventurous life based on accepting societal or communal norms 
without a great deal of scrutiny.  It ought not to be within the purview of liberalism to insist on the 
development of certain personal qualities at the expense of others. 
We would think it both illiberal and impractical if someone claimed that the task of the state 
was to ensure that everyone developed all the qualities associated with intelligence to a maximal 
degree.  It is the task of a liberal state to guarantee the conditions for development of intelligence; 
but it is not the task of the state to force people to develop their personal intelligence to a maximal 




As argued above, personal autonomy is a valuable quality. The characteristically liberal position is 
that everyone should have equal liberty to develop and deploy it. But it is a big step from there to 
say that the state ought to encourage everybody to develop and deploy it to a maximal degree. What 
is it about autonomy that should make it, alone, the personal quality that the state must foster above 
all others? 
It might be said that autonomy is instrumentally extremely valuable. It helps us to achieve 
all sorts of other goods. A person’s autonomous decision to pursue a particular career, for example, 
may result in personal happiness or material well-being. Moreover, happiness and material well-
being, as well as personal relationships, success in achieving goals etc, depend on autonomy for a 
good deal of their meaning. They all have far more significance to the agent if they are attained 
through the agent’s autonomous choices and actions.
But all this could equally be said of intelligence. Intelligence also helps us achieve other 
goods, resulting in happiness and well-being; and successes earned by our wits are more satisfying 
than those achieved by chance (and in fact we observe that successful people seldom do attribute 
their success to chance, preferring to give the credit to their own intelligence). 
What is special about autonomy, though, the perfectionist liberal might urge, is that it is 
intrinsically valuable. Even when autonomy does not lead to success and happiness, we would still 
rather be the masters of our fate and the captains of our souls, as W.E. Henley put it (Henley [1888] 
2016: 268). . We prefer to direct our own lives. We resent the interference when others try to direct 
them for us.  Being autonomous brings a dignity to our lives. It is true that in most societies the 
mass of people have neither expected nor got much autonomy. Autonomy was the privilege of 
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powerful men; the idea that everyone should have it would once have been regarded as strange, 
indefensible and impossible. It was, we might say, a positional good. But it was always a good. The 
notion that everyone, not just kings, should have the liberty to achieve this good is the essence of 
the liberal view.
Autonomy is also, as far as we know, a uniquely human quality. With the possible exception 
of the other great apes no other animal is capable of it, and even great apes could only be capable of 
it in a severely limited sense.  
Again, however, all the same things could be said of intelligence. It, too, is intrinsically 
valuable. A lively apprehension, a grasp of complexity, appreciation of nuances, the pleasures of 
learning and of problem-solving are all aspects of intelligence which we value purely for their own 
sake.  And even when the exercise of intelligence is not enjoyable in itself, we would still prefer an 
intelligent understanding of a bad situation to the option of living in a fool’s paradise. Intelligence, 
too, is a more or less uniquely human quality, with the same partial exception of the great apes and 
a handful of other mammals, none of them capable of approaching anywhere near the  heights of 
human intelligence. 
Neither can it be said that autonomy is a more fundamental quality than intelligence, for a 
certain level of intelligence is one of the essential conditions for autonomy: a baby’s intelligence is 
not  sufficiently  developed  for  it  to  be  autonomous,  and  as  its  intelligence  grows  so  does  its 
autonomy;  and  someone  who  is  brain-damaged  or  severely  mentally  handicapped  will  never 
achieve full autonomy.
     
4.5  Content-neutrality
Another key feature of autonomy is that it is content-neutral. The actual content of the choices one 
makes is irrelevant in the question of whether one is autonomous. This naturally makes it attractive 
to liberals. In championing autonomy they are not championing any particular way of life. (There is 
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an opposing view, held by some perfectionist liberals such as Marina Oshana, that autonomy is 
substantive. I do not accept that view, and argue against it  below).  A commitment to personal 
autonomy does not imply favouring any particular values or choices. All that is relevant is the 
manner in which those choices are made and those values subscribed to. It is the content-neutrality 
of autonomy that makes Barry willing to accept autonomy-based liberalism as genuinely liberal 
(2011: 123). 
Intelligence,  equally,  is  content-neutral.  Intelligent  people  display an unlimited  range  of 
beliefs  and  behaviours.  Two  highly  intelligent  people  may  believe  directly  contrary  things 
(Heraclitus believing that everything changes and Parmenides believing that nothing changes). An 
intelligent person may even find reasons to renounce the use of intelligence: in  Candide  Voltaire 
recommends that  we should ‘Travaillons sans  raisonner:  c’est  le  seul  moyen de  rendre  la  vie  
supportable’ (Work without thinking; it is the only way to make life bearable) ([1759] 1962: 106).  
Nor is there any one belief or behaviour that an intelligent person must exhibit in order to qualify. 
Intelligence  is  also  without  moral  content.  If  somebody  employs  their  intelligence  in 
planning  terrorist  attacks,  or  devising  and  testing  instruments  of  torture,  we  do  not  therefore 
conclude that they must be unintelligent. We think it is a shame that they use their intelligence in 
ways so pernicious to the rest of us, and try to put a stop to their evil activities. 
One might object that if we understand autonomy in a similar way then we lose our reason 
to value it. This seems to be Raz’s view. He states that freedom, of which he takes autonomy to be 
‘a concrete form’ (Raz 2009: 394), is ‘not an independent separate ideal, that freedom consists in 
the pursuit of valuable forms of life, and that its value derives from the value of that pursuit’ (Raz 
2009: 395). Yet specific instances of intelligence allied to malevolence do not make us cease to 
value intelligence in general. Intelligence seems to be intrinsically valuable. I contend that personal 
autonomy is intrinsically valuable in the same way.
A liberal state, then, should view personal autonomy and should form policies regarding 
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personal  autonomy  in  the  same  way  that  it  views  intelligence  and  forms  policies  regarding 
intelligence. Stunting a person’s intellectual development by denying them education or stimulation, 
and compromising or denying another person’s autonomy, must both be proscribed by the liberal 
state. The state must also ensure the requisite conditions for the development of each (which are in 
many ways similar:  a decent education, and state-guaranteed liberty of thought, expression and 
lifestyle are requisite for both).  But there seems to me no sound liberal reason to go beyond that. 
It is always open to the perfectionist liberal to accept the analogy and say, Yes, the goal of a 
liberal state is to foster maximal development of both autonomy and intelligence. But this seems a 
move too far towards the extreme perfectionist end of the spectrum. Such an over-intervening state 
would  compromise the freedom of choice that liberals value. 
5. Autonomy and Irrevocable Choices
5.1 Taliban Woman  
In her book Personal Autonomy in Society (2006), Oshana considers the possibility of a burqa-ban 
grounded in Autonomy-based Paternalism, through means of a case study,  ‘Taliban Woman’: 
Suppose that this woman has embraced the role of subservience and the abdication of independence that it 
demands, out of reverence, a sense of purpose, an earnest belief in the sanctity of this role as espoused in 
certain passages of the Qu’ran... She is not permitted to support herself financially. She does not have legal 
custody of her children... She has no voice in the manner and duration of any schooling that her children, 
particularly her daughters, may receive. She must remain costumed in cumbersome garb – a burqa –  when in 
public... [Nevertheless her life is] consistent with her spiritual and social values, provides her with a sense of 
worth, and satisfies her notion of well-being.
(2006: 60). 
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Oshana argues for a social-relational account of autonomy. On her view, whatever Taliban Woman's 
personal preferences, she cannot be autonomous if her social relations with others preclude her from 
directing  her  own life.   Taliban woman  has  given up the  capacity  to  direct  her  own life.  All 
decisions  are  taken  for  her  by  men.  Therefore  Taliban  Woman is  not  autonomous.  Paternalist 
intervention on her behalf –  changing the laws of the country, giving her legal rights equal with 
those of men, banning the burqa, making school compulsory for girls  etc – would not violate her 
autonomy, since she has none. 
Oshana also argues that a socio-relational account of autonomy must be a substantive one; in 
other words, autonomy must be of a certain kind, which does not including unthinking obedience to 
the will of others, or allowing oneself to be demeaned.
I should like, contra Oshana, to argue two things. First, that a socio-relational conception of 
autonomy need not be a substantive one. Second, the key point in deciding whether Taliban Woman 
is autonomous (and I agree with Oshana that she almost certainly is not) is whether her decision to 
live a life of unthinking obedience is revocable. 
In discussing Oshana’s Taliban Woman I shall draw on work by  John Christman and Joel 
Anderson. They offer an account of personal autonomy consistent with its being social-relational, 
but  which  is  content-neutral,  not  substantive. They  stipulate  two  conditions  for  autonomy: 
authenticity and competency (Christman and Anderson 2005: 3). 
The Authenticity Condition requires that the choices made by the agent are such that, given 
the opportunity to reflect, the agent would endorse the aims, values and desires that drive those 
choices. Their choices authentically belong to them.  
‘Competency’ requires that the agent must have ‘various capacities for rational thought, self-
control, self-understanding and so on – and... they must be free to exercise those capacities, without 
internal or external coercion’ (2005: 3). 
On Christman’s and Anderson’s proceduralist account, then, autonomy is  not substantive 
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and to say that an act is autonomous is to say nothing about the content of that act. It is just to say 
that the required conditions were in place: that the agent is competent and their choice  authentic. 
Characterising  autonomy as  socio-relational  does  not  contradict  the  proceduralist  account.  My 
argument  is  that  the  Competency  Condition  comprehends  the  socio-relational  character  of 
autonomy, without committing one to a substantive conception. 
But let us look first at Oshana’s criticisms of the proceduralist account. 
5.2 Oshana’s critique of the proceduralist account of autonomy
Oshana responds at length to Christman, and others who hold a proceduralist view of autonomy, in 
Personal  Autonomy  in  Society  (2006).   The  point  where  she  most  directly  differs  from  the 
proceduralist account is her disagreement with Christman’s view that people can be autonomous 
‘despite having desires for subservient, demeaning or even evil things’ (‘Autonomy and Personal 
History’, pp. 2-3, quoted in Oshana 2006: 42). 
However, Oshana’s objection mischaracterises what it is to lack autonomy. A desire for evil 
things  might  indicate  an  unusual  amount  of  autonomy  –  suggesting  a  determined,  self-willed 
flouting of conventional morality. If the agent’s carrying out their evil desires would harm the rest 
of us then we should prevent the agent carrying them out. But this is an argument for thwarting their 
autonomous choices, not denying that they had them in the first place. 
Subservient or demeaning desires, on the other hand,  could  supply evidence of a lack of 
autonomy. This would depend on the nature of the desire. There seem to be three possibilities: 1) an 
autonomous  choice  to  relinquish  one’s  autonomy  temporarily;  2)  an  autonomous  choice  to 
relinquish  one’s  autonomy  permanently;  and  3)  a  non-autonomous  choice  to  relinquish  one’s 
autonomy (whether temporarily or permanently makes no difference).
For Case 1), imagine a businessman who works very hard during the week and who relaxes 
at  weekends  by  being  chained  up  in  a  dungeon  and  humiliated  and  abused  by  a  dominatrix. 
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Imagine also that the businessman is fully competent mentally, is not coerced in any way and that 
this is an authentic choice which he endorses whenever he reflects on it (and he reflects on it a lot). 
His choice of recreation is subservient and demeaning (as it is intended to be). But I see no reason 
to doubt that it is autonomous. Not only is the choice itself autonomous, but it does not lead to any 
long-term diminution of his autonomy. 
For Case 2), let us look at Oshana’s own example of the Voluntary Slave, from her 1989 
article, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’. She argues that a person who has voluntarily entered into 
a condition of slavery cannot be autonomous. Their  choice  to become a slave could have been 
autonomous,  if  made in accordance with the Competency and Authenticity Conditions;  but  the 
consequence is a total, irrevocable loss of autonomy (if it is not irrevocable, then the slave is not 
really a slave, but play-acting). One would do one’s best to prevent someone making such a terrible 
choice, for their own sake. This would be a clear case where Autonomy-based Paternalism would 
be  justified.   (It  would  also,  incidentally,  be  supported  by  good  non-paternalist  reasons:  the 
corrupting effect of power on the slaveowner, the potential for abuse, and the damaging effects on 
society’s values and morale.) 
Case 3) would be where the agent’s choice to be subservient and demeaned failed to satisfy 
the Competency and/or Authenticity Conditions in the first place. Perhaps the agent was not of 
sound mind, or was threatened or otherwise coerced into the choice. In such a case the agent would 
not be autonomous, but that would not be because of the content of their choice. It would be for 
procedural reasons: because they did not meet the Competency Condition.
Thus the  content-neutral,  proceduralist  account  is  sufficient  to  rule  on whether  cases  of 
subservient or demeaning behaviour are or are not autonomous. 
 Oshana claims, however, that consistent content-neutrality is impossible. She argues that 
proponents  of  content-neutral  accounts  cannot  ‘avoid  introducing  substantive  claims  into  their 
theories, in spite of their desire not to do so’ (Oshana 2006: 43). This, she says, is because the 
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conditions of authenticity and competency depend on facts that are not content-neutral: ‘facts about 
the social situation of the agent and facts about the character of the agent’s desires’ (Oshana 2006: 
43). 
This is beyond dispute. But it does not seem to be a problem for the proceduralist. Pre-
existing facts do make authenticity and competency possible. But what then? Oshana states that 
‘When pressed to specify those facts, we cannot help but be selective’ (2006: 43). That is true, but 
then we are being selective about the conditions that make autonomy possible, not about which 
desires count as autonomous. Oshana has found evidence of substantiveness among proceduralists, 
but not where she needs to find it. 
Oshana’s next  point  has  more bite.  She says  that  ‘[we]  also need to  know which pro-
attitudes –  desires, values, interests – are consonant with an unimpaired critical psychology’ (2006: 
43). 
A  proceduralist might disagree. One has an unimpaired critical psychology if one is able to 
critically reflect on and embrace one’s desires and values. What those desires and values actually 
are need not come into it.  However, being able to critically reflect  on one’s desires and values 
depends on a normative idea of a healthy, functioning psychology. If an individual held bizarre, 
delusional or incoherent beliefs, or was in the grip of a phobia or obsession, this might be apparent 
in their expressed desires and values, which would be taken as evidence of a lack of capacity for the 
appropriate critical reflection (the case of Chloe Jennings-White, discussed in Chapter 4, might be 
an example). This amount of substantiveness, I think, the proceduralist must admit to. Yet it is not 
substantiveness about the desires themselves, but about the mental state which they may reveal.
Oshana continues:
 [I]t is plausible that a desire for drug addiction (for example), or for enslavement, for systematic deception, for 
brainwashing, for the restraint of civil liberties, or for browbeating and  threatening gestures on part of others is 
inconsonant with procedural independence and is inconsonant with a person’s autonomy.
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(2006: 43). 
It  is  not  possible  to  state  in  advance  that  any  one  of  these  strange  desires  is  definitionally 
inconsonant with procedural independence, without knowledge of the context. (One might imagine 
someone desiring to experience drug addiction so that they could write a book about it.) But if the 
full context suggested mental derangement and hence a lack of competency, then yes, such a desire 
–  or rather, the incapacity of which the desire was a symptom –  would indeed be inconsonant with 
procedural independence (and hence autonomy). To this extent, Oshana is right. 
However, this does not call for a large admixture of substantiveness to the proceduralist 
account.  There  is  a  distinction  to  be made between the  capacity for  critical  reflection and the 
content of desires. For the proceduralist it is the capacity for critical reflection that is crucial.  The 
content of a desire or value is relevant only insofar as it may be symptomatic of incapacity for 
critical reflection. In any case the content would be only one factor among others in making that 
diagnosis. Other factors would include the origin of the desire/value, its duration, its relationship 
with  other  desires/values  of  the  agent,  reasons  offered  in  support  of  it,  its   instrumentality  in 
achieving long-term goals, and so on. 
 But  what  of  Taliban  Woman?  She  is  not  mentally  deranged;  she  is  capable  of  critical 
reflection; she made her choice in a procedurally independent manner. Yet I agree with Oshana that 
Taliban Woman is  not  autonomous.  If  it  is  not  the  content  of  her  choice that  makes  her  non-
autonomous, then what is it? 
For proceduralists the case allows three possible responses. 
1) They can maintain that, despite all appearances,  Taliban Woman is autonomous. 
2) They can agree that Taliban Woman is not autonomous but find an explanation for this 
within the proceduralist framework.
3) They can admit that Oshana is right and adopt a substantive view of autonomy. 
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3) is always available if 1) and 2) fail. But let us try 1) and  2) first. 
Trying to maintain 1) seems to make a mockery of the concept of autonomy. The concept is 
stretched to absurd limits if a woman with no power to direct her own life with regard to such 
matters as career, parenthood, dress, personal relationships, freedom to travel, access to education 
and political choices, and without power ever to change this, qualifies as autonomous. That she was 
autonomous when she chose that life makes does not make her autonomous after the choice has 
been enacted, any more than the fact that someone was alive when they chose to kill themselves 
mean they are alive after doing so. Let us grant, then, that Taliban Woman is not autonomous.
Opting for 2) entails showing that Taliban Woman fails to meet the conditions laid down by 
proceduralists.  It  is  clear  that  Taliban  Woman as  described  by  Oshana  meets  the  Authenticity 
Condition. She owns her choice.  It  is consistent with her values. She is able to reflect  upon it 
adequately and she endorses it. 
But  what  of  the  Competency condition?  Let  it  be  granted  that  Taliban Woman has the 
required  capacities  for  rational  thought,  self-control,  self-understanding  and  so  on.  But  the 
Competency Condition also requires that the agent be ‘free to exercise those capacities, without 
internal or external coercion’ (Christman and Anderson 2005: 3). Taliban Woman is not free in this 
sense as she would be swiftly and harshly punished if her capacity for rational thought led her to 
decide she no longer wanted to live the life of Taliban Woman. She has not decided this as yet; but 
would not be free to do so if she did.  
As Christman has stressed, although a person is constituted by  interpersonal and social 
relations, these interactions are ‘alterable and shifting’ (2004: 144.) But such shifts and alterations 
are ruled out by Taliban Woman’s position. If she changes her mind she is certain to be punished 
very severely. Therefore she is not free to exercise her rational capacities, and not only because she 
would not be allowed freedom if  she desired it,  but  because awareness of  the brutal  sanctions 
hanging over her might prevent her from even desiring it. Therefore the Competency condition is 
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not satisfied, and Christman could agree with Oshana that Taliban Woman is not autonomous –  but 
for proceduralist reasons. There is no need for recourse to 3). 
There is a large area of common ground between Oshana and Christman. Both agree on the 
importance of social-relational factors, in defining autonomy as well as in thinking about actual 
social policies that further it. But an understanding of autonomy as social-relational does not of 
itself entail a substantive position of  values.  It does, however, require a substantive view of the 
social  conditions – laws, institutions, education, welfare etc –  which make possible and encourage 
autonomy.
The point I want to bring out is that, on a proceduralist account, any choices that surrender 
control  over  one’s  life  to  others  must  be  revocable,  if  the  agent  is  to  continue  to  count  as 
autonomous. To be able to rule oneself entails that one is able to adopt one course of action over 
another. Otherwise one would be in the position of the king in Le Petit Prince, whose rule over the 
stars consists in ordering them to come out at night, knowing perfectly well that they will do so in 
any case. It is because he knows this that he issues the order. If the stars behaved differently, if they 
did  not come out on certain, known nights, then on those nights he would ‘order’ them not to. 
Similarly, if a person has only one option and, knowing that, ‘chooses’ it, this cannot count as self-
rule. For the ‘self-rule’ is driven by the option available; the non-existent options are disvalued for 
sour grapes reasons. I will address this further aspect of the argument in Chapter Seven.
6. The Burqa-wearer in the West
Whether or not one agrees with Oshana that a substantive conception of autonomy is required, we 
can agree that Taliban Woman is not autonomous. But the burqa-wearer in a liberal state is not in 
the same position as Taliban Woman. In the first place, she is not subject to the same restrictions as 
Taliban Woman. She may still be able to choose to attend university, for instance (in East London a 
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burqa-clad woman on a university campus is not an unusual sight). In the second place, and more 
importantly, her decision to wear the burqa is revocable. If she decides to doff it after a period of 
experiment, the liberal state will support her right to do so. 
6.1 An objection
At  this  point  I  must  acknowledge  and  bracket  off  an  objection.  Perhaps,  despite  the  official 
protection of the state, the burqa-wearer in the west will not find her decision as easy to revoke as 
she thought. Perhaps within her community there are powerful forces of disapproval, backed up by 
the threat of ostracism or violence, which would make it too risky to revoke her decision and seek 
the liberal state’s protection. I consider this possibility in Chapter Eleven. At this point, however, let 
us accept that the burqa-wearer in the west has the freedom to cease wearing the burqa whenever 
she likes and see if the case for an Autonomy-based Paternalist ban has anything to recommend it. 
6.2 First- and second-order autonomy
I argue that an Autonomy-based Paternalist ban could not be justified, by analogy with the case of a 
Roman Catholic nun who has made the autonomous decision to join an extremely strict order. This 
choice entails surrendering much of her freedom. Once inside the convent, she must give up certain 
things: she cannot drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes or marijuana, have friends over to stay, or have 
sex; she is restricted as to her mode of dress and is not permitted to wear make-up; she is not 
allowed out of the convent unaccompanied and only with the permission of the Abbess; she cannot 
lie in bed in the mornings but must get up at 4 a.m. to pray, and so on. 
The nun would say that the freedoms she has renounced are freedoms she no longer 
desires, or no longer desires to desire.  She is still free to do the things that are most important to 
her: to worship, pray, sing hymns and meditate; freer than before, in that opportunities are more 
plenteous. The Book of Common Prayer refers to God as one ‘whose service is perfect freedom’ 
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and that, one must guess, is how the nun would see it.  Still,  from a neutral point  of view, she 
undoubtedly has far fewer freedoms than before. The question is whether she has also surrendered 
her autonomy. 
Clare Chambers (2008) draws a distinction between first and second-order autonomy. First-
order autonomy means being able to evaluate and question the rules by which one lives one’s daily 
life for oneself,  with the ability to reject  or change them if  unsatisfied and to endorse them if 
satisfied. The nun in the strict convent has first-order autonomy as long she can evaluate the rules 
by which she lives and endorse them. In this she is the same as the burqa-wearer in the west, who 
also has first-order autonomy in that she can endorse the rules she lives by.
Second-order autonomy is the condition of being able to choose to live or not to live in 
accordance with those rules in the first place. The nun had second-order autonomy in the days 
before she became a nun, when she made the willing, unconstrained choice to join the order; and 
she still has second-autonomy if she continues to endorse that choice. 
It is not even necessary for either the nun or the western burqa-wearer to endorse every 
single rule by which she lives, in order to retain autonomy. As Chambers points out (2008), it is 
possible to have second-order autonomy without full first-order autonomy. For suppose that the nun 
does not endorse all of the rules by which she has to live. Perhaps she does not like the rule about 
rising at four a.m. She would change it if she could and rise at 8.30. She follows the existing rule 
unwillingly, only because it is a condition of her remaining a nun, a choice which as a second-order 
autonomous agent she continues to endorse.  Again there is  a  parallel  with the western burqa-
wearer. She might find some of the restrictions associated with burqa-wearing onerous, but accept 
them because they are inseparable from the way of life she has chosen and continues to choose.
The question is whether the nun and the western burqa-wearer are truly autonomous. Clare 
Chambers (2008) notes that  there are four possible combinations of the first- and second-order 
autonomy distinction. One might have both, one might have neither, one might have second- but not 
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first-order autonomy, or one might have first- but not second-order autonomy. Obviously liberals 
would be happy about the first of these combinations and unhappy about the second. The difficulty 
is  in  determining whether,  if  only one  order  of  autonomy is  present,  which  the  liberal  should 
prioritise. In other words, is one more truly autonomous if one has only first-order autonomy, or 
only second-order autonomy?
The case of the nun is an example of the latter. For the former, Chambers offers the example 
of  ‘a child who has not chosen to attend a progressive school but who, once there, is required by 
the teachers to question rules and to find out answers for herself’ (2008: 164). 
Chambers makes the claim that  Martha Nussbaum and others who define themselves as 
political liberals prioritise second-order autonomy over first-order autonomy (Chambers 2008). On 
Nussbaum’s account, according to Chambers, 
Second-order autonomy must be protected, but individuals must be free to use their second-order autonomy to 
alienate their first-order autonomy, for example by joining a convent
(2008: 165). 
Therefore the nun poses no problem for those who prioritise second-order autonomy; and if my 
analogy holds, neither does the woman who make a second-order autonomous choice to wear a 
burqa. 
The position argued for here is in line with Nussbaum’s prioritisation. Autonomy of its very 
nature seems to have something of the second-order about it. It depends on the second-order ability 
to reflect and decide for oneself what is valuable in life (Colburn 2010). Ronald Dworkin (1988) 
sees second-order reflection and preference as an essential part of autonomy. Indeed one could ask 
whether the idea of autonomy does not lead to an infinite regress, in which first-order autonomy 
submits  to  the  priority  of  second-order  autonomy,  which  submits  to  the  priority  of  third-order 
autonomy, etc. Dworkin (1988) accepts this possibility and argues that whichever is the highest 
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level of autonomy is the one that should have priority:
Might we not have preferences about our second-order preferences? Could I not regret the fact that I welcome 
the fact that I am not sufficiently generous in my actions? I accept this claim, at lest ion principle. As a theory 
about the presence or absence of certain psychological states empirical evidence is relevant. It appears that for 
some agents, and some motivations, there is higher-order reflection. If so, then autonomy will be thought of as 
the highest-order approval and integration.
(1988: 19)
As Dworkin states, human beings seldom actually do proceed far or for long beyond second-order 
autonomy (1988);  but  whichever  is  the  highest  order  of  autonomy that  we  reach should  have 
priority over lower orders. 
6.3 Chambers’ disagreement with Nussbaum
Chambers,  however,  does  not  agree  with  Nussbaum’s  prioritisation.  She  objects  that  the  very 
possibility of second-order (let alone higher-order) autonomy is problematic, because preferences – 
including second-order autonomous ones – are socially formed:
[T]he social formation of preferences casts doubt on [Nussbaum’s] position in two ways. First, it suggests that 
people may be less autonomous than they appear, since their decisions are profoundly  shaped by their contexts. 
Second, if autonomy is (always) limited, a choice or outcome cannot be rendered just by the mere fact of 
having been autonomously chosen.
(Chambers, 2008: 171)
The real issue, according to Chambers, is whether the social influence which produced the second-
order autonomous choice is  inimical  to equality (a  foundational  liberal  value) and whether  the 
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choice itself causes or entrenches inequality (Chambers 2008). 
We are now approaching the problem of adaptive preferences, to be considered more closely 
in the next chapter. To anticipate, I shall argue that the adaptive preference objection is not fatal to 
the possibility of personal autonomy. At this point, there are two points to be made in reply to 
Chambers. 
First, if we reject as truly autonomous those choices which are the result of social influences 
which do not favour equality, we find ourselves in the strange position of approving the choice to 
become a nun from a woman who comes from a family of freethinkers, whilst disapproving of 
(perhaps preventing, if we put Chambers’ strictures into practice) the choice to become a nun from a 
woman  who  comes  from  a  devout  Roman  Catholic  family  with  strict  views  about  women’s 
subordinate role. One can defy social influence to become a nun, but not go with the grain of social 
influence to do the same thing. The result would be an absurd double-standard: women would be 
allowed to become nuns if their families  and communities disapproved, but not if their families and 
communities approved. This would be to deny the relational character of personal autonomy. Or 
more accurately, it would mean that the only relation between the agent and their family, friends and 
community that would count as  autonomous would be one of opposition. 
Second, Chambers bolsters her case by pointing to a seeming inconsistency on Nussbaum’s 
part. Nussbaum holds that female genital mutilation (FGM) should be banned, because it is unjust. 
However, Nussbaum would ban the practice even if it were chosen autonomously by adult women, 
which,  Chambers  argues,  ‘[undermines]  her  claim  that,  for  a  political  liberal,  second-order 
autonomy is sufficient for justice’ (2008: 176). 
Chambers agrees with Nussbaum that FGM should be banned. But the reasons Chambers 
has for banning it do not rest on its violating second-order autonomy, for under certain conditions it 
need not do that. Chambers’ reasons for banning it are that it is a) the result of an unjust social 
structure which makes women subordinate to men, and their sexual pleasure and fulfilment of no 
133
importance; and b) harmful to the women who undergo it. And indeed Nussbaum cites both of these 
reasons herself, in her list of eight reasons why the practice should be eliminated (Chambers 2008: 
177). 
What, then, could Nussbaum say in reply? One possible response would be to say that FGM 
need not be banned after all – as long as it were not carried out by force, not performed on minors, 
only  performed  under  anaesthetic  by  qualified  surgeons  with  proper  instruments  in  sterile 
conditions, and were chosen autonomously by educated, informed adult women who had thought 
about their choice long and hard. After all, under those conditions one would approve of gender 
reassignment surgery, which could also cause loss of sexual function and pleasure.  In this way 
Nussbaum could preserve her prioritisation of second over first-order autonomy. 
However, Nussbaum need not be driven to such a volte face. On her list of eight reasons to 
eliminate the practice Nussbaum includes: ‘5. FGM is irreversible’ (in Chambers, 2008: 177). This 
seems a crucial difference between FGM and other practices which may be chosen at a second-
order level of autonomy. 
Chambers points out that certain other practices are also irreversible: ‘so are most tattoos, 
male  circumcisions,  abortions,  precautionary  mastectomies  or  hysterectomies,  and  many 
sterilisations’ (2008: 178). That is certainly true. But those practices do not seem harmful to the 
individual to the same extent as FGM. Tattoos, for example, (which in any case are not altogether 
irreversible) do not cause bodily harm; male circumcision if correctly carried out does  not cause 
long-term harm and, although it may cause some local loss of sensitivity, does not diminish sexual 
desire, sexual function or the intensity of orgasm; abortion, like precautionary surgery, is chosen 
because it causes less harm to the agent than the alternative. Irreversibility per se does not provide a 
reason for banning an action or practice. Losing one’s virginity is irreversible but is not on that 
account  a  candidate  for  banning.  The  practice  must  also  be  harmful  (or  more  harmful  than 
alternatives) if it is to be a candidate for a ban; and the greater the degree of irreversible harm the 
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stronger the reason for banning the practice.  FGM is both seriously harmful and irreversible: it is 
the conjunction of these two facts which provides a reason to ban it. Therefore Nussbaum’s Reason 
Number 5 for banning FGM could simply be amended to ‘FGM is both seriously harmful and 
irreversible’; and her prioritisation of second- over first-order autonomy in general can be saved by 
amending the principle to: ‘Practices which cause serious harm to the individual (including loss of 
first-order autonomy) are acceptable if second-order autonomously chosen, as long as the choice is 
reversible.’ 
Under this formulation, both the nun and the western burqa-wearer retain their autonomy, 
even if their first-order autonomy is compromised, as long as they retain second-order autonomy, 
which relies upon the freedom to revoke their choice at any time. If the nun could leave the convent 
whenever she ceased to endorse her choice, and if the western burqa-wearer could throw off her 
burqa whenever she ceased to endorse hers, then they are both autonomous. Possessing second-
order autonomy requires having one’s liberty protected by the state, and in liberal states, unlike in 
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, this condition is met. 
If  Autonomy-based  Paternalism does  not  justify  banning  enclosed  religious  orders  in  a 
liberal state, then it does not justify banning the burqa either. Of course it is open to anyone to argue 
that religious orders should indeed be banned in order to restore the autonomy of nuns. A ban on 
these grounds would have been justifiable (from a liberal point of view) in mediaeval Italy, where 
convents were frequently used as prisons in which to immure errant daughters. But it is hard to see 
how it could be justified in a modern liberal state, where there is nothing to stop a nun renouncing 
her vows and leaving the convent. Just so, Autonomy-based Paternalism could not justify banning a 
burqa which was voluntarily worn and could be relinquished at any time. 
7. Conclusion 
Let us return to the analogy between personal autonomy and intelligence. It was argued in Section 4 
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that a liberal state has no business trying to make every one of its citizens maximally intelligent. 
Not only would this be impossible (is  anyone maximally intelligent?), but it is not for the liberal 
state to stipulate that cultivating one’s intelligence is the chief end of life. For the same reasons, it is 
not for the liberal state to try to make every one of its citizens maximally autonomous. 
But  it  is  the  task  of  a  liberal  state  to  allow everyone equal  right  of  access to  widely-
recognised  goods  of  life,  which  would  include  autonomy  (as  well  as  other  goods  such  as 
intelligence,  health,  sexual  fulfilment  etc).  An  irrevocable  choice  may  deny  such  access 
permanently. Thus the liberal state is justified in banning FGM and may be justified in banning 
practices highly likely to cause premature death. 
Or consider the following scenario. A religious sect doles out to its followers a 
certain drug, which has the effect of permanently reducing their intelligence, making them docile, 
cheerful and obedient to the sect’s leaders. The followers take the drug voluntarily, but after taking 
it  they  can  never  recover  their  former  level  of  intelligence.  A liberal  state  would  certainly  be 
justified in banning this practice on paternalist grounds. The irrevocability of the choice justifies a 
ban. A ban on practices which temporarily reduce intelligence, such as getting drunk, would not be 
so justified. 
In  the  same  way,  an  Autonomy-based  Paternalist  burqa-ban  could  only  be  justified  if 
wearing the burqa entailed irrevocable loss of personal autonomy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
 ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES AND THE BURQA
The Argument 
Clare Chambers argues that choices are the result of social influence (2008). Therefore one should 
not give a free pass to practices merely because the agent has chosen them. For the choice may not 
be truly autonomous. It may be the result of an adaptive preference.  
In  this  chapter  I  argue  that  not  all  adaptive  preferences are  incompatible  with  personal 
autonomy. If the choice to wear a burqa was formed under social conditions compatible with the 
flourishing of the individual, and if wearing it does not make it impossible for the wearer to flourish 
(according to her own idea of flourishing), and if she can stop wearing it whenever she wishes, then 
it  is  compatible  with  autonomy  (in  particular,  it  is  compatible  with  a  relational  concept  of 
autonomy) and a liberal state has no reason to ban or discourage the practice. 
However,  in  cases  where  burqa-wearing  and  the  attendant  conditions  are  sufficiently 
oppressive to prevent the flourishing of the individual,  this would be an unacceptable adaptive 
preference – an Inappropriate Adaptive Preference, or IAP, as Serene Khader terms it (2011) – and 
the liberal state would be justified in intervening to free the women from their adaptive preference. 
Any such state intervention would have to be sensitively judged, however, and a burqa-ban might 
prove too crude an instrument for the task. 
1. Defining the Problem
1.1 The problem of adaptive preferences
Thus far I have considered burqa-wearing as a voluntary practice: a choice of the individual for 
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reasons that appear good to her. Such a choice is in principle compatible with personal autonomy, 
even if it compromises first-order autonomy, as long as we prioritise second-order autonomy, which 
means that the choice must be revocable. I have not made claims about whether, or to what extent, 
burqa-wearing actually is voluntary; but I have tried to establish that  if all or most burqa-wearing is 
voluntary then liberals have no cause to restrict or prohibit the practice (always assuming it causes 
no harm to others). 
However, suppose that  burqa-wearing is  not  voluntary. I put to one side the question of 
outright coercion. Obviously liberals would want to prohibit that. (How liberals should deal with 
coerced burqa-wearing is discussed in Chapter Eleven.) Suppose instead that burqa-wearing is the 
result of an adaptive preference –  a possibility raised in the previous chapter.
Natalie Soljar  points out that many contemporary feminist philosophers (herself included) 
value  the  notion  of  personal  autonomy,  because  absence  of  autonomy  is  a  good  way  of 
characterising the oppression of women (Soljar, SEP, Fall 2015). In response to criticisms that the 
traditional conception of personal autonomy is atomistic, they have sought to produce conceptions 
of autonomy which recognise its social character –  forms of ‘relational autonomy’, that is to say, 
accounts which ‘deny that  autonomy requires self-sufficiency’ (Soljar,  SEP, Fall  2015).  Instead 
these accounts stress that autonomy is compatible with the agent being in and valuing social and 
familial  relationships.  Voluntary burqa-wearing would be compatible with such a  conception of 
autonomy,  as  argued  in  the  previous  chapter.  But  burqa-wearing  as  the  result  of  an  adaptive 
preference  –  that  is,  where  ‘choices  and  preferences  are  accommodated  to  oppressive  social 
conditions’ (Stoljar, SEP, Fall 2015) – looks like a failure of personal autonomy. Stoljar quotes JS 
Taylor’s claim that adaptive preferences are ‘paradigmatically non-autonomous’ (Taylor, 2009, in 
Stoljar, SEP, Fall 2015). 
The problem, then, is that if adaptive preferences are by definition non-autonomous, and if 
burqa-wearing is an adaptive preference, then burqa-wearing cannot be autonomous. The liberal 
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state  could  have  grounds  to  take  action  against  burqa-wearing.  Far  from  being  a  case  of  an 
individual’s free choice it would be a case of systematic social oppression. 
My approach will be first to examine the concept of Adaptive Preferences. I shall identify 
different  conceptions  and  attempt  to  show  that  not  all  of  them  are  paradigmatically  non-
autonomous. 
I  shall  then argue that  burqa-wearing as  an adaptive preference can be compatible  with 
personal autonomy. I demonstrate this with a Case Study (Case Study 1).
The  notion  of  relational  autonomy  both  depends  upon  and  is  in  tension  with  adaptive 
preference.  In  some  cases  the  social  pressure  is  very  strong,  leaving  less  space  for  personal 
autonomy. Nevertheless I argue that even in these cases some personal autonomy could exist and 
any state intervention should be sensitive and not extend to a ban. I demonstrate this with Case 
Study 2.
Finally, I will argue that in cases where the pressure to adapt one’s preferences is so strong 
as  to  amount  to  coercion,  the  liberal  state  would  have  a  clear  right  and  duty  to  intervene.  I 
demonstrate this with Case Study 3. 
1.2 Defining adaptive preference
One of the earliest accounts of adaptive preference is provided by Jon Elster (1983). He quotes the 
well-known La Fontaine fable about the fox and the grapes in a chapter epigraph: Renard, on the 
point of starvation, sees some grapes above a high wall which he cannot reach; his reaction is to say 
that they were too green anyway, and fit only for ‘goujats’ (boors).  The sour grapes phenomenon, 
Elster says, is an example of  adaptive preference formation (1983: 110). In this case, the fox had 
only two choices:  going without  the  grapes and lamenting it,  or  going without  the grapes and 
convincing himself he did not want them anyway. He takes the latter course and is commended by 
La Fontaine for doing so. And indeed perhaps the fox was wise to spare himself the misery of 
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pining for the unattainable. Nevertheless, his preference has been distorted by his circumstances. 
Elster’s conclusion is that social justice should not be grounded purely on ‘given wants’ (1983: 
140); ‘there is also the alternative possibility of changing the wants through rational and public 
discussion’ (1983: 140).
Elster distinguishes adaptive preferences from  character planning (1983:  117).  Both are 
responses to a tension between what one would like and what one can have. But whereas character 
planning is a reasoned, self-aware process of adjusting to one’s circumstances, and a matter of 
upgrading  accessible  options  rather  than  downgrading  inaccessible  ones,  adaptive  preferences 
occur,  as  it  were  ‘behind  one’s  back’;  they  are  an  automatic,  unreasoned  and  often  excessive 
reaction to constraints. Moreover character planning is flexible and quickly responds to changes in 
circumstances,  is  indeed on the  lookout  for  them.  It  follows  that  choices  formed by character 
planning are free in a way that adaptive preferences are not (Elster 1983). 
Amartya Sen examines the implications of adaptive preference for work in international 
development. He argues that 
deprived  people  tend to  come to terms with their  deprivation  because of  the sheer  necessity  of  
survival, and they may, as a result, lack the courage to demand any radical change, and may even  
adjust their desires and expectations to what they unambitiously see as feasible.
(Sen 1999: 62-3). 
Therefore we should seek to expand people’s freedom to judge the kind of lives they would like to 
lead, a goal which takes in other objectives too, such as reducing poverty and improving education 
(Sen 1999). Sen argues for a Capabilities Approach: providing people with the capability to make 
life choices, rather than seeking to satisfy expressed preferences. 
Martha Nussbaum is in agreement with this approach and has developed Sen’s Capabilities 
idea into 10 specific Central Human Capabilities (referred to and listed in Chapter 2): viz, 1. Life, 2. 
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Bodily  Health,  3.  Bodily  Integrity,  4.  Senses,  Imagination  and  Thought,  5.  Emotions,  6. 
Practical  Reason (including  liberty  of  conscience),  7.  Affiliation (A:  capability  for  social 
interaction,  friendship  and  freedom  of  assembly;  and  B:  protection  against  discrimination  on 
grounds  of  sex,  race,  caste  etc)),  8.  Other  Species,  9.  Play, and  10.  Control  Over  One’s 
Environment  (Nussbaum 2001: 78-80).
This approach requires only that citizens have the capability to access these goods, not that 
they actually do access them. Nussbaum captures this point by pointing to the difference between 
starving  and  fasting  (Nussbaum  2001).  In  a  liberal  state  which  fully  enacted  the  capabilities 
approach, no citizen need starve, but citizens would be entitled to fast if they so chose. Just so, in 
such a state no woman should be obliged to cover her face in public, but she would be entitled to do 
so if she so chose. 
Michael Watts argues that the approach of Sen and Nussbaum is ‘counterfactual’ - i.e. it is 
concerned with what individuals would want if it was available, rather than what they actually do 
want (Watts 2009). In such an approach, the role of education is of crucial importance, for two 
reasons:  it  enhances  capabilities,  and  it  also  enhances  the  ability  for  critical  reflection  (thus 
facilitating a move from adaptive preference to character planning, in Elster’s terms). 
Serene  Khader,  responding  to  Sen  and  Nussbaum,  offers  a  ‘deliberative  perfectionist 
approach’ to public intervention in the lives of people with adaptive preferences (APs) (Khader 
2011: 5). Public institutions have a duty to help people flourish, so they should intervene when 
people  accept  oppressive  social  conditions  through adaptive  preference:  but  they  should  do  so 
sensitively, not simply imposing coercive measures without thought or sympathy (Khader 2011). 
Khader notes that APs have been characterised in many different ways: as conscious, as 
unconscious,  as  resulting  from a  lack  of  options  or  as  resulting  from a  lack  of  awareness,  as 
undermining the sense of self, or as not necessarily doing so (Khader 2011). Khader also argues that 
seeing APs as a problem necessarily involves perfectionism, for it requires some kind of normative 
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idea of what a human life ought to be like (Khader 2011). Nussbaum’s ten Capabilities, for instance, 
are designed to be suitable for all human beings – we all want, or would want if we were healthy 
and normal, to have them. Khader argues that: 
the idea that a person can experience satisfaction with her form of life and yet not be doing well requires a 
criterion  of  well-being  other  than  pleasure  or  desire-satisfaction.  Second,  seeing  well-being-inconsistent 
preferences as evidence of inauthentic choice requires a view of human beings as having a natural tendency 
towards flourishing
(2011:  49).
Building on this  idea of  human flourishing,  Khader  offers  the following definition of  adaptive 
preference:
An adaptive preference is a preference that (1) is inconsistent with a person’s basic flourishing, (2) was formed 
under conditions non-conducive to her basic flourishing, and (3) that we do not think a person would have 
formed under conditions conducive to basic flourishing
(2011: 51). 
I  accept  and  employ this  definition.  Khader  claims that  it  is  perfectionist.  As  already argued, 
however,  I  do  not  accept  a  simple  dichotomy  between  political  liberalism  and  perfectionist 
liberalism. There is a continuum between them. The more fully and the greater the specific detail in 
which the idea of flourishing is defined, the more perfectionist the account; but it is possible for the 
elements of flourishing to be very general (as Nussbaum’s capabilities are). I shall argue below that 
it is possible to be too perfectionist in judging whether an adaptive preference is consistent with 
flourishing. 
All preferences are of course adaptive in a broad sense. No preference is formed in a cultural 
or social vacuum. Any preference we have is inevitably a response to the culture we live in, and the 
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opportunities  it  allows,  promotes  or  condemns.  Moreover  our  preferences  are  also  formed  in 
response to our limitations as frail, human, time-bound creatures with limited physical and mental 
capacities.  Nussbaum notes that as children we may ache to be able to fly like birds, but we soon 
adapt to the fact that we can’t, and are probably the better for that adaptation (Nussbaum 2001). 
Preferences which do not prevent our flourishing are no cause for concern. But preferences which 
do inhibit our flourishing are a problem. To capture this distinction Khader refers to the problem 
forms  of  adaptive  preferences  as  IAPs  (inappropriate  adaptive  preferences);  they  are  those 
preferences which are harmful to the bearer and were formed under bad social conditions. 
2. Dealing with Adaptive Preferences
2.1 Deliberative intervention
How then is  a  liberal  state  to  intervene to  help those who are  saddled with the wrong sort  of 
adaptive preferences? Khader argues that the rule must be to work on changing the conditions, not 
the preferences directly (2011);  a rule fully consistent with Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approach. If 
conditions are changed then the preferences will change accordingly – unless they are very deep-
rooted;  but  in  that  case  nothing could be done anyway.  It  is  always possible  that  an agent  ‘is 
committed to a conception of the good that does not value human flourishing and that will not 
change even under better social conditions’ (Khader 2011: 53). But that is not very likely; it is more 
likely that she is just managing ‘a bad option set’ and her preferences will change when the options 
improve.  The latter  is  much more likely because ‘people  have  a  tendency to value their  basic 
flourishing’ (Khader 2011: 53). Khader calls this claim ‘the Flourishing Claim’ (2011). 
Khader does not offer a precise definition of human flourishing, nor provide evidence that 
people do indeed value it. She does say that flourishing is not the same as satisfaction with life, and 
also that it involves exercising ‘valuable human capacities’ ( Khader 2011: 49).  The claim does not 
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seem to  be  based on any scientific  theory  about  human nature;  Khader  does  not  refer  to  any 
experiments or observations which support it. The Flourishing Claim, though, must rely on certain 
ways of living counting as flourishing, and others not counting, otherwise the claim would fail to 
distinguish what it is that people value; and this requirement must in turn rely on some kind of 
claim about human nature, which must in principle be capable of being corroborated (or falsified) 
by scientific investigation. Perhaps  Khader’s claim is a legacy from the Aristotelian view that the 
end of life  is  eudaimonia,  or ‘happiness’ in the sense of living well  (Aristotle  2004),  although 
Khader explicitly says she does not endorse Aristotle’s views on what constitutes a flourishing life 
(Khader  2011:  49).  In  any  case  it  seems  a  plausible  claim,  in  line  with  both  experience  and 
intuitions about human nature. A human being who was determined not to flourish would seem to 
be  a  pathological  case,  requiring  explanation.  Khader’s  claim,  while  not  explicitly  resting  on 
scientific  observation,  is  not  incompatible  with a  scientific understanding of human nature and 
could in principle be corroborated (or falsified) by observation or experiment. Moreover, the idea of 
flourishing  is  sufficiently  broad  and  flexible  (Khader  does  not  follow  Aristotle  in  identifying 
flourishing with virtue, or the contemplative life; there is no single golden road to flourishing) that 
accepting  it  does  not  push  one  uncomfortably  far  towards  the  perfectionist  end  of  the  PL-
Perfectionist spectrum. 
Khader,  then,  justifies  state  intervention  in  order  to  create  the  conditions  conducive  to 
flourishing. An important qualification is that such intervention needs to be deliberative – i.e. not 
coercive, abrupt, sweeping or heavy-handed, not taken without investigation and consultation, and 
sensitive to women’s needs (all the cases considered by Khader concern the adaptive preferences of 
women). Intervention must respect the agents’ autonomy. 
It has been claimed that APs are paradigmatically non-autonomous (Taylor, 2009). Khader 
contests this. She argues that APs cannot be defined as ‘autonomy deficits’ (2011). There are other 
types of autonomy deficits which are not APs. Moreover not all APs are autonomy deficits. Khader 
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analyses  three  different  accounts  of  procedural  autonomy deficits  and  argues  that  APs  do  not 
necessarily fall into any of them. For example, not all APs are deficits in rationality. It need not be 
the case, for example, that an individual with an AP  is incapable of critical reflection on their 
decisions: ‘most deprived people make reflective decisions   on a daily basis – even if they are 
sometimes decisions among rotten options’ (Khader 2011: 81). Khader also argues that one cannot 
identify all APs with a lack of a life-plan or a lack of agency (see pp.  85-95). Khader’s argument 
appears  to  show,  at  any rate,  that  adaptive  preferences  and  autonomy deficits  are  not  entirely 
coterminous (2011). 
Khader’s argument is that when an AP is inappropriate – when it is an IAP – this is not 
because  it  is  an  autonomy  deficit,  but  because  it  is  a  preference  ‘inconsistent  with  human 
flourishing developed under conditions unconducive to flourishing’ (2011: 106).  Nevertheless it is 
possible if not likely that some types of adaptive preference do involve autonomy deficits. And 
indeed personal autonomy has to be one of the valuable human capacities that Khader says must be 
exercised for an individual to flourish. That it need not be the only one is agreed.  
Where does this leave us with regard to burqa-wearing? The test for whether burqa-wearing 
is an IAP (we know that it is an AP) is whether it prevents flourishing (which ought to include the 
possibility of the exercise  of  personal  autonomy).  But not  all  burqas are  worn under the same 
conditions. The justification, if any, for intervention and the type of intervention required has to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Below I examine three case studies of burqa-wearing, which differ 
in  terms of  how far  they are  IAPs,  how far  they involve loss  of  autonomy,  and what  kind of 
intervention would be justified. 
2.2 Case Study 1: The Convert
The first case study comes an autobiographical account by Na’ima B. Robert, a Muslim convert 
who describes  how she  came to  wear  the  burqa  (more  accurately,  a  full-jilbab  with  niqab)  in 
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London in the 21st century. 
Robert  recounts  how, as a  convert,  she first  took to  wearing the  hijab and loose-fitting 
clothes.  She describes  this  as a  ‘tonic’ and says it  freed her  from her  ‘reliance on her  looks’. 
Presently,  under the influence of a friend, Umm Tasmeen, she graduated to a more enveloping 
garment, the full jilbab. But soon that no longer seemed enough either. The final step was to cover 
her face. She writes: 
I came to the realization that wearing the niqab was the least I could do as thanks to Allah who had done so 
much for me. It was on an afternoon that I remember as if  it  were yesterday: the buzz of busy streets of 
Whitechapel, the thought of my new marriage and wonderful husband, all the years that Allah had protected me 
from every danger, the good life He had given me, the blessing of guidance, of good friends, of security, and 
now, love – all these things were rushing through my mind. The niqab was not something I disliked – in fact, I 
quite liked it; it was not difficult for me to wear it – I was living in the East End, after all, and my husband was 
supportive.
(Robert 2006: 193-94). 
This is clearly an adaptive preference. It is an adaptation to the Wahhabist Muslim community that 
she lives in (‘I was living in the East End, after all’). The question is whether it is an inappropriate  
adaptive preference. To answer that  question we need not rely on her interpretation of how and why 
she came to have that preference. Since it is adaptive she may not be aware of the real reasons.  But 
whether it is inappropriate or not depends on the objective facts of her situation. Assuming then, 
that  the  facts are  as  she  reports  them –  which  is  a  separate  issue  from the  story  of  how her 
preference came to be formed – there is no evidence from this account that the choice was the result 
of coercion, harassment or intimidation from others; nor that her choice is irrevocable. She says 
elsewhere in her book that she still has female friends who do not cover their faces. If she were to 
change  her  mind  and  uncover  again,  her  account  offers  no  reason  to  think  she  would  suffer 
unpleasant consequences. She therefore retains full second-order autonomy. 
146
Robert’s case also does not appear to meet Khader’s criterion for an IAP, that it prevents or 
inhibits flourishing. Robert’s account makes it clear that in terms of the life she has chosen, she is  
flourishing. She is exercising valuable human capacities, such as forming fulfilling relationships 
with her community, friends and family, finding love and sexual fulfilment with her husband,  and 
immersing herself in a religion which she finds spiritually rewarding. She has written a book to 
celebrate these facts, exercising the valuable human capacity of creativity and self-expression. This 
does  not  therefore  seem to  be  an  IAP.  It  seems  rather  closer  to  what  Elster  called  ‘character 
planning’ (Elster 1983). 
Some might feel tempted to retort: ‘Oh, but she only thinks she’s flourishing. In fact she is 
deluded. She would discover what real flourishing was if she got rid of that niqab and explored life 
outside her enclosed community.’ 
A liberal is certainly entitled to believe this. But a liberal state is not entitled to act upon it. 
Just as the liberal state has no warrant to prevent people voluntarily joining enclosed orders of 
monks or nuns, it has no warrant to prevent people outside of such institutions voluntarily following 
strict religious lifestyles. A liberal state which sought to impose one particular model of flourishing 
on all  citizens would be at  the extreme perfectionist  end of the PL-Perfectionist  spectrum, and 
would violate the Liberal Paternalist Principle: very great restrictions on liberty would be imposed 
for gains which would not be accepted as such by the individual affected. The individual’s freedom 
would be overridden completely. At this point perfectionism ceases to be liberal. A liberal state 
could not ban the burqa on the grounds that it represents the wrong kind of flourishing. 
This is assuming that we can take Robert’s account of the facts at face value. One problem 
with autobiographical accounts, especially those whose purpose is to defend or champion a way of 
life, is that one can never be sure how accurate, impartial or free from self-deception they are. 
Perhaps there was more pressure on Robert than she admits. Perhaps she would suffer reprisals if 
she were to change her mind about burqa-wearing. Perhaps her husband, who is supportive of her 
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choice to cover her face, would not be supportive of her choice to uncover it. Thus it is wise to seek 
independent corroboration of autobiographical accounts where practicable. But in the absence of 
testimony  that  conflicts  with  Robert’s  account,  the  liberal  state  has  no  good  grounds  for 
intervention. 
Any pressure upon her takes the form of carrot, not stick. She writes that wearing the niqab 
has earned her approval in her community: ‘My husband was chuffed and Umm Tasneem and other 
friends were pleased’ (Robert 2006: 196). She also feels content with the results of her choice:
[I]n the mini bubble that was the East End, I felt comfortable and confident – Bengali women were often seen 
around with niqab on so I didn’t stick out like a sore thumb
(2006 Robert:  196). 
If she were to doff her  niqab  she might lose some of this approval and sense of belonging. The 
liberal  state can punish acts of violence,  intimidation,  harassment or persecution.  But it  cannot 
punish acts of approval. A liberalism that favours relational autonomy must favour the possibility of 
individuals making choices in order to please others and to be in good standing within their families 
and community – as long as (to reiterate) no coercion is involved, flourishing (in terms acceptable 
to the individual) is not compromised, and choices are not irrevocable. 
2.3 Case Study 2: The Pirzada Women
My second case study is the common practice of veiling amongst the conservative Sufi Pirzada 
community of Old Delhi, discussed by Uma Narayan (2002). The women are expected by their 
communities to veil their faces on their rare public excursions. Many complain about this. Many of 
the younger  women hope to  marry into less  conservative families  where they will  have fewer 
restrictions. Yet at the same time many feel that 
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...the burqa is an integral part of their social identity and sense of self, and the social discomfort they would feel 
without it outweighs its physical inconveniences
(Narayan 2002: 420). 
However, there is an element of coercion as well: 
Some younger Pirzada women acknowledge that they veil because of the insistence of strict family elders or 
because their community would disparage their reputation, hurting their prospects for a good marriage, were 
they to go unveiled
(Narayan 2002:  420). 
Yet Narayan claims that: 
[t]hese  reasons,  individually  and  collectively,  demonstrate  that  these  women  differ  from  the  prisoner  of 
patriarchy, who is forced to veil under  literal coercion.  These women recognize that they have real practical 
and  emotional  stakes  in  the  approval  of  their  family  elders  and  in  maintaining  their  reputation  in  the 
community.
(2002: 420). 
I  cannot  agree  with  Narayan  that  strict  insistence  on  compliance,  or  having  one’s  reputation 
disparaged if one does not comply, means that no coercion is occurring. It is not clear what Narayan 
means by ‘literal coercion’ – physical violence? If that is what she means we should reply that 
physical violence is not the only form of coercion; and moreover that in this case, the threat of it 
may well hover in the air even if it is not made explicit. Acts of violence against women, including 
acid attacks and honour killings, are far from unknown in India and must form the background to a 
preference for veiling. 
I discuss the issue of coercion more fully in Chapter Eleven. For now, I can agree with 
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Narayan that it is possible to make an autonomous choice as a form of ‘bargaining with patriarchy’ 
(2002: 421). Suppose the pressure were less: suppose that the choice was between active approval 
and mere tolerance. In such a case, the woman who chose to veil – though doubtless her preference 
would be adaptive  in  that  it  was tailored  to  the  norms of  the culture  she lived in  –  could  be 
autonomous, for the reasons that Narayan goes on to give: 
The decisions many women make with respect to ‘cultural practices’ ought, I think, to be understood as a 
choice of a ‘bundle of elements’, some of which they want and some of which they do not, and where they lack 
the power to ‘undo the bundle’ so as to choose only those elements they want. Much of what individuals in 
general want in life comes in such ‘mixed bundles’ that require resignation to certain tradeoffs as a means to 
secure goods one values, and it would be both incorrect and dangerous to ignore that choices were in fact being 
made by women
(2002: 422). 
Narayan agrees with Nussbaum that 
...women’s  preferences  are  often  deformed  by  their  patriarchal  socialization  and  limited  opportunities. 
Nussbaum correctly insists that such deformed preferences should not count against social policies that that 
will enable them to make choices that are currently inconceivable or unappealing, since women can reconsider 
what they are entitled to and what they can aspire to as the options available to them increase.
(2002: 425). 
The question then is, what state action should a liberal feminist support in order to address cultural 
practices such as veiling, purdah and arranged marriages, which ‘contribute to maintaining women’s 
second-class social status’? (Narayan 2002: 425.)
Narayan says where outright coercion is taking place the (liberal) state ‘ought to intervene to 
protect women’ (2002: 425). Again, Naryan does not define coercion. The kind of intervention she 
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seems  to  mean  is  to  ‘protect  their  ability  to  exit  from  the  coercive  situation’,  which  would 
presumably mean punishing the coercers as well as providing refuges for the women to exit to. I 
agree with her that this is unproblematic in principle. 
Narayan also argues that the state should actively foster legal and social changes (such as 
access to education) so that  women are empowered to rethink and modify or reject  oppressive 
practices (Narayan 2002). In other words, this is a version of a capabilities approach, and shares 
with it two essential principles: first, there is a norm underlying it – the legal and social changes go 
in a certain direction. The implicit claim is that women’s lives go better for them when they have 
such goods as education, employment etc. Second, this approach assumes that preferences will re-
adapt when new capabilities are made available. On this reading preferences are plastic, alterable ,  
and evolvable. 
The case of the Pirzada women is a case of an IAP. The liberal state would therefore be 
justified in intervening. However, the nature of the  intervention needs to be carefully considered. 
Banning burqas in cultures where the practice is well-established simply does not work very well, 
because the coercive effects can be no less oppressive than the practice which the ban aims to 
eradicate. Narayan gives the example of the effects of banning the veil in Iran in the days of the 
Shah: many lower-class women did not feel able to go out unaccompanied, and some lost their jobs, 
because veiling was not allowed in the workplace (Narayan 2002). 
I have argued (Chapter Six) that autonomy is both a) procedural and b) relational. If it is 
procedural, then there must be genuine alternatives to any preference: the Competence Condition 
requires both critical reflection  and ability to act on it. But it is also relational: that is to say, any 
autonomous choices must take account of the agent’s relationships, her position in her family and 
social circle and society in general. It is not non-autonomous to take those things into account when 
forming preferences and making decisions. All that is necessary when squaring these two is that 
there genuinely are options (which means that outright coercion for or against a certain choice has 
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to be outlawed). Then the capabilities approach takes care of the rest. 
In the case of the Pirzada women, the answer would be to a) strictly enforce laws against 
violence,  harassment  and  intimidation,  including  or  especially  within  the  family,  while  also 
providing refuges to escape to if necessary; and b) to provide the requisite capabilities for freedom, 
such as education, employment opportunities, the right to own property, and full knowledge of their 
rights and the state’s commitment to enforcing  them. Then in time we might expect to see the 
women’s preference for veiling change. 
2.4 Case Study 3: Malak Hifni Nassef 
Malak Hifni Nassef  (1886-1918) was an Egyptian feminist,  a contemporary of the modernising 
intellectual  Qassim  Amin,  who  published  Tahrir  Al-Mara  (The  Liberation  of  Woman)  which 
advocated,  among  other  things  such  as  reform in  education,  polygamy and  divorce  laws,  that 
women must unveil (see Ahmed 1992: 144). Yet Nassef was opposed to unveiling. Her preference 
was to remain veiled, for the following reason:
How can you men of letters... command us to unveil when any of us is subjected to foul language if she walks 
in the street, this one throwing adulterous glances at her and that one bespattering her with his despicableness 
so that the sweat of shame starts from her brow
(Nassef, cited in Ahmed 1992: 180). 
This is  a  clear  case of an IAP. Nassef’s  preference to wear the veil  is  nothing to  do with her 
flourishing. She explicitly states that it is the behaviour of men in the streets that makes veiling 
necessary; there is no suggestion that she wears the veil for any other reason than protection from 
harassment. Moreover there is an element of physical intimidation; it is not unreasonable to fear 
that verbal harassment could lead to actual sexual assault. If the harassment and intimidation ceased 
then so would Nassef’s preference for burqa-wearing. 
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Nassef would not be helped by a ban on the burqa alone. The remedy here would be to 
change the situation to make Nassef’s preference unnecessary, as well as or rather than outlawing 
the preference. It would thus be necessary to change the culture; which may not be not as hard as it 
sounds. Cultures can change very rapidly. Such a change could be instituted or helped along by a 
liberalising state, by education and by inflicting strict penalties on men found guilty of harassing or 
intimidating unveiled women. And indeed Egypt did liberalise in this respect in the first half of the 
twentieth century, especially under the modernising influence of President Nasser, so that burqa-
clad women became an unusual sight; see, for example the 1959 graduation photograph from Cairo 
University  (Malverde,  2014,  at  https://www.democraticunderground.com/10024727575);  though 
subsequently, for complex political reasons, this liberalisation went into reverse. 
One can sympathise with Nassef's desire to carry on wearing the veil as a protection against 
the persecution of her day. It would have taken considerable personal courage to unveil in such 
circumstances.  Face-covering is, for the  individual, a solution to the problem of harassment. Yet 
continuing to wear the veil perpetuates the culture which produces such persecution, and isolates 
those women who choose not to wear it, exposing them to abuse or assault. IAPs reinforce the very 
culture which makes them necessary. For the liberal the course of action here is plain. The state 
should ensure that all women have the capability to walk the streets without fear of harassment; and 
IAPs such as Nassef’s would swiftly disappear. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
 THE BURQA AND MULTICULTURAL THEORY
The Argument
In this chapter, I consider whether the liberal position on face-covering per se – viz. that voluntary 
habitual face-covering in public should be tolerated, in the absence of any demonstrable harmful 
consequences to  others  such as  a  rise  in  crime,  but  that  certain institutions might  legitimately 
require temporary of the face-covering to facilitate identification or communication – is altered 
when  multicultural considerations are taken into account. The liberal position on face covering per 
se deliberately excludes cultural factors. It avoids mention of the fact that burqas are worn only by 
Muslims and only by women. When we allow such considerations back in, does that change the 
position?  I  consider three main forms of  multiculturalism: ‘maximal’ tolerance,  the granting of 
group rights, and the politics of recognition.  I shall argue that the latter two of these should in some 
cases be taken into account by liberals when formulating public policy, for good liberal reasons; but 
that burqa-wearing is not one of those cases. The liberal position on face-covering per se is by itself 
adequate to deal with burqa-wearing.
1. Defining Multiculturalism
The term ‘multiculturalism’ has more than one meaning, so it will be helpful to pin down what is 
meant by it here. It can be used to describe either a state of affairs or a political programme. If one 
says, for example, ‘Multiculturalism is a fact in Europe and North America’, one is describing a 
state of affairs – the fact that nations in these parts of the world have culturally diverse populations 
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– with no suggestion that anything should be done about it. It  is multiculturalism as a political 
programme that we are concerned with here. By multiculturalism in this sense I mean the idea that 
distinct  cultural  groups  within  a  larger  society  should,  at  least  in  some  cases,  receive  special 
treatment. I accept Susan Moller Okin’s characterisation of multiculturalism as involving the claim 
that:
...minority cultures or ways of life are not sufficiently protected by the practice of ensuring the individual rights 
of their members, and as a consequence these should also be protected by special group rights or privileges.
(1999: 10-11) 
I should add that it is only liberal multiculturalism that I am concerned with. Non-liberal or illiberal 
multiculturalism could of course endorse special rights for privileged cultural groups, but that has 
no bearing on the question of whether a liberal state should ban the burqa. 
I consider three theories of  soi-disant  liberal multiculturalism. The first is the theory that 
liberal states should simply tolerate the practices of all the different minority cultures that may exist 
within them, provided that those practices are not unjust to anyone outside the minority culture, as 
advocated by Chandran Kukathas. 
The second is the granting of group rights to minorities. The case for group rights is based 
on the claim that ‘minority rights are not only consistent with individual freedom but can actually 
promote it’, because ‘freedom is intimately linked with or dependent on culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 
75) – with the proviso that group rights must not override the freedom and equality of individual 
citizens.
The third is that liberal states have a duty to recognise minority cultures – to show not just 
tolerance but acceptance and respect to minority cultures, as advocated by, for example, Kymlicka, 
Charles Taylor, Joel Anderson, Alex Honneth and Anna Galeotti. 
I  argue  that  the  first  of  these  forms  of  multiculturalism  is  not  fully  compatible  with 
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liberalism, and so rule it  out of consideration.  I  argue that  there is a liberal  case (with various 
qualifications) both for group rights and for recognising minority cultures.  However, I do not think 
either of these forms of multiculturalism should alter the liberal position on face-covering per se. 
2. The Theory of ‘Maximal’ Toleration
In  The  Liberal  Archipelago  (2003),  Chandran  Kukathas  argues  for  a  theory  of  liberalism  as 
toleration. On this view, a liberal state, as he defines it, would tolerate diversity and not seek to 
impose any comprehensive idea of the good. A theory such as this would tend to militate against a 
burqa-ban more strongly than the liberal position on face-covering per se previously outlined.  That 
position assumes that face-covering is voluntary. If it were imposed on unwilling individuals the 
liberal state would have reason to intervene. This is not the case with liberalism as toleration.  Even 
if  burqa-wearing were imposed upon women within the minority culture where it  was worn,  a 
liberal society as conceived by Kukathas should tolerate it. Kukathas expresses his  idea of liberal 
society thus: 
a  collection  of  communities  (and  so,  authorities)  associated  under  laws  which  recognize  the  freedom of 
individuals to associate as, and with whom, they wish. This model of a free society is one in which there may 
be many associations, but also in which none is ‘privileged’ or regarded as having especial moral significance. 
Thus there may, in such a society, be many authorities, all authority resting in the end on the acquiescence of 
subjects rather than of justice.
(2003: 19). 
This is a staunchly anti-perfectionist view. No ideal conception of society is proposed, just a diverse 
range of co-existing ones. On the other hand it is not a Rawlsian conception either. There is no 
overlapping  consensus  on  justice,  only  a  consensus  that  each  association  tolerates  the  others, 
without interference. The metaphor Kukathas deploys is of an archipelago – a sea dotted with small 
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islands.  ‘The  islands  in  question  here  are  different  communities  or,  better  still,  jurisdictions, 
operating in a sea of mutual toleration’ (Kukathas, 2003: 22). And again: 
The liberal archipelago is a society of societies which is neither the creation nor the object of control of any 
single authority. It is a society in which authorities function under laws which are themselves beyond the reach 
of any singular power
(Kukathas 2003: 22). 
Kukathas  says  that  his  conception  of  society  should  count  as  liberal,  because  it  is  based  on 
toleration:
The value which is fundamental to liberalism is toleration. A society or a community is a liberal one if, or to the 
extent that, it is tolerant. What it tolerates as liberal society is dissent or difference...
(2003: 23)
An endorser of Kukathas’s theory would see the burqa-question in some such way as this: ‘I may 
not like or approve of the burqa, but so what? Toleration doesn’t mean anything unless it includes 
tolerating things you dislike or disapprove of. Nobody outside the minority culture is obliged to 
wear the burqa. If women within the minority culture don’t like it, they are free to leave the culture 
and emigrate to another island on the archipelago; if they don’t, it’s because the costs of leaving are 
greater than the costs of staying. As long as it does not impose severe burdens on those outside the 
minority culture – and since it is restricted to that particular island of the archipelago, it won’t – 
there is no reason for the other islands to interfere.’
For Kukathas, tolerance is the fundamental liberal value. He argues (following Kant) that it 
is necessary for free public reason: 
A stance of tolerance  upholds  or  honours  reason since it forswears the use of force in favour of persuasion 
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(whether by argument or example).
(Kukathas 2003: 130). 
The outcome of  a  policy  of  what  we  might  call  inter-island tolerance  would  be,  according to 
Kukathas, something more than a mere  modus vivendi;  it would be a form of ‘moral commons’ 
(2003:  132).  By this  he  means  that,  owing to  the  necessity  of  interaction  between the  islands 
(brought about by trade, intermarriage, professional relationships or other factors), norms inevitably 
emerge about how citizens from different islands relate to each other, which eventually lead to a 
‘public realm’: a realm within which unofficially agreed rules govern interactions – rules which will 
be the result of compromises between the islands, rather than rules which prevail on any individual 
island. 
Such a theory has its advantages. It is certainly true that tolerance is required to make public 
reasoning possible; if the expression of some opinions is punishable by death, for instance, then 
reasoning is hobbled from the start. Then again, the theory’s ambitions are modest; it seeks only to 
eliminate conflict between groups. That is a worthwhile aim and, plausibly, more achievable on this 
theory than a perfectionist one which would attempt to correct the imperfect norms of individual 
islands. Moreover, Kukathas’s theory does not rule out change. The pan-archipelago norms might 
over time filter back to individual islands and have an influence. Within the public realm people are 
allowed to persuade and disagree, and migration between islands is always at least theoretically 
possible. 
The question is whether this form of toleration is a truly liberal one. I argue that it is not. It 
would lead to a plural but not to a pluralistic society – ie to a society of separate, parallel groups 
rather  than  a  society  founded  on ‘social  heterogeneity  and  diversity,  grounded on  respect  and 
reciprocity’ (Galeotti 2002: 2012). Kukathas’s archipelago is similar to the Ottoman Empire millet 
system described by Kymlicka, where the Ottoman rulers, themselves Muslims, allowed Christians 
and Jews within their empire to freely practise their faith, as well as ‘a more general freedom to 
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govern themselves in purely internal matters, with their own legal codes and courts’ (1995: 156). As 
Kymlicka notes, ‘This system was generally humane, tolerant of group differences, and remarkably 
stable’ (1995: 157). It was certainly stable, lasting from the fifteenth century to the early twentieth. 
But  it  was  not  a  liberal  society,  for  as  Kymlicka  says,  ‘it  did  not  recognize  any  principle  of 
individual freedom of conscience’ (1995: 2003). No religious group tried to interfere with another; 
but within the groups, heresy or apostasy were not tolerated.  
Similarly,  in  Kukathas’s  liberal  archipelago,  there is  no  violence or  oppression  between 
islands, but there is nothing to prevent violence or oppression within islands.  Kukathas’s theory has 
no way of dealing with that – or rather it deals with it by tolerating it. This means that individuals 
oppressed by their  communities can seek no redress from a state  which is  tolerant  in  the way 
Kukathas proposes. The consequences for minorities within minorities could be unpleasant. 
Kukathas acknowledges this point: 
...there would in such a society be (the possibility of) communities which bring up children unschooled and 
illiterate;  which  enforce  arranged  marriages;  which  deny  conventional  medical  care  to  their  members 
(including children); and which inflict cruel and ‘unusual’ punishment...Yet, if this is what toleration might lead 
to, is it defensible? 
(2003: 134). 
Kukathas  identifies  and  answers  several  separate  objections  that  an  opponent  of  his  form  of 
toleration could raise. I need deal with only two here, for if I can show that his answers to these 
objections are not satisfactory, that is enough to defeat the claim that his conception of toleration is 
liberal. 
2.1 Objection 1
‘[T]his level of toleration in effect condones the oppression of internal minorities (minorities within minority 
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communities) and of the weakest members of such communities in particular’
(Kukathas 2003: 135)
Kukathas’s answer to this objection is  that  ‘the threat  of oppression is  as  likely to  come from 
outside the minority community as it is from within’ (2003: 135-6), and he cites a whole history of 
states  persecuting minorities  to  support  his claim.  If  the state  is  authorised to  intervene in  the 
practices of minority communities it  may abuse this power,  and fabricate  stories of oppression 
within the minority communities to justify its own oppression; again, historical precedents are not 
lacking. 
Furthermore,  persuasion (allowable under a policy of toleration) as a means of alleviating 
oppression is morally better and more efficacious than the use of force. 
The last of these points can be dealt with swiftly.  If  persuasion is always more efficacious 
than force, then force need never be used and eschewing it makes no difference. However it is far 
from clear that this is the case. The Hindu custom of  suttee –  burning widows along with their 
deceased husbands – was ended, under the Raj, by force. The story of how General Sir Charles 
James Napier helped to end it  is told in his brother William’s  History of  Sir Charles Napier’s  
Administration of Scinde (1851). When a deputation of priests came to Sir Charles demanding that 
the practice be allowed, as it was their custom, he replied:
‘Be it so. This burning of widows is your custom; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation also has a custom. 
When men burn women alive we hang them, and confiscate their property. My carpenters shall therefore erect 
gibbets on which to hang all concerned when the widow is consumed.’  
(Napier, 1851, p. 35). 
As William Napier records,  ‘No suttee took place then or afterwards’ (1851: 35). 
It is perhaps necessary to stress that my use of this example in no way implies support for 
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the British Imperial project. Sir Charles Napier saved a life on this occasion and in the long run the 
abolition of  suttee  saved multiple lives, but as commanding officer of the army which conquered 
Sindh he was responsible for the deaths of many thousands of Indians; and the British were not in 
India  by  invitation.  No  doubt  on  a  net  balance  sheet  the  harms  caused  to  India  by  the  Raj 
outweighed the goods. Nevertheless, ending the practice of suttee was a good, even though Napier’s 
power to end it was based not on legitimate authority in India but sheer brute force. The point of the 
Napier case is simply to show, contra Kukathas, that force may prevail where persuasion does not. 
In such cases persuasion is evidently not more efficacious and it can hardly be more moral either, 
since  it  does not  work.  (And force  deployed by a  liberal  state  within its  own rightful  area  of 
authority would not, of course, be vulnerable to the objection about legitimacy that can be levelled 
at Charles Napier.)
Kukathas’s claim that the majority culture is as likely to be the oppressor as the minority 
culture may well be true. But the question is whether a liberal majority culture is more likely to be 
oppressive than illiberal minority cultures. If liberalism means, minimally, that all citizens are free 
and equal, as I have argued, then the liberal majority culture is very likely to be less oppressive than 
an illiberal minority culture. 
Of course, states do not always live up to their principles. A state might claim to follow 
liberal principles whilst busily oppressing its citizens. But this objection can be levelled at  any 
political philosophy, including Kukathas’s own philosophy of group toleration. A state might claim 
to be tolerant of minority cultures while busily oppressing them. That in itself is no objection to 
Kukathas’s theory.  He is  proposing an ideal  state,  yet  to be achieved. Just  so,  proponents of a 
liberal state which protects the rights of members of minority cultures are proposing an ideal state, 
which has as yet been only partially or imperfectly achieved. 
2.2 Objection 2
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The second objection to his position which Kukathas addresses is: Why not have a minimal level of 
toleration,  stopping  short  of  tolerating  internal  tyrannies,  rather  than  the  maximal  toleration 
proposed by Kukathas? That would serve the same purpose of making public reason possible.  
It  is  worth  noting  here  that  the  phrase  ‘minimal  level  of  toleration’ already  makes  a 
questionable assumption. What Kukathas means by it is that state toleration would stop short of 
tolerating tyrannies internal to minorities. It is by no means clear, though, that this would make for a 
lower level of tolerance overall. For under it the beliefs and practices of minorities within groups 
would be tolerated, whereas under Kukathas’s ‘maximal’ tolerance they would not. 
Leaving that aside, however, Kukathas’s answer to the objection is that it ‘presupposes that 
some ultimate moral authority is both desirable and feasible’ (2003: 137) – which is exactly what 
Kukathas disputes. In his paper, ‘Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in a Liberal Society’ (2010), 
Kukathas claims that ‘there are no universal values we can safely say are universal and not in fact 
particular norms masquerading as universal’ (2010: 9). 
It is certainly true that some values are local norms. But to claim that all values are merely 
local norms leads us all the way to moral relativism. As has frequently been pointed out, moral 
relativism is self-defeating. Anyone who says ‘You should not judge other cultures by the moral 
values of your own’ is caught in a contradiction. For if values are relative, why shouldn’t I? Edward 
Westermarck (1932) advocated moral  relativism as  leading to  tolerance;  yet  ‘for  the consistent 
relativist, tolerance can only ever be a framework-dependent virtue, while Westermarck, and others, 
seem to recommend it as a universal desideratum’ (Baghariam and Carter, SEP, Summer 2017).
This is  not  to say that  relativism  never  makes sense.  Things such as table manners are 
relative to culture; eating like a Tudor today would be extremely rude, but it was not rude in 1540. 
Still, it is both desirable and feasible to establish some bottom-line universal moral claims, based on 
the fact that there are universal truths about what is good for human beings and what is not. As 
Brian Barry puts it: 
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It is better to be alive than dead. It is better to be free than to be a slave. It is better to be healthy than sick. It is 
better to be adequately nourished than malnourished. It is better to drink pure water than contaminated water. It 
is better to have effective sanitation than to live over a sewer. It is better to be well educated than to be illiterate 
and ignorant. It is better to be able to practise the form of worship prescribed by your religion than to be 
prevented  from doing  so.  It  is  better  to  be  able  to  speak  freely  and  be  able  to  join  social  and  political 
organisations of your choice than to fear that, if your activities attract the disfavour of the regime, you face 
arbitrary arrest, torture or ‘disappearance’ at the hands of bodies organised or connived at by the state.
(2001: 285)
It is true, as Barry says, that sometimes people deny others the right to these goods. But nobody 
wants to deny them for themselves. They are transcultural goods, although they are not distributed 
equally across cultures. But a liberal is, precisely, someone who thinks that rights to them ought to 
be distributed equally. As Barry puts it: 
The defining feature of a liberal is, I suggest, that it is someone who holds that there are certain rights against 
oppression, exploitation and injury to which every single human being is entitled to lay claim, and appeals to 
‘cultural diversity’ and pluralism under no circumstances trump the value of these basic liberal rights.
(2001: 132-3).
I think, therefore, that it is both desirable and feasible for there to be an ultimate moral authority, as 
long as it confines itself to these basic liberal rights and does not interfere in matters that genuinely 
are relative to culture. What Kukathas calls ‘minimal’ toleration, but what I should call a form of 
toleration that protects basic individual rights, is the form appropriate to a liberal society. I do not 
agree,  therefore,  that  Kukathas’s  form  of  group  toleration  qualifies  as  a  form  of  liberal 
multiculturalism; and therefore it has no impact on the question of whether a  liberal  state should 
ban the burqa. 
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3. Group Rights 
3.1 Group-differentiated rights 
In  this  section  I  consider  a  second  kind  of  multicultural  theory:  that  which  advocates 
accommodation, in the form of special provision or exemptions from laws, for minority cultural 
groups within society. The case for such special provision or exemptions is based on a theory of 
what Will Kymlicka terms ‘Group-Differentiated rights’ (1995: 26). They are group-differentiated 
because one is entitled to them in virtue of membership of a cultural group. Non-members of the 
group are not so entitled. This theory does not make as strong claims for what is due to cultural 
minorities as does the theory of maximal tolerance, or the theory of the politics of recognition (see 
Section 4,  below).  Kymlicka’s version of group-related rights,  and its  close relatives,  could be 
termed  weak multiculturalism.  It is described as such by Sarah Song (2007), though for slightly 
different reasons (see Section 3.4, below). 
I shall outline and broadly defend Kymlicka’s position, as well as more recent versions of it 
by other theorists, but will  stress the limits of such a theory rather more than Kymlicka or his 
followers  do.  My  position  will  be  that  at  least  some  degree  of  cultural  accommodation  is  in 
principle  compatible  with  liberalism,  two  conditions  being  met:  1)  that  special  provision  or 
exemptions for a cultural group do not impose unreasonable burdens on the rest of society; 2) that 
special provision or exemptions for a cultural group do not override, or cause the overriding of the 
rights of its individual members. 
This position could in theory make some difference to the liberal position on voluntary face-
covering  per  se.  It  might  lead  to  a  more  accommodationist  line  on  exemptions.  Demands  for 
exemptions from the requirement to temporarily uncover the face would be more strongly backed. 
However,  this  depends  on  whether  burqa-wearing  meets  the  two  conditions  given  above:  not 
imposing unreasonable burdens on the rest of society, and not overriding or causing the overriding 
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of the rights of individual women within the group. I suggest that burqa-wearing may be more 
problematic on both those counts than some other cultural practices for which exemption could be 
claimed, and conclude that accepting the liberal case for accommodationism does not commit one 
to modifying the liberal position on voluntary face-covering per se. 
3.2 Group-specific rights
The theory developed by Kymlicka in  Multicultural Citizenship  considers three types of group-
specific rights: 1)  Self-government rights  (1995: 27), which would apply to native minorities of 
countries settled or colonised by larger populations; 2)  Polyethnic rights  (1995: 30) which would 
apply to minority immigrant populations; and  3) Special Representation Rights (1995: 31), which 
concern quotas within legislatures etc for minority ethnic groups, either native or immigrant.
It is only the second of these which concerns us here. Polyethnic rights include  ‘exemptions 
from  laws  and  practices  that  disadvantage  [cultural  groups],  given  their  religious  practices 
(Kymlicka 1995:  31). Kymlicka cites exemptions from animal slaughtering legislation, and also 
notes that ‘Muslim girls in France have sought exemption from school dress-codes so they can wear 
the chador’ (1995: 31). 
Kymlicka argues that group-differentiated rights ought not to be opposed to the rights of 
individuals. Individual rights impose a limit, for the liberal, to the extent of group-differentiated 
rights: ‘Liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the 
freedom or  autonomy of  individuals’ (Kymlicka 1995:  75).  In many cases,  however,  Kymlicka 
argues that rights for minority groups pull with, not against rights for individuals: ‘minority rights 
are not only consistent with individual freedom but can actually promote it’ (1995: 75) because 
‘freedom is  intimately  linked with  or  dependent  on  culture’ (1995:  75).  Culture  is  defined by 
Kymlicka as ‘societal culture’,  ‘whose practices and institutions cover the full range of human 
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activities, encompassing both public and private life’ (1995: 75). The claim is that culture should 
matter to liberals because
freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not only provides these 
options, but makes them meaningful to us.
(Kymlicka 1995: 83)
Kymlicka goes on to quote Ronald Dworkins’ A Matter of Principle  (1985) and agrees with him 
that
[t]he availability  of  meaningful options depends on access  to  a  societal  culture,  and on understanding the 
history and language of that culture – its ‘shared vocabulary of tradition and convention’
(Dworkin 1985: 228, 231, in Kymlicka 1995: 83).
There  is  an  opposing  liberal  position  (Barry  2011)  that  the  state  need  not  make  any  special 
provision to ensure the rights of minority group, because their rights are already taken care of by 
liberalism’s universal commitment to equal rights and freedoms for all citizens: minority groups 
would already have their  right to worship and to associate as they wished protected.  Kymlicka 
characterises this position as a policy of ‘benign neglect’ of minority cultures (1995: 107). However, 
Kymlicka argues, correctly in my view, that such a position is ‘not only mistaken, but actually 
incoherent’  (1995: 108), because governments cannot avoid making decisions on such matters as 
public holidays and official  languages,  which inevitably promote some cultural  identities at  the 
expense  of  others.  The  need  for  group-differentiated  rights  thus  proceeds  from  the  liberal 
commitment to equal rights for all citizens;  differential  treatment  for minority groups might be 
required  to  redress  the  inequality  produced  by  promoting  the  majority  cultural  identity  at  the 
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expense of other cultures. 
However, this form of multiculturalism does not commit the liberal state to granting all and 
any minority groups’ demands for differential treatment. The question in the case of any particular 
demand for special treatment or exemption from a law by a minority cultural group is, first, whether 
the practice for which exemption or provision is demanded is likely to cause unreasonable burdens 
to those outside the cultural group; and second, whether the practice actually does promote or is at 
least compatible with the individual rights of the group members.
Kymlicka is clear that not all demands for group rights should be granted:
Liberal principles impose two fundamental limitations on minority rights. First, a liberal conception of minority 
rights will not justify (except under extreme circumstances)  ‘internal restrictions’ – that is, the demand by a 
minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members.
(1995: 152). 
And: 
External  protections  are  legitimate  only  insofar  as  they  promote  equality  between  groups,  by  rectifying 
disadvantages or vulnerabilities suffered by the members of a particular group.
(Kymlicka 1995: 152). 
To sum up: ‘a liberal view requires freedom within the minority group, and equality between  the 
minority and majority groups’ (Kymlicka 1995: 152). 
This view is thus more attentive to the rights of individuals within minority groups than is 
Kukathas’s ‘maximal’ tolerance. It seems entirely in line with liberal principles, and any special 
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treatment for minority groups consistent with it ought to be unexceptionable to a liberal, wherever 
they  are  on  the  spectrum from political  liberalism to  perfectionist  liberalism.  The  question  is 
whether it justifies making the liberal position on voluntary face-covering per se more lenient; i.e. 
whether it would legitimise exemptions for burqa-wearers in situations where the uncovering of the 
face would normally be required. 
The  answer  will  turn  on  the two conditions stated earlier:   1)  that  special  provision  or 
exemptions for a cultural group do not impose unreasonable burdens on the rest of society; 2) that 
special provision or exemptions for a cultural group do not override, or cause the overriding of the 
rights of its individual members. 
 3.3 Developments of the group-specific rights approach
This  section considers  developments  of  Kymlicka’s  theory,  by  Sarah Song (2007)  and Jocelyn 
Maclure (2011). I argue that these developments are useful in laying down procedural rules for how 
to apply accommodationism but that neither leads to a significant departure from the liberal position 
on voluntary face-covering per se. 
Song (2007) attempts to distance herself from Kymlicka’s position, which she describes as 
‘weak multiculturalism’, for a slightly different reason than the one given by me (Section 1, above). 
In Song’s view, Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is weak because he sees culture as one primary good 
among others (2007: 22). Song takes issue with him here, because she claims that not everyone 
values culture as a primary good, or values it equally: ‘we need to be open to the possibility that 
cultural membership may be differently valued by different members’ ( 2007:  29).  This is not a 
serious objection to Kymlicka’s position, however. It is the case with all primary goods that they 
may be differently valued by people. Song also stresses how cultures are not monolithic or fixed but 
are ‘internally contested, interactive, and loose-jointed’ (2007: 32). No doubt this is true, but there is 
no reason to think Kymlicka would disagree.  Granted that cultures are contested, interactive and 
loose-jointed, one still wants to say: to the extent that it makes sense to talk of cultures as coherent 
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entities at all, then we can ask whether particular practices of a culture should be accommodated. 
Despite  her  efforts  to  distance  herself  from Kymlicka,  Song argues  for  the  Kymlickian 
position of ‘rights-respecting accommodationism’ (2007: 9). Like Kymlicka, she argues that justice 
may require accommodation for cultural minorities, but that it should be limited by ‘the protection 
of the basic rights of individual members of minority groups’ (Song 2007: 9). This is the same 
limitation  as  Kymlicka’s  own rule  that  accommodations  must  not  permit  ‘internal  restrictions’ 
(1995: 152). 
Song advocates what she calls a ‘deliberative approach’ (2007: 9) to questions involving 
potential conflict between group rights and the rights of individuals within those groups (cf Khader 
2011). The deliberative approach involves looking at the question in its context and weighing up all 
the factors before coming to a decision: 
my approach does not suggest global answers to particular cultural  dilemmas, such as the issue of veiling 
among Muslim girls...What is constant is a commitment to protecting the basic rights of women and girls, but 
what such a commitment requires with respect to the practice of veiling... will depend on context and what 
individuals at the center of these controversies are themselves saying
(Song 2007: 12). 
This approach does not represent a significant departure from Kymlickian multiculturalism, and 
there is no reason to think that Kymlicka would wish to dissent from it. It is, however, a useful 
reminder that such questions are complex and their contexts both particular and dynamic. A cultural 
accommodation for burqa-wearing might be justified in one context or at one time, and not justified 
in another context or at another time. 
A more recent application of Kymlicka’s form of multiculturalism is developed by Jocelyn 
Maclure  (2011).  Maclure’s  aim  is  ‘to  present,  and  seek  to  defend,  the  legal  obligation  to 
accommodate, under certain circumstances, minority religious beliefs or practices’ (2011: 262). 
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Although Maclure’s  focus  is  on  religious  beliefs  and practices,  his  argument  applies  to 
cultural practices generally. Maclure’s argument for accommodation stems from Kymlicka’s point 
that  in  a  culturally  diverse  society,  governments,  and  public  institutions,  cannot  avoid  making 
decisions on matters of public policy which will  have differential  impacts on different  cultures 
(Kymlicka, 1995: 108). Thus although the purpose of rules on, say, school uniform, may not be 
discriminatory in their purpose they may very well  be discriminatory in their effect. Therefore, 
under  certain  circumstances,  accommodation  is  necessary  to  correct  ‘indirect  and  involuntary 
discrimination’ (Maclure 2011: 267), such as a school ban on headgear which would impact more 
harshly on male Sikhs, who would not be allowed to wear turbans, than on others. 
It is true, as Brian Barry points out, that all laws have unequal impact and this is no evidence 
that they are unfair: 
If we consider virtually any law, we shall find that it is much more burdensome to some people than to others. 
Speed limits inhibit  only those who like to drive fast.  Laws prohibiting drunk driving have no impact on  
teetotallers. Only smokers are stopped by prohibitions on smoking in public places. Only those who want to 
own a handgun are affected by a ban on them, and so ad infinitum.
(Barry 2011: 34)
However, in most cases the unequal impact is intentional: laws against speeding are  supposed to 
impact on those who wish to drive fast, not on those who do not. Maclure’s concern is with those 
laws or rules where the unequal impact is an  unintended side-effect. In such cases an exemption 
would not run counter to the reason why the law was formulated.
Unintended adverse impact does not of itself justify exemption from a rule, however. It must 
also be shown that the costs of exemption are acceptable to others.  An exemption from wearing a 
school cap and an exemption allowing a burqa to be worn in class raise different questions. The 
school cap exemption is easier to justify. It is hard to see how not wearing a cap but complying with 
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the rest of the uniform code would impose unreasonable burdens on other pupils or on teachers.
An exemption to allow a pupil to cover her face in class, however, is much more likely to 
impose  unreasonable  burdens  on  the  school  community,  creating  problems  of  identification, 
communication and security.  Within a  school  context  it  is  unlikely that  an exemption allowing 
Wahhabist  Muslim girls  to  cover their  faces would be justified.  In  some other  contexts,  where 
identification  alone  was  at  issue,  and  alternative  means  of  identification  available,  perhaps  an 
exemption would be justified.  (This is assuming, of course, that burqa-wearing does not lead to the 
overriding of rights of individual women within the community, a question explored in Chapter 
Eleven). 
Maclure  identifies  two  problems  that  could  result  from  a  policy  of  accommodation: 
Proliferation and Instrumentalization (2011: 270). 
‘Proliferation’ refers  to  the  consequences  of  being  unable  to  distinguish  between  mere 
preferences  and  what  Maclure  calls,  citing  Taylor,  ‘strong  evaluations’ (2011:  268)  –  that  is, 
meaning-giving beliefs which are central to one’s identity. Because rules can be onerous and people 
tend to want as many exemptions as they can get, the temptation is to represent mere preferences as 
strong evaluations, resulting in a proliferation of demands for exemptions.  
‘Instrumentalization’ refers to the risk that  people will  exploit accommodationism to get 
other  things,  such  as  extra  holidays.  This  seems to  be  not  so  much  a  separate  problem from 
proliferation as a particular case of it. Instrumentalization would be a leading cause of proliferation. 
The  proliferation  problem raises  the  possibility  of  a  slippery  slope.  However,  Maclure 
argues that there are ways to block the slope: tribunals could assess the sincerity of claims for 
accommodation,  and  moreover  accommodation  claims  must  still  meet  the  requirement  of 
reasonableness (2011:  273). One would need to look at the effects on others of granting the claim; 
and also the burdens it places on the institution which is asked to accommodate:
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  Accommodation claims must be reasonable because exemptions,  compensations,  or adaptation measures 
modify, to varying degrees, the prevailing terms of social cooperation. The obligation to accommodate is meant 
to redress an injustice by correcting indirect discrimination; logically,  it should not do so by creating new 
situations  of  unfairness.  Yet,  for  an  accommodation  claim to  be  turned  down,  it  must  be  shown that  its 
deleterious effects are real and significant.
(Maclure 2011:  274)
Maclure’s argument is useful in that, as well as justifying a liberal policy of exemptions in principle, 
it  also  identifies  crucial  restrictions  on  that  policy.  Because  of  those  restrictions,  Maclure’s 
argument makes little difference to the liberal  position on voluntary face-covering  per se.  That 
position already grants the right to cover the face habitually, and would only require burqa-removal 
in situations where identification, communication or security were at issue. Exemptions in these 
cases would be likely to have real, significant, deleterious effects precisely because of the nature of 
those  situations:  for  impairing  or  compromising  identification,  communication  or  security  is 
generally likely to be deleterious. 
Maclure’s argument, like Kymlicka’s which it follows, therefore tends to support the  liberal 
position  on  habitual  voluntary  face-covering  per  se,  rather  than  modifying  it.  However,  the 
Kymlickian  position  would be  likely  to  extend cultural  exemptions in  other  areas,  that  do  not 
involve face-covering. 
3.4 Case Study: Aishah Azmi
Let us consider how a theory of group rights with the built-in protections against adverse impact on 
others advocated by Kymlicka and Maclure would play out in a specific case.  I choose the case of 
Aishah Azmi, who in September 2011 was suspended from her position as a teacher at Headfield 
Church  of  England  School  in  Dewsbury,  Yorkshire,  for  refusing  to  remove  her  niqab  in  the 
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classroom, previously referred to in Chapter One (Wainwright,  2006,   Guardian website).  Mrs. 
Azmi claimed unfair discrimination and took her employers to a tribunal, but lost the case. The 
school’s  decision  not  to  allow her  to  teach  unless  she  uncovered  her  face  was  upheld.  Direct 
discrimination was ruled not to have occurred because Ms. Azmi was subject to the same rule that 
would have debarred a teacher from covering their  face for non-religious reasons;  and indirect 
discrimination was also ruled not to have occurred, because  covering her face interfered with the 
performance of her duties. Wearing the niqab hindered trust and communication between her and 
the children she was teaching – a conclusion reached after the school had monitored her teaching 
with her face covered for an agreed period, and listened to the views of the children in her class (see 
the report of the Tribunal Judgement, delivered on 30 March 2007, in the case of Azmi v. Kirklees 
Metropolitan Borough Council: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2007/0009_07_3003.html). 
It ought to be no surprise that covering the face hinders communication, given the crucial 
role the face plays in human interaction (see Chapter Three). Teaching with one’s face covered – 
especially to children of primary school age, who are more reliant on encouraging looks and smiles, 
more easily made shy or scared, and less equipped to deal with unfamiliar situations than older, 
more self-sufficient students – imposes a burden that is both unreasonable and unnecessary. 
In this particular case,  then,  the first  condition is not  met,  and we do not even need to 
investigate the second condition. However, there may be other cases where face-covering does not 
impose an unreasonable burden – for example if uncovering is required merely to establish identity, 
when other means of identification are available. In such cases, the first condition would be met. 
However, the second condition – whether the practice of burqa-wearing as a whole overrides or 
causes the overriding of the rights of the individual – also needs to be met for an exemption to be 
justified. That is not a simple question, and will be explored in more detail in Chapter Eleven, 
where the issue of coercion is considered. 
Pending that exploration, we can say that if the practice of burqa-wearing can be shown not 
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to  override  or  cause  the  overriding  of  the  rights  of  individual  women,  then  exemptions  from 
requirements to uncover the face would be legitimate provided they did not impose unreasonable 
burdens on the rest of society. Therefore, in a few cases the position of weak multiculturalism might 
justify exemptions from a rule requiring the face to be shown. 
Given,  however,  that  exemptions  could  only  be  justified  where  alternative  means  of 
communication or identification were available and equally efficacious, one is inclined to doubt 
whether the rule in such cases would be necessary at all. Practically speaking, the position of weak 
multiculturalism would be almost indistinguishable from the liberal  position on voluntary face- 
covering per se.  
4. The Politics of Recognition 
New life was breathed into multicultural theory by  the ‘politics of Recognition’, first advocated by 
Charles Taylor, and more recently in slightly different forms by  Joel Anderson, Axel Honneth and 
by Anna Galeotti. 
The politics of recognition is fundamentally different from Kukathas’s theory of maximal 
tolerance. In Kukathas’s theory, the essential is that the practices of cultural groups be permitted. 
Kukathas states: 
Toleration, in the sense in which it is being used here, is an undemanding virtue, since it requires little more  
than indifference to those who are,  or  that which is,  tolerated.  It  may, on occasion, require  a  measure of 
forbearance, but it does not require respect or empathy or admiration or even much concern for others. It 
certainly does not require taking the tolerated individual or groups seriously; and it is perfectly consistent with 
a contempt for everything for which they stand, as well as with an unwillingness to engage them in rational 
dialogue, or even to understand them.
(2003: 130)
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The politics of recognition, on the other hand, requires a good deal more than indifference to those 
who are tolerated. It requires that they be recognised: that is, that a positive attitude of respect be 
shown towards them, in virtue of who they are both as individuals and as members of a culture. 
Clearly, this is more demanding than Kukathas’s maximal toleration. 
In his essay ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in the book  Multiculturalism  (Taylor, C.,  et al, 
1994) Taylor makes the following claim: ‘A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the 
need for, sometimes the demand, for recognition’ (1994: 25). He argues that 
...our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the  misrecognition of others, and so a 
person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror 
back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. 
(Taylor 1994: 25)
Taylor’s thesis is  that  guaranteeing equal  rights for all  citizens is  not  sufficient  to address this 
problem of misrecognition. In addition, and potentially conflictingly, there is need for a ‘politics of 
difference’ (Taylor 1994: 38) which requires us to recognise ‘the unique identity of this individual 
or group’ (1994: 38).
Recognition entails not merely acknowledgement of identity but endorsement and respect. 
Furthermore this may be demanded not merely for current members of the group in question, but 
future members too. Some recognition-demands aim to ‘maintain and cherish distinctness, not just 
now but forever’ (Taylor 1994: 40). In Taylor’s own example of the francophone community of 
Quebec, what is demanded is not merely that the state recognises the right of the Quebecois to 
speak French, but that it takes steps to ensure that their descendants will do so too. To achieve this, 
it was not sufficient  for the state to set up francophone schools; it was also deemed necessary to 
pass  a law preventing francophones from sending their  children to anglophone schools (Taylor 
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1994).  
5. Two More Versions of the Politics of Recognition
More recent  versions of  the  politics  of  recognition,  such as  those  advanced by Anna  Galeotti 
(2002), and Joel Anderson and Alex Honneth (2005) make more ambitious claims for the role of 
recognition.  In Galeotti’s formulation, recognition of minority groups is to replace the classical 
liberal form of tolerance – where the state permits non-harmful cultural  practices but is neutral 
towards them. Instead,  for  Galeotti,  tolerance  demands official  recognition of  minority  cultural 
practices. For Anderson and Honneth, recognition forms part of their theory of personal autonomy. 
They take the liberal  perfectionist  view that  autonomy is an essential  good which liberal  states 
should seek to promote, and by combining this with a commitment to the politics of recognition, 
arrive at  a  ‘recognitional  theory of  autonomy’.  It  will  be seen,  then,  that  Galeotti  places  more 
emphasis  on  recognition  of  groups  while  Anderson  and  Honneth  place  more  emphasis  on 
recognition of individuals. The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible; but Anderson and 
Honneth’s theory does appear to suggest possible limitations on the group recognition required by 
Galeotti.  I  first  outline  each  theory  in  turn,  before  turning  to  a  discussion  of  the  limits  of 
recognition. 
5.1 Toleration as Recognition
In her book Toleration as Recognition (2002) Galeotti begins by noting that the traditional liberal 
idea  of  tolerance  as  non-interference  with  (non-harmful)  individual  choices  has  not  prevented 
controversy erupting over a number of  issues in contemporary liberal states. She cites, for example, 
‘the wearing of  the Islamic headscarf in public schools, the admission of gays into the army and 
regulations concerning speech that incites violence or hatred’ (2002: 4).
In Galeotti’s view, ‘what gives rise to most genuine contemporary issues of toleration are, in 
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fact, differences between groups rather than between individuals’ 2002: 5). Such cases, Galeotti 
claims, do not involve  choice.  These cases are not about moral disagreement, but instead about 
‘asymmetries in social standing, status, respect and public recognition’ (2002: 5). 
In a nutshell: ‘what is really at stake in contemporary issues of toleration is equal respect 
and social standing for minority groups, rather than equal liberties for individuals’ (2002: 6). What 
toleration as recognition means is that we do not ignore differences, but publicly recognise them. 
This makes minority groups feel included within the polity. Public recognition can be grouped into 
6 categories: 
1. ‘Claims for public toleration of social differences...
2. Claims for limiting toleration of practices and forms of speech that are seen as offensive to the dignity 
of members of  newly-included groups, and which thus damage their  collective image and public 
presence...
3. Claims  for  revising  public  conventions  that  are  based  on  a  majority  culture,  and  which  exclude 
minority members from certain activities...
4. Claims  for  special  policies  aimed  at  providing  minority  members  with  more  opportunities  and 
resources...
5. Claims for special  support for  minority cultures in order  to prevent  their  being swamped by the 
majority culture... 
6. Claims for collective rights to group autonomy and collective liberty.’ 
(2002: 197)
Galeotti recognises that some of these claims might be difficult to uphold in particular cases: for 
example the second one clashes against freedom of expression, while some readjustments under 3) 
might be too burdensome to carry out. Her contention is not that all recognitional claims should be 
upheld. The aim is ‘an undertaking to question and revise those conventions which are based on 
what the majority considers to be the norms, so as to take into account the views of minorities’ 
(2002: 202). But each claim must be taken on its own terms and not all will be granted; it is the 
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consideration of the claim which does the important work here. 
Toleration as recognition, Galeotti says, leads to an inclusive and pluralistic society. This is 
in  stark  contrast  to  the plural society  of  minimally  interacting  ‘islands’ of  Kukathas’s  liberal 
archipelago, where tolerance means ‘hands-off’ rather than recognition. 
It is not a foregone conclusion that Galeotti’s toleration as recognition would justify burqa-
wearing in all circumstances. But it would ensure that any claims for exemptions from particular 
restrictions from face-covering be considered with due attention and respect. 
5.2 Recognition as the ground of personal autonomy
Joel Anderson and Alex Honneth emphasise a different role for recognition, more focused on the 
individual within society. In their essay ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice’ (2005), 
they offer a conception of personal autonomy in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ (2005: 127). They 
embrace the idea of relational autonomy, summarised in the claim that: 
Autonomy is a capacity that exists only in the context of social relations that support it and only in conjunction 
with the internal sense of being autonomous
(2005: 129, quoting Jennifer Nedelsky)
From this claim they develop their recognitional theory. The key idea is that autonomy can only be 
achieved  in  socially  supportive  conditions.  Anderson  and  Honneth  consider  a  helpless  baby’s 
journey to adult autonomy, with all the support it requires along the way (2005: 130). When one 
becomes an adult, the support of others becomes less direct, more complex and diffuse, but does not 
cease to be necessary. Therefore, ‘one’s autonomy is vulnerable to disruptions in one’s relationship 
to others’ (Anderson and Honneth 2005: 130). The competencies that comprise autonomy depend 
on attitudes to oneself (self-trust, self-respect, self-esteem) and these, in turn, are dependent on the 
sustaining attitudes of others (Anderson and Honneth 2005: 131). One’s relationship to oneself is 
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not a matter of solitary reflection, but the ‘result of an ongoing intersubjective process’ (Anderson 
and Honneth 2005: 131). 
Liberal  states  are  already  supposed  to  put  in  place  conditions  which  will  help  citizens 
achieve  personal  autonomy,  by  providing  the  ‘material  and  institutional  circumstances  of 
autonomy’ (Anderson and Honneth 2005: 129) –  that is to say, welfare, education, shelter, help for 
the disabled,  religious tolerance and so on. Anderson and Honneth support  such provisions but 
argue that by themselves they are not sufficient to guarantee autonomy.  The state must also protect 
or assist the necessary socially supportive conditions for autonomy. The implication is that in a 
culturally diverse society this will necessarily include multicultural policies.
Such a theory could justify a more accommodationist position on burqa-wearing than the 
liberal  position  on  voluntary  face-covering  per  se.  In  order  for  the  individual  to  develop  the 
personal autonomy prized by Anderson and Honneth, their culture would have to be recognised. 
Thus  Anderson  and  Honneth’s  theory  would  suggest  a  similar  approach  to  accommodation  to 
Galeotti’s, although the routes by which they reached this approach differ.  Policy might be more 
accommodating in three ways.
5.3 Three types of accommodation
1) Demands for exemptions from the requirement to temporarily uncover the face would be 
more strongly backed, for the need for recognition of one’s cultural practices would supply a sound 
reason for exemption. We might expect, then, that exemptions from the requirement to temporarily 
remove the burqa in institutions would be granted more frequently under Anderson and Honneth’s 
approach, as under Galeotti’s. Claims 1) and 3) of Galeotti’s categories of recognitional claims, 
above, would have particular force here. 
2) The obligation to recognise burqa-wearing would be something to set against any possible 
harms, such as a rise in masked crime. The threshold at which burqa-wearing was judged to have 
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reached an unacceptably harmful level would therefore be likely to be raised. 
3) A liberal state which subscribed to the politics of recognition would refrain from public 
disapproval  or  criticism  of  burqa-wearing;  and  liberal  individuals  who  took  the  politics  of 
recognition seriously would also be careful not to voice disapproval (and would perhaps school 
themselves not to feel it). Claim 2) of Galeotti’s categories of recognitional claims, above, would 
apply here. 
6. Limits of the Politics of Recognition
Neither Galeotti nor Anderson and Honneth argue that the politics of recognition mean that any and 
all claims by minority groups, or individuals  qua members of minority groups, are to be granted. 
However, neither theory has much to say about where the limits should be drawn. In this section my 
aim is to consider what kind of claims should not be recognised. 
6.1 Harmful practices
I start from the position that cultural claims, like religious claims, can be disaggregated, to employ 
Laborde’s  useful  term (see  Chapter  Two).  That  is  to  say,  although one  may take  a  respectful, 
recognitional  stance  in  general  towards  minority  groups,  specific  practices  are  to  be  evaluated 
individually and not all must qualify for recognition. Harmful practices, for example, are likely 
candidates for failing to merit recognition. FGM, or clitoridectomy, is a clear example of a practice 
which ought not to be tolerated even in Kukathas’s attenuated sense of ‘toleration’, let alone the 
recognitional  sense  of  Galeotti.  Interestingly,  Galeotti  herself  brings  up  clitoridectomy  as  a 
contested practice several times, and does say that it should not be recognised, but she does so with 
great circumspection.  Although the word clitoridectomy appears five times in her index, only one 
of those references makes it clear that recognition should not extend to such a  practice, and even 
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then  a  careful  reading is  required  to  discern  her  view.  It  is  worth  quoting  in  full  and indeed 
necessary to quote in full, as the point is made so periphrastically: 
I do not deny that cultural differences may sometimes pose problems of ethical and legal incompatibility (the 
typical example being clitoridectomy), nor that fundamentalism is widespread among Islamic immigrants and 
may nurture terrorism (as has happened in France); yet I hold that, as a rule, neither incompatibility nor  
political self-defence are sufficient justification for stopping public toleration of differences, with some clear 
exceptions (such as the two just mentioned).
(Galeotti 2002: 86)
Although clitoridectomy is  an  ‘exception’ to  the  general  rule  of  public  recognition  of  cultural 
differences, Galeotti spends no words explaining why it is an exception, and does not explicitly 
condemn  the  practice.  An  attendant  risk,  perhaps,  of  the  politics  of  recognition  is  a  lack  of 
forthrightness in ruling out cultural practices that do not deserve recognition. This is not a flaw in 
the theory itself but a psychological reluctance of its proponents to emphasise things that should not 
be recognised rather than things that  should be, from a fear that stressing the exceptions might 
undermine the well-founded claims (and in the passage quoted above that is the line Galeotti seems 
to take). However, such reluctance is not justified. Having clear limits does not make recognition 
any less valuable.
In the case of the burqa, the point to decide is whether it counts as a harmful practice. If so, 
that would be a  prima facie  reason for not affording it recognition (and therefore, in Galeotti’s 
terms, not tolerating it). I do not think a case that it is harmful has been made. But this is discussed 
in detail in Chapter Eleven. 
6.2 Divided cultures
Cultures are not monoliths. Galeotti herself notes that cultures ‘are not only subject to continual 
changes and influence from others... but are also internally segmented and divided’ 2002: (p. 208). 
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When cultures are divided, it is no easy matter for the liberal state to rule on which of the contested 
beliefs or practices are to be recognised. Moreover, focusing on cultural  groups risks failing to 
recognise the claims of dissident or reforming individuals within the group. 
By  preventing  francophone  citizens  from having  their  children  educated  in  English,  as 
Charles Taylor advocates (1994),  the state prioritises group rights over individual rights. This could 
have the effect both of stultifying the ambitions of individuals and also preventing the community 
itself from ever changing. There is a danger generally of allowing the politics of recognition to 
restrict the autonomy of individual members of  cultural groups. 
The point is made by K. Anthony Appiah, who argues that Taylor’s ideal in which people 
are respected for their identity – respected as black, or as gay etc – should not be an endpoint: 
I think we need to go on to the next necessary step, which is to ask whether the identities constructed in this 
way are ones we – I speak here as someone who counts in America as a gay black man – can be happy with in 
the long run.
(1994: 162) 
The politics of recognition tends to impose a script and ‘proper ways’ of living up to one’s identity: 
thus ‘there will be expectations to be met, demands to be made’ (Appiah 1994: 162). Therefore it 
requires that:
...one’s skin color, one’s sexual body, should be acknowledged politically in ways that make it hard  
for those who want to treat their skin and sexual body as personal dimensions of the self.
(Appiah 1994: 163). 
The  politics  of  recognition  must  therefore  be  kept  within  bounds  or  it  could  squash  personal 
autonomy.
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A further point is that the politics of recognition could have a similar such squashing effect 
on future generations as well. Provisions demanded now by spokespeople for cultural groups (who 
often are among the most traditionalist of their group) are to shape the lives of those as yet unborn, 
and put a brake on future modernising movements.
6.3 The Rights-Protecting Requirement and the Autonomy-Protecting Requirement
Consistency with liberal principles therefore requires a limitation on policies of recognition 
which are designed to perpetuate cultural  practices. The practices must not be such as to as to 
infringe upon the fundamental liberal rights of the individual. We can call this the Rights-Protecting 
Requirement.
There is a further limitation. If the practices are such as to restrict  the personal autonomy of 
some members of the cultural group, that is reason for a liberal state’s declining to perpetuate them. 
Liberals at  any point  on the PL-Perfectionist  spectrum would have reservations about  a  policy 
which severely limited or impaired the personal autonomy of some group members. Such practices 
ought not to be tolerated. We can call this the Autonomy-Protecting Requirement.
Perhaps the particular policy discussed by Taylor, of preserving francophone communities 
by making francophone schooling compulsory for them, survives both requirements. Fundamental 
rights such as the right to free speech or to due process or religious freedom are not affected, so the 
Rights-Protecting Requirement would seem to be satisfied. Speaking French rather than English 
does not impair autonomy, so the Autonomy-Protecting Requirement also seems to be satisfied. 
The communal  gains in preserving the language of the Quebecois  (including its  songs,  poetry, 
stories  etc)  might  be  thought  enough  to  outweigh  the  relatively  small  restriction  of  denying 
francophone children an anglophone education. After all there are plenty of other opportunities to 
learn English. 
Still,  there is room for debate here. Appiah does not agree that compulsory francophone 
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education  for  French-speaking  children  in  Quebec  would  satisfy  the  Autonomy-Protecting 
Requirement: ‘I think (and Taylor, I gather, does not) that the desire of some Quebecois to require 
people who are ‘ethnically’ francophone to educate their children in French  steps over a boundary’ 
(Appiah 1994: 163). 
Note that the factors a liberal state should consider in deciding this case do not depend on 
the claims of the politics of recognition. They are the reason the claim was made, but not the reason 
one should accede to it. The decisive questions for the liberal are not whether the cultural practice is 
important, nor how endangered it is. The decisive questions are whether the practice satisfies the 
Rights-Protecting Requirement and the Autonomy-Protecting Requirement.
All such demands for the protection of cultural practices must pass these tests. Suppose a 
demand were made by a conservative Islamic group that schools be set up where all girls were to 
wear the burqa, appealing to the politics of recognition:  This practice is important to our culture  
and deserves to be recognised; without recognition the survival of the practice is not guaranteed. 
I  do  not  think  that  this  demand would  pass  the  Rights-Protecting  Requirement  and the 
Autonomy-Protecting Requirement. But the point is that it would have to pass them if the policy 
demanded were to be implemented by a liberal state. Neither the importance of the tradition nor its 
endangerment supply sufficient reason for perpetuating it.
Taylor acknowledges this to some extent. He argues, effectively, for what one might call a 
two-tier  form of  liberalism,  in  which fundamental  individual  rights  (‘rights  to  life,  liberty,  due 
process, free speech, free practice of religion and so on’ (Taylor 1994: 59) form the bottom tier, 
while a second tier allows for  ‘privileges and immunities that are important’ as well (1994: 59). 
The rights of the bottom tier are indefeasible, while the second tier relates to important privileges or 
immunities that could in principle be restricted or revoked, although one would need a compelling 
reason for doing so (1994: 59). 
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6.4 A potential problem 
There remains, however, a potential problem. What if the cultural group affected does not accept the 
reason for revoking or restricting their privileges or immunities? What if the cultural group accepts 
neither the Rights-Protecting Requirement nor the Autonomy-Protecting Requirement? What if, in 
short, they do not accept liberal principles? As Taylor points out, in Islam there is no tradition of a 
separation between church and state, for example (1994: 62). Liberalism is not culturally neutral. It 
is  a  Western  tradition,  historically  an  outgrowth  of  Christianity  (Siedentorp,  2015).  In  a 
multicultural society there may be 
...substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our 
philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising 
our basic political principles.
( Taylor, 1994, p. 63)
When this kind of clash occurs then liberalism must defend its values. Taylor cites the Rushdie 
affair as a case in point and condemns the fatwa against him: ‘There will be variations when it 
comes to applying the schedule of rights, but not where incitement to assassination is concerned’ 
(1994: 62). In 2011, writing with Jocelyn Maclure, he states: 
Except in flagrant cases of defamation or incitement to hatred, the state cannot restrict some people’s freedom 
of expression on the pretext that ideas or representations have the effect of profaning what, for others, is  
considered sacred’ (2011: 108); and they add ‘We would certainly not like to live in a society where Salman 
Rushdie or Richard Dawkins would be censored 
(2011: 109) 
Yet this defence is immediately followed by ‘With that said, just because we have the right to do x 
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does not mean that doing x is wise or desirable’ (2011: 109). The suggestion seems to be that writers 
and  artists  should  self-censor,  or  at  least  think  very,  very  carefully  before  not  self-censoring. 
Freedom of expression must be balanced, in Taylor and Maclure’s view, by ‘an ethics of concern for 
the other’ (2011: 109).  This highlights a potential tension between liberal values and the politics of 
recognition.  The requirement of recognising the values and beliefs of other cultural groups could 
make it tricky to be full-blooded about defending liberal values. To defend liberal values in cases 
like  the  Rushdie  affair  means  asserting  the  primacy  of  free  expression  over  the  protection  of 
religious sensibilities. To do so necessarily implies that liberal values are superior to other values. 
But the politics of recognition seems to require, or at least nudge us in the direction of  recognising 
all cultures as of equal value. As Taylor says, with explicit demands for cultural recognition, ‘the 
presumption seems to be of equal worth [of all cultures]’ (1994: 66). That is surely right: no one 
demands recognition for their culture on the basis that it is of lesser value than the dominant one. 
Yet the demand is problematic. It is not true that all cultures are of equal value. It would be a 
most remarkable fact if they were. Let us first note that even to make the claim that all cultures are 
of equal value implies some kind of universal standard against which they could be judged and 
found to be equal.  (A claim of equal value is not a claim of incommensurability.) But let us grant 
that there is such a standard and we are reasonably clear about what it is. A dilemma then presents 
itself. 
6.5 The synchronic/diachronic fork
Is the claim of equal cultural  value  diachronic? If  that  is  the case then all  cultures throughout 
history have been of equal value. There is no such thing as progress. A culture cannot improve. If it 
did it would be of greater value than it was before, which is what is denied. Neither could there be 
such a thing as decadence. A culture cannot deteriorate. If it did it would be of less value than it was 
before, which is also denied.
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If one rejects this view, then the claim of equal cultural value must be  synchronic.  That 
means that all the cultures in the world at this moment are of equal value. It was not always thus, 
but  right  now it  is.  That  seems an extraordinary coincidence.  Moreover,  it  is  by  its  nature  an 
ephemeral state of affairs. Unless we are able to freeze this moment somehow, then as different 
cultures develop their value will diverge again so that some are of greater value than others, as was 
formerly the case. 
6.6 A recommended attitude
Taylor agrees that the presumption of equal value for all cultures is impossible to grant. However, 
he says there is something true in the presumption; if not all cultures have equal value, they do at 
least all have value:  
As  a  presumption,  the  claim  is  that  all  human  cultures  that  have  animated  whole  societies  over  some 
considerable stretches of time have something important to say to all human beings.
(Taylor 1994: 66). 
Taylor refers to this as ‘a starting hypothesis with which we ought to approach the study of any 
other cultures’ (1994: 66-67). 
He sums up by saying: 
Just as all must have equal civil rights, and equal voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so all should enjoy 
the presumption that their traditional culture has value 
(Taylor 1994:  68). 
What Taylor is  recommending here is  an  attitude.  It  is  a  reasonable,  humane attitude,  and has 
expediency in its favour. A multicultural society in which this attitude prevails is likely to function 
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more smoothly than one in which it does not. But in the end it seems to come down to little more 
than decency and good manners. When it comes to deciding actual policies – should a conservative 
Islamic group set up schools where the girls have to wear burqas? – the decision cannot be made on 
the  basis  that  all  cultures  have  value.  That  should  inform the  spirit  in  which  the  question  is 
investigated, and the tone in which the debate is conducted and the manner in which the decision is 
announced. But it should not influence the policy itself, which is to be decided in line with liberal 
principles.  The  tests  are  whether  the  privilege  or  immunity  demanded  satisfies  a)  the  Rights-
Protecting Requirement and b) the Autonomy-Protecting Requirement. 
To sum up:  Charles  Taylor’s  argument  for  a  politics  of  recognition  offers  reasons why 
provision could be made by a liberal state to facilitate or preserve certain cultural practices, as long 
as they do not offend against liberal principles; and it persuasively suggests an appropriate tone in 
which public debate about questions should be conducted. But I do not see that it offers reason to 
modify in essentials the Liberal Position on voluntary face-covering per se.
6.7 Limits of state power
Anderson and Honneth (2005) make the valid argument that if liberal states value autonomy, and if 
autonomy  requires  socially  supportive  conditions,  then  liberal  states  should  foster  or  provide 
socially supportive conditions. 
However, the implication that this must result in recognitional multicultural policies – i.e. 
policies that provide recognition for cultural  groups within society – does not necessarily carry 
through. I agree that liberal states ought to provide socially supportive conditions to facilitate the 
possibility  of  personal  autonomy;  but  the  recognitional  policies  adumbrated  by  Anderson  and 
Honneth may in some cases be outside the legitimate sphere of the liberal state.
     First, the three attitudes identified by Anderson and Honneth as underpinning the competencies 
necessary for autonomy – self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem – are not necessarily attitudes that 
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the state can do a great deal about. Self-respect – characterised by Anderson and Honneth as ‘the 
ability to stand up in public without shame’ (a view they attribute to Amyarta Sen) and as ‘the 
ability to assert claims’ (attributed to Joel Feinberg) (2005: 132) –  is perhaps the most amenable to 
protection by the state. The state can at least block interference with standing up in public and with 
the assertion of claims. But let us examine how this would translate into practice in relation to 
burqa-wearing.  The  state  would  protect  the  right  of  burqa-wearing  individuals,  and those  who 
support them, to stand and assert their claims in favour of public face-covering for those women 
who choose it. To be even-handed, however, the state should also protect the right of those who 
wish to stand up and offer a critique of public face-covering for women. Both parties to the debate 
are thus enabled to preserve self-respect. But this says nothing about how any particular question 
relating to burqa-wearing should be decided.  If the question is, for example, whether temporary 
facial uncovering should be required of a witness in a court of law, then allowing each side to assert 
their claims without shame does not of itself settle the question. 
Anderson and Honneth add that the state should actively support self-respect (2005: 133). 
The state could attempt to do this through education policy, by emphasising the importance of self-
respect through the national curriculum, in citizenship classes and other lessons. However, in  cases 
where the minority culture itself does not support equal respect for all its members, the state would 
find itself actually in opposition to the minority culture. In any case it is not obvious that the state 
would be able to achieve a great deal through education policy. It seems unlikely that a citizenship 
class once a week could override the whole tradition of values and beliefs in which a young person 
has been brought up. If your citizenship teacher tells you that girls are as worthy of respect as boys, 
and every member of your extended family informs you otherwise, the citizenship teacher’s words 
may not carry much weight.
Self-trust seems even less amenable to influence from the state. ‘Self-trust’ is described by 
Anderson and Honneth as ‘basic self-confidence’ (2005: 133), and also as the ability to trust one’s 
189
feelings,  impulses  and  desires  (2005:  134).  This  is  linked  very  closely  with  trust  in  one’s 
relationships, especially intimate ones: Anderson and Honneth point out that those who have been 
raped or physically abused find it much more difficult to trust their emotions. A state concerned 
with  protecting  and fostering  autonomy must  have  firm laws against  rape  and physical  abuse. 
Liberal states already have those. Perhaps they should be more strongly enforced. But other than 
punishing and deterring such outrages it  is hard to see how the state could do much to secure 
trusting intimate relationships among its citizens. It cannot police relationships to prevent emotional 
cruelty,  sarcasm,  contempt,  indifference,  lack  of  warmth,  or  lack  of  respect.  The  state  cannot 
enforce trusting relationships. Trust by its nature cannot be enforced. Perhaps the most the state can 
do, apart from punishing violence, is to provide safety-nets and escape routes for victims when 
trusting relationships break down: fair divorce laws, women’s refuges, and a benefit system that 
makes separation possible. 
Again,  though,  such  policies  would  not  necessarily  be  multicultural.   In  cases  where 
violence or cruelty occurs within a minority culture and with its sanction, the state would find itself 
working in opposition to the minority culture.
‘Self-esteem’ is not defined by Anderson and Honneth, but seems to mean a self-image or 
identity that one feels proud of, or at least satisfied with, and which gives one the ability to be a 
fully-functioning agent in society. This seems the least amenable to protection by the state of all. 
Self-esteem, Anderson and Honneth rightly point  out,  can be impaired by negative or insulting 
comments, and conclude: 
a conception of  social  justice  that  is  seriously committed to  protecting the autonomy of  individuals  must 
include a protection against threats of denigration 
(2005: 137). 
Some limited protection is possible and already available in certain areas: there is a law against 
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incitement to racial hatred, and where racist comments fall short of incitement they are  de facto 
prohibited in any public institution or forum and would force the resignation of any public figure or 
official  who made them; there are equal  opportunities  laws restricting what  can be said in  job 
advertisements, so that women and ethnic or cultural groups are not unfairly excluded; we have 
laws against libel, which operate if a personal denigratory statement is made publicly and cannot be 
proved true. 
But the liberal state cannot and should not go very much further than that. If the state were 
to attempt to prohibit  all  denigratory remarks (and Anderson’s and Honneth’s interpretation of 
what counts as a denigratory remark is extremely wide: they cite ‘stay-at-home dad’ as an example 
of  a  negative  term  (2005:  136)),  the  consequence  would  be  a  totalitarian  policing  of  private 
utterances which would take away more autonomy than it secured. 
This is not to argue that, since it is impossible for the state to guarantee self-respect, self-
trust and self-esteem in all its citizens, it should not even try to do anything. Half a loaf is better 
than no bread, and where the state can help and protect  those attitudes (subject  to not eroding 
freedoms which are themselves necessary for autonomy, like freedom of speech) it should do so. 
But I wish to re-emphasise that such policies may not be multicultural in nature. Much of 
Anderson’s and Honneth’s discussion appears to suppose that threats to the attitudes necessary for 
the competencies which underpin personal autonomy are likely to come from outside one’s culture 
or community. They employ the all-embracing word ‘society’ rather than speaking of communities 
and sub-cultures within a society, and often blame ‘society’ for failures to secure autonomy for its 
citizens:  ‘society’s recognitional infrastructure can leave the autonomy of individuals unacceptably 
vulnerable’ (2005: 142). By all means let us blame society when it is society’s fault. Sometimes, 
however, it is not society as a whole which is to blame, but minority cultural groups within it. 
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6.8 The need for recognition may be at odds with multicultural policies
A clear  example  of  this  emerges  from  Catriona  Mackenzie’s  paper,   ‘Relational  Autonomy, 
Normative Authority and Perfectionism’ (2008), which compares the cases of two women, Mrs B 
and Mrs. H.  Mackenzie’s aim is to argue for a ‘Weak substantive’ view of personal autonomy, 
halfway between Christman’s  and Oshana’s,  and in  doing so  she  makes  use  of  Anderson and 
Honneth’s theory that  recognition from others is essential  for autonomy. What I focus on here, 
however, is a point  which emerges,  perhaps inadvertently, by the way: the fact  that policies to 
ensure the recognition which is necessary for autonomy may militate against multicultural policies. 
 Mackenzie considers first the case of Mrs B – a quadriplegic who brought a suit against the 
hospital for keeping her alive against her will. In a legal judgement Dame Butler-Sloss found in her 
favour and the ventilator was switched off. Mackenzie supports this decision, which she says was 
made according to  the  principle  of  respect  for  autonomy,  and approvingly  quotes  Butler-Sloss 
quoting Kim Atkins: 
Respect  for  autonomy is  an acknowledgement  of  the  limitations of  our  knowledge  of  other  people and a 
willingness to incorporate that understanding into our worldviews.
(Mackenzie 2008: 515-6). 
Mrs  B  is  an  ideal  model  for  endorsement  accounts  of  autonomy  such  as  Christman’s  and 
Anderson’s: she has reflected long and hard on her situation and has deeply-considered reasons for 
her choice. 
Mackenzie contrasts this textbook endorsement case with the case of Mrs H. Mrs H has 
cancer,  and  has  lost  her  hair,  one  leg,  and  husband  (who  left  her  because  her  disability  was 
burdensome and an embarrassment to him). She tells hospital staff she wants no further treatment 
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but wishes to be left to die (though the hospital could keep her alive in the medium-term). Mrs H 
poses a problem for endorsement accounts: she genuinely wants what she says she wants, but her 
view is a result of ‘oppressive social relationships that undermine her ability to flourish’ (2008: 
518).  There are norms of traditional femininity in her culture that  she no longer satisfies. This 
seems a clear, indeed an extreme case of what Khader termed an IAP – an Inappropriate Adaptive 
Preference (Khader 2011).
It is not at all clear that society as a whole is at fault in the case of Mrs H. It is the minority 
culture to which Mrs H belongs that is to blame: a culture in which women are not granted equal 
respect with men and are judged on a narrow notion of femininity and wifely/motherly capabilities, 
and  in  which  men’s  responsibilities  to  their  wives  are  taken  less  seriously  than  women’s 
responsibilities to their husbands. 
Mackenzie does not specify which minority culture Mrs H belongs to or say very much 
about its oppressive social  relationships.  But there is  a description in Zarghuna Kargar’s book 
Dear Zari (2012) of a similar case which occurred in Afghanistan in the 1980s. A young wife and 
mother, Wazma, loses her leg in a Russian rocket attack. After this her husband Waheed (who 
previously had been loving and affectionate towards her) leaves her, taking their child away, and 
marries another woman. Kargar interviews Wazma:
What if the rocket attack had taken Waheed’s leg instead of hers? Wazma smiled and replied that she would 
have stayed and looked after him. She would never have left him. She said she knows she was cast out because 
she is a woman.
(2012: 158-589)
Nor is this an isolated case:
Wazma is not alone. Hundreds of women in Afghanistan suffer like this. According to the United Nations, the 
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decades of war that have plagued Afghanistan – the rocket attacks, landmines and bombs – have left more than 
a million people disabled... It is not unusual to find a man like Waheed with a heart made of stone, as Wazma 
puts it; a man who would reject his wife because she had become disabled. However, there are many women – 
young and old – who are married to disabled men and take care of all their needs. It is easier for a disabled man 
to find a wife because the woman has no say in the marriage, but it is almost impossible for a disabled woman 
to find a man who will accept her.
(Kargar 2012: 159)
   
This is a culture which actively wants women to have less autonomy than men, or indeed none at 
all. Mackenzie’s answer to Mrs H’s problem implicitly recognises this. ‘Society’ is presented as the 
solution to the problem, not the cause of it.
Following Anderson and Honneth, Mackenzie states that autonomy ‘can only be developed 
and sustained intersubjectively’ (2008: 526). But no such intersubjective support is available to Mrs 
H from her husband or community – as cruelly evinced by her husband’s desertion of her.  She 
lacks self-trust,  self-respect and self-esteem because her culture (not society at large) refuses to 
accord her those qualities. 
How, then,  could Mrs H’s autonomy be respected? Mackenzie  argues that  ‘we’ (i.e.  the 
hospital team and any liberal-minded sympathisers who reject Mrs H’s culture’s values) must treat 
her as a human being with her own needs and values; try to understand her perspective; and change 
her attitudes towards herself (2008: 528). Once this change has been effected she would qualify as 
autonomous. She might then decide she no longer wanted to die; or, if she still wanted to end her 
life it  would be the same kind of autonomous decision as that  made by Mrs B, and should be 
respected.  This  approach  is  both  a)  relational  and  b)  grounded  in  the  agent’s  first-person 
perspective. 
     What Mackenzie is suggesting in effect is that the prevailing liberal culture of our society should 
step in to supply the deficiencies in Mrs H’s minority culture. Her minority culture does not grant 
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disabled women the social-relational conditions necessary for autonomy. Those conditions must 
therefore  be  supplied,  in  the  first  place  by  health  professionals,  and  more  generally  by  the 
institutions (the education system, media and laws) of a liberal state.
The implication, whether intended by Mackenzie or not, is that the liberal state has a duty to 
rescue people from minority cultures which are socially oppressive towards their members – to 
provide an alternative infrastructure in which intersubjective support and recognition are provided. 
Many  cultures,  particularly  those  with  strongly  conservative  religious  views,  are  particularly 
oppressive towards women; but women are not the only victims: homosexuals, or persons of lower 
caste or those who are socially disgraced in some way are also likely to be denied intersubjective 
support and recognition. 
This is no easy task for liberal states. In cases like Mrs H’s, where the oppressed person is 
already being cared for by a hospital,  at  least  the means are on hand to provide the necessary 
personal support  (although altering her attitudes to make her autonomous will still  be far from 
easy). But in the presumably far more frequent cases where the oppressed person is not in the care 
of a state institution, it is hard to see what sort of rescue operation could be mounted. Would such 
people even identify themselves as oppressed, if the oppression had successfully destroyed their 
self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem? And even if they did, could the state actively intervene, 
remove them from their community, provide them with a new place to live, a new social network, 
and  a  team of  professionals  to  de-programme  them?  Not  only  would  this  be  logistically  and 
economically impracticable, the attempt would arouse bitter resentment and opposition from the 
communities at the state’s poaching their members in this way. 
What the state could do is  to prohibit,  and enforce the prohibition of,  cultural  practices 
which in general impair the self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem of individuals and groups within 
communities:  e.g.  forced  marriages,  polygamous  marriages,  unequal  divorce  customs,  female 
genital mutilation, threats or violence against apostates. 
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At the same time, given the socio-relational character of autonomy, the liberal state needs to 
protect religious and cultural practices which give the individual a sense of belonging, and within 
which their most meaningful relationships occur. There is therefore a tension between a) protecting 
and supporting the social infrastructures within sub-cultures which make autonomy possible, and b) 
suppressing customs which undermine the self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem of individuals and 
groups  within  those  sub-cultures.  Thus  there  is  a  need  for  the  kind  of  sensitive,  deliberative 
intervention recommended by Serene Khader (2011). 
Burqa-wearing is a prime site for this tension. On the one hand, the liberal state should 
protect burqa-wearing to the extent that it is a social practice which, by giving wearers a sense of 
belonging, makes personal autonomy possible; on the other hand, if it is a practice which impairs 
the self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem of women then the liberal state would have a prima facie 
duty to prohibit it. Which of these alternatives is true is an empirical question, and the answer is not 
necessarily  a  static  one.  But  it  turns  on  whether  the  practice  is  coerced.  A burqa  worn  under 
coercion would not produce a sense of belonging or make personal autonomy possible. The issue of 
coercion is discussed in Chapter Eleven.
6.9 The liberal position on face covering  per se  is compatible with a recognitional view of 
autonomy
 At this point, we can state that, even if one takes a position towards the liberal perfectionist end of 
the spectrum and a recognitional view of autonomy, there is still no reason to move away from the 
liberal position on voluntary face-covering per se. To restate the three areas where movement might 
be considered: 
1) Demands for exemptions from the requirement to temporarily uncover the face should not 
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gain extra force from a recognitional approach. Those requesting such an exemption would have a 
right to be heard and to assert their claim. But so would those who disagreed. The liberal state’s 
obligation  to  safeguard  self-respect  extends  to  granting  a  fair  and respectful  hearing  to  public 
assertion of claims, not to granting the claims themselves. 
2) If  burqa-wearing turned out to have harmful  side-effects on others,  such as a rise  in 
masked crime, the politics of recognition ought not to affect the level at which the harms were 
judged unacceptable. In such circumstances, the state could make clear that the only reason for a 
ban was to protect citizens from harm. There is no reason why such a ban should impair the self-
respect,  self-trust  or  self-esteem of  those  supported  the  practice.  It  could  and should  be  made 
evident that it was not the cultural practice itself that necessitated the ban, but its abuse. To make 
that clearer the state would continue to allow burqa-wearing at private or ceremonial events.
3)  A liberal  state  which subscribed to  the  politics  of  recognition need not  refrain from 
allowing public disapproval or criticism of burqa-wearing, as long as this was balanced by the right 
to speak up and defend the practice. If the liberal state were to prohibit criticism of burqa-wearing 
(or any other cultural practice) it would offend against its own principle of free expression. The 
essential proviso is that such criticism should not be permitted to be defamatory or intimidatory 
towards individuals or groups. 
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CHAPTER NINE
GENDER AND THE BURQA
The Argument
In Chapter Three it was argued that the liberal position on voluntary habitual face-covering per se  
should be to allow it, except in individual cases where security, identification or communication 
was at issue, when temporary uncovering could justifiably be required. However, that position takes 
no account of the gender-asymmetry of burqa-wearing. The burqa is a face-covering for women, not 
for men. The question addressed in this chapter is whether consideration of that gender-asymmetry 
should cause liberals to modify the basic position on face-covering per se. The gender-asymmetry 
of burqa-wearing could lead to injustice against women, where  gender-symmetrical face-covering 
would  not.  If  that  were  the  case,  there  could  be  justification  for  a  ban,  or  other  means  of 
discouraging or preventing burqa-wearing. 
I shall argue, following Susan Moller Okin, that certain practices of some minority cultures 
may be at odds with liberal principles and in those cases the liberal state is justified in preventing or 
discouraging them. 
I shall examine Clare Chambers’ argument that cultural practices, even if apparently freely 
chosen, are unjust when the choice is a) socially constructed and b) the result is disadvantageous to 
the chooser. I accept her argument in principle but stress that both her conditions are matters of 
degree, and in neither her chosen example of breast enhancement surgery nor in the case of burqa-
wearing would those degrees be likely to reach levels high enough to warrant a ban. 
So I shall conclude that Chambers’ argument would not justify a burqa-ban as far as justice 
towards the burqa-wearer herself goes. The question of the injustice towards individuals other than 
the burqa-wearer herself is the subject of chapters Ten  and Eleven. 
198
1. A Defence of Liberal Feminism 
My argument takes as a given the principle that women and men have the same rights and freedoms 
and are equally entitled to justice, and assumes that this principle can and should be realised within 
the framework of liberal institutions: that is to say, the kind of liberal feminism embraced by Okin, 
Chambers and Nussbaum.  I do not therefore consider radical or Marxist varieties of feminism, 
which would oppose liberal institutions as instantiations of patriarchy or bourgeois hegemony. 
I also do not consider Islamic feminism as such. To be clear, I do not of course mean that 
Muslims cannot be feminists. But they are either liberal feminists, in which case there is no need to 
consider their view separately; or they are not, in which case they are outside the scope of my 
consideration. One might put it that there is a fork between ‘weak’ Islamic feminism and ‘strong’ 
Islamic feminism; and neither prong of the fork is eligible to be considered under the question of 
whether a liberal state should ban the burqa. 
By weak Islamic feminism I mean a feminism in agreement with the principle tenets of 
Western liberal feminism – that all male and female citizens are, or should be, free and equal, that 
women labour under unfair disadvantages that should be removed, and that this can be achieved 
under liberal institutions –  but which happens to be espoused and practised by Muslims. This can 
be considered on the same terms as liberal  feminism  per se.   It  is not an alternative to liberal 
feminism but a form of it, and need not be considered separately.
On the other prong of the fork, strong Islamic feminism, any rights claimed for women or 
girls must be consistent with the position on women’s and girls’ rights, relative to men’s, laid down 
in authoritative Islamic texts – the Qu’ran and the Hadith.  By strong Islamic feminism I mean  the 
position that is characterised by Amal Treacher  as follows: 
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Muslim  feminists,  in  contrast  to  secular  feminists,  demand  women’s  place  and  rights  within  an  Islamic 
framework. They argue that Islam has delivered women from being perceived and treated as commodities. 
Within this account, Western women are exploited as cheap labour, oppressed as sex objects, and robbed of 
their femininity. Unlike Western women, Muslim women do not have the double burden of equality – work and 
home – which has been counterproductive. Further, Western feminism has not produced true liberation for 
women as women; rather, it has forced them to become like men.
(2003: 64). 
The requirement for the Islamic framework imposes a limitation on this kind of feminism. Only 
equality-demands which are consistent with Islam, or some interpretation of it, can be admitted. 
Liberal feminism does not have this restriction, or any corresponding to it. 
Strong Islamic feminism is similar to radical feminism in its essentialism. Like many forms 
of radical feminism it assumes that there are differences in the essential natures of men and women, 
and consequently what is good for men is not necessarily good for women (hence the reference to 
‘women’s place and rights’, as though it is taken for granted that they will be different from men’s). 
By contrast the liberal feminist position does not depend on assumptions about the essential natures 
of men or women. Nor is it committed to denying any such differences. It is to the liberal way of 
thinking irrelevant whether men or women in general are likely to have some particular quality, 
faculty or disposition. For a liberal, an individual of either sex has the same right to develop and 
pursue whatever skills or ambitions they may have, regardless of whether they are unusual for their 
sex in having those skills or ambitions. As John Stuart Mill put it: 
Even if [a presumption of fitness] be well grounded in a majority of cases, which it is very likely not to be, 
there will be a minority of exceptional cases in which it does not hold; and in those it is both an injustice to the 
individual, and a detriment to society, to place barriers in the way of their using their faculties for their own 
benefit and for that of others.
([1869] 2008: 22-23) 
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The possibility might be raised that there could be a middle, or mixed position between weak and 
strong Islamic  feminism.  Anna Kemp,  in  her  book  Voicers  and Veils:  Feminism and Islam in  
French  Women’s  Writing  and  Activism  (2010)  ascribes  a  more  Islam-conscious  identity  to  her 
account  of  what  I  have  termed  weak  Islamic  feminism,  as  resisting  ‘both  patriarchal  Muslim 
traditions and nativist feminist caricatures of Islam as inherently patriarchal’(113-4). 
Yet this is  not  genuinely a middle position.  It  is not a defining tenet of western liberal 
feminism that it  must depict Islam as inherently patriarchal. The key point on which feminists, 
Muslim  or  not,  agree  is  that  patriarchy,  Muslim  or  not,  should  be  resisted.  Kemp  is  perhaps 
understandably concerned that western feminists operate a double-standard, condemning patriarchal 
Muslim practices more harshly than patriarchal western ones. But that concern duly noted, the kind 
of feminism she describes is no different from weak Islamic feminism: that is, liberal feminism 
which happens to be espoused and practised by Muslims. 
Indeed any kind of middle or mixed position would be vulnerable to the fork outlined above. 
For any elements of that position which could be characterised as strong Islamic feminism would be 
outside  the  scope  of  my  consideration  here;  while  elements  of  weak  Islamic  feminism,  being 
subsumed under liberal feminism, need not be considered separately. 
The liberal  principle that all citizens are free and equal already contains a commitment to 
feminism, in that ‘citizens’ comprehends both women and men. The assumption is that both women 
and men value the same rights and freedoms and should have them to the same extent. Historically, 
perhaps, liberals have not been sufficiently alert to the fact that they do not actually get them to the 
same extent (with the honourable exception of John Stuart Mill). Liberal feminists would no doubt 
want to point out that in the past and in contemporary societies, it has tended to be women who 
chiefly suffer from inequality or lack of freedom. For this reason it might be a good strategy to 
focus  on  the  experiences  of  women  and  to  pass  laws  or  enact  policies  that  benefit  women 
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specifically. Marilyn Friedman, for instance, argues in her essay ‘Autonomy and Male Dominance’ 
that we should prioritise female autonomy over male autonomy: 
under conditions of male dominance, female autonomy is more valuable than male autonomy because it better 
promotes social realisation of the moral equality of all persons. Because it is more valuable, we all have good 
reason to advance women’s autonomy whenever possible while at the same time restraining male aggression. 
(2005: 169)
Nevertheless,  that  would  be  a  temporary  prioritisation,  designed to  bring  about  equality;  once 
equality was achieved then there would be no need to prioritise either sex.  
2. “ Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?”
Susan Moller Okin’s essay ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ clearly sets out the possible and 
indeed likely conflict between liberal feminism and multiculturalism. She states that those opposed 
to oppression ‘have been too quick to assume that feminism and multiculturalism are both good 
things which are easily reconciled’ (Okin 1999: 10). Instead, Okin argues:
there  is  considerable  likelihood  of  tension  between  them  –  more  precisely,  between  feminism  and  a 
multicultural commitment to group rights for minority cultures 
(1999: 10). 
Okin’s  argument  is  straightforward.  Many  cultures  do  not  respect  the  liberal  norm of  gender 
equality. Granting them group rights thus risks allowing oppression of women to continue. As Okin 
puts it:
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Suppose...  that a culture endorses and facilitates the control of men over women in various ways (even if 
informally, in the private sphere of domestic life). Suppose, too, that there are fairly clear disparities in power 
between the sexes, such that the more powerful, male members are those who are generally in a position to 
determine and articulate the group's beliefs, practices and interests. Under such conditions, group rights are 
potentially, and in many cases actually, antifeminist.
 (1999: 12).
Okin offers the example of the French government’s permissive policy in the 1980s towards the 
polygamy practised by many Arab and African immigrants (1999: 9-10). Polygamy was allowed for 
these  immigrants  (though  not  for  other  French  citizens)  because  it  was  part  of  their  culture, 
resulting in some 200,000 polygamous families living in Paris alone. A cultural practice was thus 
protected (for a while, until the French government reversed its policy); but the result was not good 
for the women concerned. According to Okin, reporters discovered that
...the women affected by polygamy regarded it as an inescapable and barely tolerable institution in their African 
countries of origin, and an unbearable imposition in the French context.
(1999: 10). 
Okin points out that proponents of group rights, while alert to inequalities between groups, can be 
blind to inequalities within them. But ‘those who make liberal arguments for the rights of groups 
must take special care to look at inequalities within groups’ (1999: 23). Okin agrees with Kymlicka 
that group rights are not justified if they enable groups to oppress their own members; but argues 
that  such  oppression,  particularly  of  women  and  girls,  is  more  widespread  than  Kymlicka 
acknowledges (Okin 1999: 21). 
Okin’s prescription is that group rights should not be granted unless the individual rights of 
all group members have been given equal weight: 
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Unless women – and, more specifically, young women (since older women are often co-opted into reinforcing 
gender inequality) – are fully represented in negotiations about group rights, their interests may be harmed 
rather than promoted by the granting of such rights.
(1999: 24). 
Okin does not go into detail about the actual mechanism by which women should be represented in 
such negotiations. Practical questions present themselves. Who presides over negotiations? Who 
chooses the representatives? What balance between men and women, young and old, should there 
be? In the event of flat-out disagreement how is the issue to be decided? A vote could instantiate a 
tyranny of the majority, but without a vote how are competing interests to be weighed? 
Okin leaves these practical questions alone because they are in a sense beside the point. Her 
actual prescription is of less importance than the purpose for which it was conceived. Her purpose is 
that the granting of group rights should not harm the interests of women. The means by which this 
is achieved is secondary. If indeed negotiations did not lead to women’s interests being protected 
against harmful group rights, then negotiations, or that particular type of negotiations, would be the 
wrong way to go about it. Another mechanism would have to be found. 
It is important to note that Okin’s whole line of argument depends on the claim that western 
liberal societies are, in general, better for women to live in than many of the traditional cultures 
from which minority immigrant groups originate. If Okin were asking this question from Saudi 
Arabia or Afghanistan then the answer would be,  ‘No, multiculturalism is not bad for women, 
women need more of it.’ Okin is clear that she is speaking from within a western liberal tradition, 
which is  better  in  terms of  women’s rights  and the quality  of  women’s  lives  than many other 
cultures. As she puts it: 
While virtually all of the world’s cultures have distinctly patriarchal pasts, some – mostly, though by no means 
exclusively, Western liberal cultures – have departed further from them than others. Western cultures, of course, 
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still practice many forms of sex discrimination... [examples follow]... But women in more liberal cultures are, 
at the same time, legally guaranteed many of the same freedoms and opportunities as men. In addition, most 
families in such cultures... do not communicate to their daughters that they are of less value than boys, that 
their lives are to be confined to domesticity and service to men and children, and that their sexuality is of value 
only in marriage, in the service of men, and for reproductive ends. This situation... is quite different from that 
of many other women in the world's other cultures, including many of those from which immigrants to Europe 
and North America come.
(1999: 16-17). 
My view is that Okin is correct in this claim. Certainly some non-western cultural practices, such as 
forced marriage, polygamy or FGM, impact harshly on women and should not be tolerated by a 
liberal state. The question is whether the considerations Okin raises imply that a liberal state should 
be less permissive towards the burqa. Before turning to that question, though, I discuss and answer 
some objections to her argument. 
3. Two Objections to Okin
3.1  Azizah Y. al-Hibri’s response
I have chosen Azizah Y. al-Hibri's essay written in reply to Okin, ‘Is Western Patriarchal Feminism 
Good for Third World/Minority Women?’, for two reasons. First,  I see it  as representative of a 
common and in my view ineffective approach towards arguments about multiculturalism: that is, to 
cast  doubt  on  an  arguer’s  credentials,  authority  or  agenda rather  than take on  the  premises  or 
validity  of  their  argument.  And second,  al-Hibri’s  objection brings out  an important  feature  of 
Okin's argument: namely, that Okin’s criticism does not depend on identifying culture with religion. 
It makes no difference whether any particular cultural practice which is oppressive to women is 
religiously motivated. The important point is that it oppresses them. 
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al-Hibri  makes  a  three-fold  objection  to  Okin.  First,  she  charges  Okin  with  having 
‘Stereotypical views of the “Other”’; second, with making ‘a conflation of different belief systems’; 
and third, with being in ‘conflict with American constitutional principles’ (1999: 41). As we shall 
see, none of these objections, even if well-founded, seriously damages Okin's argument. 
al-Hibri’s  first  charge  is  based  on  the  claim  that  Okin’s  characterisation  of  individual 
cultures and religions as more patriarchal than Western societies is erroneous, being based on a 
sketchy, outsider’s understanding. al-Hibri states: 
...her  understanding  of  other  cultures/religions  is  derived  from  secondary  sources  outside  these 
cultures/religions. As a result, she makes simple but significant errors in assessing other belief systems.
(1999: 42). 
By way of example, al-Hibri points out that the stories of the creation of Eve and the fall of Adam 
in the Qur’an are not the same as the Biblical creation story, though Okin assumes that they are. In 
the Qur’anic version of the story, al-Hibri says, Eve was not created from Adam’s rib but as his 
equal, and Adam and Eve were tempted, and succumbed, simultaneously. 
Okin therefore made a factual  error. But this in no way implies the stance that  al-Hibri 
attributes to her: 
It is...  the example  par excellence  of Okin speaking in her dominant voice about the  inessential Other.  So 
inessential is this Other that, even when included in the discussion, it is rendered remarkably 
indistinguishable and voiceless.
(1999:  42)
Okin’s argument could easily be revised to include a more accurate account of the Qur’anic creation 
myth, or indeed to omit it, and would be undamaged by such a revision. It remains the case that to  
the extent that western cultures are less patriarchal than non-western ones, multicultural policies in 
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western societies can have bad results for women. al-Hibri might simply deny that it is true that 
western societies are less patriarchal in any way at all, but it is hard to see what objection she could 
make to Okin’s example of polygamy in France, which is a non-western tradition, practised by 
Muslims, and which has Qur’anic support. According to sura 4 verse 3: 
If you fear that you will not act justly towards the orphans, marry such women as seem good to you, two, three, 
four; but if you fear you will not be equitable, then only one, or what your right hands own.
(Koran, trans. Arberry 2008). 
This verse justifies the marrying of up to four women who do not have living parents, with two 
conditions: 1) if a man fears he will not be able to treat his wives equally then he should stick to one 
wife; 2) but that limitation does not apply to slave women (‘what your right hands own’), of whom 
a man can presumably marry as many as he likes without worrying about equal treatment.  
al-Hibri  and  other  Muslims  who  do  not  endorse  polygamy  might  question  the  above 
interpretation of that verse, and indeed other interpretations are possible (see Sardar,  Reading the 
Qu’ran, 2015: 306). They would argue that polygamy is more of a cultural tradition than a religious 
one. This brings us to the second of al-Hibri’s charges: that Okin conflates culture and religion, 
treating them as interchangeable and objecting to what is bad for women in both. al-Hibri’s own 
position is that they are distinct, and that it is  culture which endorses practices which are bad for 
women, not religion (at least not when the religion is Islam). The confusion has occurred, she says, 
because Muslim countries are permitted to retain local customs if they are judged to be consistent 
with Islamic revelation: 
As a result of this principle, many countries retained local customs that we find controversial, and that have 
been erroneously viewed in the West, and sometimes locally, as Islamic.
(1999: 43)
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al-Hibri does not say whether it is erroneous to view all the practices found to be controversial as 
Islamic. But let us say for the sake of argument that that is what she means; and let us also say for 
the sake of argument that she is right. This still leaves Okin’s argument undamaged. Even if Okin 
has incorrectly  identified some practices  as  religious when she  should have identified them as 
purely cultural, this does not touch her claim that multicultural policies can be bad for women. If a 
policy of allowing burqa-wearing turned out to have bad effects for women, then the effects are bad 
regardless  of  whether  the  origins  of  that  tradition  are  cultural  or  religious.  Okin  (in  my view 
plausibly) does diagnose the origins of many practices that oppress women as religious. But her 
position does not depend on that diagnosis. 
Finally let us turn to al-Hibri’s third charge against Okin, that her position ‘conflicts with 
American principles  that  we value  greatly,  such as  the  separation  of  church  and state  and the 
freedom of belief’ (1999: 44); she points out that ‘in [the USA], people are entitled to their religious 
beliefs whether secular feminists approve of these beliefs or not’ (1999: 44). 
But nowhere has Okin said that people are not entitled to their religious beliefs. She objects 
to  certain  specified  religious  (and/or  cultural)  practices  which  involve  gender  inequalities: for 
example, ‘child marriage, forced marriage, divorce systems biased against women, polygamy, and 
clitoridectomy’ (Okin 1999: 17). 
Freedom of belief cannot extend to a free pass for practices which are both harmful and 
unjust. No defender of religious freedom, al-Hibri or Okin or anyone else, advocates that.  In fact 
unlimited freedom of religious practice leads to self-contradiction (suppose the case of granting 
unlimited religious freedom to a sect who saw it as their duty to extirpate all other religions). 
3.2 Bikhu Parek’s response to Okin
A more sophisticated critique is offered by Bikhu Parekh. Parekh agrees with Okin’s substantive 
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conclusions; in particular that ‘respect for cultures can never be unconditional and condone acts of 
inhumanity  and  oppression’ (1999:  70).  He  agrees  with  her  opposition  to  FGM and  to  forced 
marriage. However, he is less happy with her ‘wider theoretical framework’ (1999: 71). As Parekh 
sees it, Okin’s framework is that ‘the fundamentals of liberalism’ are universal values and other 
cultures  must  adopt  them.  He  first  disputes  whether  there  is  any  agreement  on  what  the 
fundamentals  of  liberalism are,  even within liberalism.  This accusation seems answerable.  The 
specific value of gender equality with which Okin is  concerned is  surely a fundamental liberal 
value, as are freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of worship and the principle 
that, whatever the given  rights and freedoms are, they should be apportioned equally. 
However,  Parekh makes  that  point  almost  as  a  kind  of  feint  before  he  gets  to  his  real 
objections: granted that agreement can be secured on liberal fundamentals, three problems arise: a) 
Okin offers no reason why non-liberals should accept these fundamentals; b) requiring minority 
liberal cultures to conform to the value of gender of equality implies that they conform to all liberal 
values; and lastly, c), he charges Okin with presenting an over-simplified picture of gender equality, 
given that in some cultures women are accorded different rights, powers and respect at different 
times of their lives. 
Although  this  is  a  more  searching  critique  than  al-Hibri’s,  Parekh’s  points  also  seem 
answerable on Okin’s terms. Okin is explicit  that  modern liberal  societies treat  women citizens 
better than do non-liberal societies. The reason for this fact is that women are treated as the equals 
of men in liberal societies. At any rate that is the ideal and it is more closely attained in liberal 
societies than in non-liberal ones. This is an empirical claim which Okin supports with copious 
examples  of  mistreatment  of  women  and  girls  in  non-western  societies,  such as  FGM, forced 
marriage and polygamy (Okin 1999). 
Even if  one  were  not  satisfied  by  Okin’s  examples  (perhaps  she  is  cherry-picking)  the 
question could be explored by more rigorous collection and statistical analysis of data about how 
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women fare in different societies – their life expectancy, educational attainments, chances of being 
the victim of violence, rape or murder, comparative survival rates for girl babies, and so on.  Steven 
Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature cites data from the World Health Organisation and the 
United Development Fund for Women which show that serious domestic violence against women is 
far more common ‘outside Western Europe and the Anglosphere’,  and that  ‘[l]aws on violence 
against women also show a lag from the legal reforms of Western democracies’ (2011: 497-98).
Even without hard data, one can get a sense of one’s existing impression of whether 
women’s  lives  go  better  in  liberal  societies  than  non-liberal  ones  by  posing  a  simple  Veil-of-
Ignorance-style thought experiment. If one did not know whether one would be embodied as a male 
or female citizen in society and one had the power to choose what kind of society to become 
embodied in, would one choose a liberal or a non-liberal society? The answer is clearly that one 
would choose a liberal society. 
These considerations seem to offer grounds for the claim that liberal cultures, most of which 
happen to be western, are better for women to live in (which is  not to say that they are perfect). 
Here is where Parekh’s next point comes in. If all cultures are to accept gender equality, are 
they also to accept other liberal fundamentals such as free speech, autonomy, individualism and so 
forth? Okin’s answer to this question would seem to be a straightforward yes. That is to say, all 
cultures in a liberal society must accept those principles to the extent of allowing others to embrace 
them. No individual is under an obligation to be autonomous or to speak their mind, but they have 
no right to prevent members of their own or other cultures from exercising those rights or to punish 
them for doing so. This neither undermines Okin’s argument about gender equality nor supports 
Parekh’s claim that such a requirement ‘shows scant respect for [minority cultures’] identity’ (1999: 
72). Cultural identity may be respected in a wide variety of ways and does not depend on being 
allowed to punish fellow-members of one’s culture for being autonomous or plain-speaking. 
Parekh’s third point is that Okin misses the subtlety of gender relations in other cultures. No 
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doubt her account could be refined, made more complex and detailed, to take into account how 
women in various cultures are treated at different stages of their lives, and how other factors such as 
class, wealth and birth cut across the gender divide. Those would be interesting areas for a social 
anthropologist to research. But such refinements would not shake Okin’s normative principle of the 
equality of the sexes. Parekh indeed agrees with Okin on that principle, but does not agree that such 
a principle should translate to a claim that women ‘should be equally autonomous, free to challenge 
their social roles, unconstrained by the subtle controls of patriarchal cultures, and so on’ (1999: 72). 
His reason is  that  such a  view would be ‘unlikely to  command universal  consent’ (1999:  72). 
Perhaps not, but one does not refute a view merely by refusing to consent to it.  The argument 
attributed to Okin seems sound: if men and women have equal rights, and if men have the right to 
be autonomous and to challenge their social roles, then women also have that right. 
Parekh might reply that  having  equal rights need not mean having the  same rights.  For 
example, men and women might have an equal right to use a swimming-pool, but not at the same 
times. That reply suggests that it would be in line with a principle of gender equality if women were 
denied  the  same  right  to  autonomy  as  men  but  granted  some  other  right  of  equal  value  and 
significance instead (which was denied to men). The problem with this response is that it could not 
satisfy women who objected: ‘I don’t want that right; I want the right to autonomy.’ This is not on 
all-fours with saying ‘I don’t want to go swimming on Wednesday; I want to go swimming on 
Thursday’. In the latter case the actual experience is the same whichever day one goes swimming. 
But in the case of autonomy it makes a real difference if one is offered something else. 
Parekh then makes a fourth point in response to Okin which is not so much an objection to 
her position as an invitation to look beyond it. If, instead of treating liberalism as hegemonic, liberal 
theorists  place liberal  values within a  multicultural  framework as  one culture  in  dialogue with 
others, then ‘different cultures can cooperatively explore their differences and create a rich and 
lively community based on their respective insights’ (Parekh 1999: 74-5). 
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Yet it is not necessary for liberals to abandon a commitment to the universalism of liberal 
values  in  order  to  achieve  this.  Liberals  believe  that  liberal  values are  good for  everyone and 
capable of being accepted and appreciated by everyone. If they ceased to believe this they would 
cease to be liberals. A liberal state worthy of the name must protect the fundamental liberal rights 
and freedoms in law. This does not in any way prevent cultures exploring their differences and 
creating a rich and lively community. 
4. Could Voluntary Burqa-Wearing be Unjust?
4.1 The burqa and freedom of choice
The examples that Okin discusses all seem clear cases where multiculturalism has bad results for 
women. Polygamy, FGM, divorce laws which grant women lesser rights than men, and child or 
forced marriage are all bad for women. They are illegal in most liberal states, with good reason, and 
a liberal state should not grant cultural exemptions for them. The case of the burqa, however, not 
discussed by Okin, is a little different. 
Habitual  face-covering is  not  illegal  in  most  liberal  states,  including the  UK, the  USA, 
Australia and most of Europe. France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Bulgaria, who do ban it, are 
exceptions. Moreover, habitually covering one’s face might seem, if freely chosen, not harmful in 
the obvious and permanent ways that the examples discussed by Okin are. I emphasise ‘if freely 
chosen’ because forcing someone to habitually cover their face in public against their will seems a 
real case of harm (see Chapters Three and Eleven). But when it is a person’s free choice the case 
appears, at least on first inspection, to be different. Liberals are generally wary of overriding free 
choice when no harm to others is in question; and though I have argued for a Liberal Paternalist 
Principle, under which paternalist intervention by the state is justified when the restriction of liberty 
is small and the harm prevented is great, I have also argued that banning the burqa would not be 
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justified under that principle (see Chapter Five). 
  There are of course clear reasons for a liberal feminist to disapprove of burqa-wearing. It is 
a practice followed only by women, not by men; it restricts women from entering the public sphere; 
and it suggests ownership of women by male relatives or husbands, since they are the only males in 
whose presence she may unveil. Moreover the burqa is associated with cultures where women often 
are oppressed in various ways (forced marriages, unequal divorce laws and so on) and might be 
disapproved  of  on  the  grounds  that  even  if  not  oppressive  in  itself  it  symbolises  oppression. 
However, liberals do not believe that disapproving of things is a sufficient reason for banning them. 
Allowing things one disapproves of might indeed be called a defining feature of liberalism. 
Still, liberals do believe that practices which are unjust are candidates for being banned. If 
burqa-wearing turned out to be unjust then the liberal position on voluntary face-covering  per se 
would be inadequate to deal with it. A less tolerant approach could be called for: either a ban or, if 
that was not practicable, more subtle forms of discouragement.  
The standard liberal position would be that, as long as wearing the burqa was freely chosen, 
it  could not be unjust. Clare Chambers, however, in her book  Sex, Culture and Justice  (2008),  
challenges this view. While accepting liberal normative values of equality and autonomy, she argues 
that  personal  choice  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  guarantee  the  justice  of  a  practice.  Traditional 
liberalism, with its commitment to individual freedom of choice, tends to neglect the way choices 
are socially constructed. Chambers’ aim is to ‘combine a liberal feminist commitment to universal 
values with an awareness of the ways that culture structures our identities and relationships’ (2008: 
5). 
4.2 Foucault’s conception of power
Chambers  grounds  her  theory  on  a  Foucauldian  conception  of  power.  She  accepts  Foucault's 
contention that 
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...first, power currently operates more significantly through creation than repression and second, that power is 
more effective the less it focuses on crude repressive mechanisms.
(2008: 22). 
How to interpret this? Let us characterise ‘power’ as meaning that the power-wielder(s) can make 
others do things they would  not choose to do otherwise; and can  stop  others doing things they 
would choose to do otherwise. Foucault is saying, first, that the power-wielder can achieve this by 
making the other – the acted-upon – complicit: rather than force them to do things or not to do 
things, the power-wielder gets them to want to do, or not to do those things. In other words, rather 
than override their choices, the power-wielder influences the choices from the start; sets the frame 
within which choices can be made. That is what power being ‘creative’ means. As Chambers puts it:
Power is not a repressive force coming from outside the individual, constraining her actions, but a creative 
force manifested in the individual’s everyday life.
(2008: 23).
The second point is that this sort of power is more effective than forcing people to do things against 
their will, for the obvious reason that when people are coerced they are almost certain to resent it, 
and rebel or take revenge if ever an opportunity presents itself. As Elias Canetti put it in Crowds 
and Power, every command that is backed by power, if obeyed, leaves behind it a ‘sting’, which is 
lodged in the person who obeyed the command forever: 
...there is no man who does not turn against a command imposed on him from outside; in this case everyone 
speaks of pressure and reserves the right to vengeance or rebellion.
(1992: 354-5)
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The more sophisticated forms of power that Foucault identifies do not cause secret opposition or 
resentment in this way. They co-opt the acted-upon, making them a willing accomplice. Chambers 
notes that this type of creative power affects the body: the way we move, hold ourselves, our gait, 
the actions we perform, as well as clothing and appearance norms (2008: 25). This is of particular 
relevance to feminism: 
...different social norms, different ideas about how men and women ought to behave, shape us physically. It is 
because women’s bodies are shaped by the result of human, social factors that it is most appropriate to think of 
them as shaped by power. 
(Chambers 2008: 25)
Women do not, for the most part, follow these appearance norms grudgingly. Great care, time and 
effort,  to  say  nothing  of  money,  are  enthusiastically  expended  on  make-up,  clothing,  shoes, 
depilation, beauty products, cosmetic surgery and so on. Men, too, follow appearance norms; but as 
Chambers points out: 
The problem with disciplinary appearance norms is not just that they are different for men and women, and not 
just that they are more exacting and expensive (in both time and money) for women, but that their effect is to 
cast women as inferior.
(2008: 29) 
Such norms are disabling (high heels make women less active and mobile, for example), they invite 
contempt from men, and anyway the norms demanded are, for most women, impossible to achieve 
(Chambers 2008: 29). 
All this is achieved without any coercion whatsoever. One might compare it to Sunstein and 
Thaler’s idea of libertarian paternalism (2003), where people are nudged towards beneficial choices. 
For example, as mentioned in Chapter Five, Sunstein and Thaler suggest putting fruit before sugary 
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desserts  in  cafeteria  lines,  customers  being  more  likely  to  choose  the  healthy  option  if  they 
encounter it  first.  This is a case of a subtle and invisible operation of power, getting agents to 
choose a particular option without their being aware that they are being nudged to do so. 
But that is different from Foucault’s conception of power in two key ways. First, there is an 
identifiable agent behind this exercise of power: the organisation that runs the cafeteria, or their 
advisers,  purposefully  chose  to  set  things  up  this  way.  This  contrasts  with  the  Foucauldian 
conception of power, where ubiquitous, inherited power structures are already in place, without any 
agent or agents needing to be consciously responsible for them. Second, in the Sunstein and Thaler 
case the intention is beneficent. The cafeteria line is set up that way for the customers’ own good. 
Moreover the good is presumed to be a universal one. No power imbalance is involved in deciding 
that those particular customers need a healthy diet. The assumption is that everybody benefits from 
a healthy diet,  and the same choice-frame should be in place whoever visits  the cafeteria.  The 
Sunstein  and  Thaler  form  of  paternalist  power  thus  seems  much  less  objectionable  than  the 
Foucauldian form; if objectionable at all. 
4.3 Objections to Foucault’s conception of power 
The difficulty with Foucault’s characterisation of power is that there seems no way to resist it, since 
it is ubiquitous and inevitable. Foucault’s thesis is that the traditional, brutal, physical methods of 
punishment  which  were  formerly  used  by  the  state  to  discipline  citizens  (he  begins  his  book 
Discipline and Punish (1995)  with a graphic description of the public torture and execution of a 
regicide,  Damiens,  in 1757) have given way to less visible,  more pervasive and more efficient 
forms of power:  ‘traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power... soon fell into disuse and were 
superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection’ (Foucault 1995: 221). These methods 
of subjection characterise the modern state and are to be found in all fields:  in the military, in 
education,  in  medicine,  in  business,  in  the police,  the judiciary and, in  short,  in  every kind of 
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institution. This is not a top-down form of power, but one that permeates every hierarchical level, 
using such methods as ‘time-tables, collective training, exercises, total and detailed surveillance’ 
(Foucault 1995: 220). To these methods should be added the threat of punishment – but with such 
efficient disciplinary methods it needs to be invoked rarely, and there is no call for the spectacular 
public punishment of earlier times. 
But if power is all-pervasive it appears to be irresistible. Moreover there seems to be far less 
reason to resist it than in former days. The story that Foucault tells could reasonably be re-cast as a 
tale of progress. Another way to put his story is that state power has become more humane, less 
oppressive, easier to live under, more respectful of the individual, allowing greater freedom in daily 
life, removing the need to live in fear of violent, cruel punishment and early death. Which story is 
closer to the truth? A Veil-of-Ignorance-style thought experiment suggests the answer: given the 
choice between living under the subtle, invisible forms of power practised by modern states and the 
brutally wielded power of the 18th century French monarchy, a sane chooser would opt for the 
former. 
That is a side-issue, however. Granted that modern state power is preferable to the state 
power of the ancien régime, there might still be reasons for resisting modern state power. But what 
are they? Foucault offers no norms by which we could judge some exercises of power to be better 
than others. When Foucault does discuss norms it is in the context of their role as instruments of 
power: 
The power of  the Norm appears  throughout  the disciplines...  The Normal  is established as  a  principle  of 
coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education and the establishment of the  écoles 
normales (teachers’ training colleges); it is established in the effort to organize a national medical profession 
and a hospital system capable of operating general norms of health; it is established in the standardization of 




Norms are thus characterised by Foucault as  inside the system of power, an integral part  of its 
workings. In Foucault’s reading, they give one no place to stand outside the system from which to 
judge it. 
Nancy  Fraser  has  given  a  critique  of  Foucault  along  these  lines  in  her  book  Unruly 
Practices. Foucault, she says, 
...claims to suspend [the question of normative] justification in his study of knowledge/power regimes. He says 
he  does  not  take  up  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  various  constraint-laden   practices,  institutions, 
procedures, and apparatuses he studies are legitimate or not
(1989: 21)
This bracketing of the normative, Fraser argues, causes problems for Foucault. The language he 
uses when describing and analysing power – ‘domination’, ‘subjection’, ‘subjugation’ –  does not 
sound neutral. Perhaps it is: but then one might question the purpose of his project. Is it merely 
descriptive? Or perhaps Foucault is only bracketing off  liberal  norms – that is, norms based on 
ideas of  rights and legitimacy – and has some other kind of norms in mind from which power could 
be critiqued. But Fraser sees no sign of this: 
I find no clues in Foucault’s writings as to what his alternative norms might be. I see no hints as to how to 
concretely interpret ‘domination’, subjugation’, ‘subjection’ and so forth in some completely new ‘postliberal’ 
fashion.
(1989: 29)
Summing up, Fraser says:
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Foucault seems to vacillate between two equally inadequate stances. On the one hand, he adopts a concept of 
power that permits him no condemnation of any objectionable features of modern societies. But at the same 
time,  and on the  other  hand,  his  rhetoric  betrays  the  conviction  that  modern societies  are  utterly  without 
redeeming  features.  Clearly,  what  Foucault  needs,  and  needs  desperately,  are  normative  criteria  for 
distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power.
(1989: 33)
Defenders of Foucault might challenge this analysis and argue that he does furnish both possibility 
and reasons for resistance to certain forms of power over others. That argument is outside the scope 
of this thesis. But whether or not Fraser is right about Foucault’s failure to supply norms that would 
justify  resistance to  power,  she  is  certainly  right  that  without  such norms resistance  would  be 
irrational if not impossible. To point out that a choice is socially constructed is not in itself an 
objection, if all choices are socially constructed.  If social construction is all there is we cannot be 
emancipated from it. Emancipation requires a normative theory – an idea of a better life we can be 
emancipated into. As Chambers puts it: 
The problem is not how to free individuals from social construction  tout court,  but rather how to free them 
from unjust  social construction. As such, it is crucial to develop a normative theory of which sorts of social 
construction are just and which are not.
(2008: 79). 
The theory Chambers develops depends on the liberal norms of freedom and equality. 
4.3  Chambers’ two conditions for a normative theory of just and unjust social construction
The question,  then,  is how to distinguish between just  and unjust  forms of social  construction. 
Chambers offers two conditions, both of which must be present, for a socially constructed choice, or 
set of choices, to count as unjust. The conditions are disadvantage and influence : 
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Together, they express the idea that if an individual is encouraged to make choices that disadvantage her, then 
the ensuing inequality is unjust
(Chambers 2008: 118). 
Although the  formulation  is  different,  this  is  very  close  to  Serene  Khader’s  conception  of  the 
Inappropriate Adaptive Preference (Khader 2011; see Chapter Seven). The key difference is that 
Khader focuses on loss of autonomy where Chambers focuses on injustice. However, both types of 
objection to a socially constructed choice or preference would be based on similar grounds; and 
whether the objection should be upheld would depend on the same considerations. 
Chambers argues that the presence of both the social influence and the disadvantage factors 
would justify the intervention of a liberal state. Chambers suggests and discusses three main types 
of  intervention:  an  equality  tribunal,  to  which  complainants  could  have  recourse  to  remove 
disadvantageous consequences of choices; state-sponsored information or education campaigns to 
make people more aware of the consequences of choices; and finally state proscription of choices 
which have disadvantageous consequences ( 2008). 
In combination the two factors are necessary conditions for identifying a choice as unjust. If 
someone is influenced to do something that is either neutral or positively advantageous there can be 
no injustice in  that.  Conversely if  someone does disadvantage themselves but  nobody else  has 
influenced them to do so, there is no one against whom a charge of injustice could be pressed. 
But are they sufficient conditions for a choice to count as unjust? This is a question which 
Chambers  does  not  address  in  much  detail.  The  answer  must  depend  on  the  severity  of  the 
disadvantage and the irresistibility of the influence. Those towards the political liberal end of the 
liberal spectrum would want those conditions to be stringently interpreted. They would not want it 
to be easy for personal choices to be labelled unjust and thus susceptible to state interference. Even 
those towards the perfectionist end of the spectrum will be reluctant to intervene on every choice 
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that is a tiny bit the result of influence and a tiny bit disadvantageous. Going too far down this road 
would leave behind anything recognisable as liberalism. Let us look more closely at the problems of 
applying the two conditions, starting with Disadvantage.
4.4 Disadvantage
The idea of  disadvantage  is a normative one. It relies on shared values about what counts as a 
disadvantage. It is universalist. That in itself is no problem for liberalism, which is a universalist 
creed. As Chambers herself notes, the liberal value of equality already entails universalism: 
...it is in the nature of liberal equality that it cannot be denied to people on the basis of characteristics such as  
gender, race, or culture.
(2008: 97). 
It is true that liberalism has particular origins. It originated in Christian Europe, more particularly in 
Protestant Europe, and it is interesting to note that the countries in which it grew, such as Great 
Britain, Germany and later the USA, were ‘late marriage societies’, which have always tended to 
grant more status and rights to women than early marriage societies (Flanders, 2015). But particular 
origins do not preclude universal application. As Chambers says, ‘Liberalism is particular in origin 
and universal in application’ (2008: 114). (The same could be said of science, incidentally.) So it is 
not a problem in principle that disadvantage invokes universal values. The problems arise when we 
attempt to secure agreement on what those values are. 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit in their book Disadvantage, argue that disadvantage is 
to be understood in terms of a lack of well-being, where well-being is understood in a pluralist 
form. Following the capabilities approach of Sen and Nussbaum (discussed in Chapter Seven), they 
identify fourteen areas or dimensions of flourishing – that is, the list of ten categories developed by 
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Nussbaum plus four more of their own (previously listed in Chapter Four). The extra categories are:
11. Complete independence (ability to do as you wish without dependence on others)
12. Doing good to others
13. Living in a law-abiding fashion
14. Understanding the law
(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007: 190-1)
This list seems to offer a  comprehensive account of the most important dimensions of flourishing (I 
should stress that  by ‘comprehensive’ I  do not mean that  they imply a  comprehensive form of 
liberalism; several of the dimensions could be satisfied in many different ways). I also agree  with 
Wolff and De-Shalit that a lack or shortfall in one or more of the dimensions would be an indicator 
of  disadvantage.  This  looks  like  a  good  model  to  help  us  apply  Chambers’  condition  of 
disadvantage.
Given agreement on that, however,  we must still  ask what would count as disadvantage 
severe enough to warrant state intervention (assuming the presence of the other condition, social 
influence).  Disadvantage is not an all-or-nothing quality, but a gradable one. Minor disadvantage 
might not suffice to make a socially-influenced choice unjust, or unjust enough to worry about; but 
then there is room for disagreement about what counts as minor. Chambers offers a sliding-scale to 
help make judgements about this: 
The greater the difference [between those making the socially-influenced choice and those not making it] in 
disadvantage, and the more enduring and less reversible that disadvantage, the more we should worry
(2008: 121). 
That is helpful in at least providing a field for controversy. But it leaves wide open the possibility 
that two reasonable people, while agreeing on Chambers’ conditions for disadvantage, would 
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disagree about their application, because they disagreed on the extent of the differential. Before 
questioning Chambers’ application of the principles, however, we must look at the other condition, 
Social Influence.
4.5 Social influence
I do not dispute Chambers’ contention that our choices are socially constructed. Neither do I dispute 
her key point that many of the socially constructed choices made by women are disadvantageous to 
them, compared to the socially constructed choices made by men. In particular I agree that both 
FGM and  cosmetic  surgery  such  as  breast  implants  are  (disadvantageous)  socially  constructed 
choices. 
However, although in the case of disadvantage Chambers offered a scale to measure, in a 
general  way, the severity of disadvantage (i.e. the differential  between those disadvantaged and 
those not, and the enduringness and irreversibility of the disadvantage), she offers no such scale for 
measuring social influence – or not explicitly, at any rate. The fact is, however, that some kinds of 
social influence are more resistible than others. In a pluralistic liberal democracy there are countless 
competing currents of social influence. But some groups are more receptive to choosing, rejecting 
or blending different currents of influence than others. Chambers herself notes that
 
...some cultural and religious groups are worse than liberal societies in emphasizing differently advantageous 
norms of behaviour for different people within the group, often but not always based on gender... We also need 
to recognize that individual members of such groups will find it harder to choose to take advantage of the 
liberal framework of rights that formally applies to them than [Brian] Barry implies.
(2008: 127-28)
The Social Influence condition, therefore, requires a scale to gauge its severity, corresponding to the 
one Chambers offered for the Disadvantage condition. 
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I propose: ‘The less open to competing currents the chooser is, and the more difficult it is for 
her to conceive of resistance to the influence of her social or cultural group, the more we should 
worry.’
Like Chambers’ criteria for deciding on the seriousness of disadvantageous, this offers a 
sliding-scale based on two variables, in this case the openness of the culture to outside influence, 
and the possibility of resistance to norms within it. Also like Chambers’ disadvantage criteria, it 
identifies the level of concern called for (‘the more we should worry) without specifying what 
remedial action should be taken. That is a separate question, to be decided according to the practical 
politics of the situation. 
4.6 Chambers’ application: FGM
Chambers’ application of her two conditions leads her to the conclusion that the two practices of 
FGM and cosmetic surgery for women are equally banworthy. Let us look at FGM first. This is the 
less controversial of Chambers’s proposals. Most liberals would agree that FGM should be banned. 
It is a clear case of harm against the individual. The harm is not usually chosen by the individual. It 
is usually inflicted by force. It is most often practised on young girls who are not old enough to give 
meaningful consent anyway. 
However, suppose these elements were removed, and that FGM was performed ‘only on 
women above a certain age who gave their consent and who were given information about the risks 
involved and the particularity of the custom’ (Chambers 2008: 177). Chambers would still wish to 
ban it as unjust, under her two conditions of Disadvantage and Social Influence. 
There is no doubt that  the practice falls  foul  of the Disadvantage condition.  Those who 
undergo it suffer loss of both bodily health and bodily integrity (items 2 and 3 of the Nussbaum 
Capabilities list) and conceivably there is emotional damage too (item  5).
Equally there is no doubt that the practice is socially influenced. It is a product of cultures in 
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which women’s sexual pleasure must be curtailed to reduce the chance of sexual infidelity (see 
Dorkenoo in Chambers 2008: 34); and in which women are expected to have undergone FGM in 
order to be accepted as a part of the community, and men are unwilling to marry an unmutilated 
woman (see Chambers: 179; and Mackie in Chambers 2007: 194). Moreover these are cultures in 
which tradition is particularly strong, and dissent is not respected as it is in western liberal cultures.
Chambers’ theory thus provides sound reasons to ban FGM. 
4.7 Chambers’ application: breast implants
Chambers argues that cosmetic breast implants are banworthy for the same reasons and to the same 
extent as FGM, because:
...nobody (in this case, women) should have to harm themselves (by undergoing breast surgery or FGM) in 
order to receive benefits (such as a successful career, a sense of self-worth, or the ability to be married) that, for 
other members of society (in this case women) do not carry similarly harmful requirements 
(2008: 197). 
However, I am not convinced that her case is persuasive.
She points out that the practice is or can be disadvantageous. The surgery is risky and can 
have harmful side effects. That is no doubt true. But breast implants carry health risks rather than 
the certainty of impairment which FGM carries. Moreover improvements in techniques could make 
breast implants safer, as well as more reversible. It is not irrevocable, as FGM is.
The desire for breast  implants is also the result  of social  influence,  promising enhanced 
career  prospects  or  greater  attractiveness.  But  here  I  would  argue  that  the  influence  is  less 
concerted, less intense and more resistible. Breast implants occur in a culture where their merits and 
demerits are freely debated, and where there are strong countervailing currents of opinion which 
can  be  encountered  in  magazines,  television  programmes,  radio  phone-ins,  the  internet,  social 
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media,  and at  the more intellectual  end of things books like Chambers’.  Moreover there is  no 
shortage of examples of successful women in a variety of fields whose success is not founded on 
having had breast implants. This contrasts very strongly with the closed cultures where FGM is the 
norm. I do not think therefore that breast implants are as banworthy as FGM; and more evidence 
would be needed of  the severity  of the disadvantage they cause and the strength of the social 
influence that encourages them to make a persuasive case that breast implants are banworthy at all. 
Whether the banning of a practice is justified on liberal paternalist grounds, using Chambers’ 
criteria,  depends on two things:  how severe the disadvantage is,  and how irresistible the social 
influence. My position would be that FGM satisfies the criteria for a ban, and breast implants do 
not. 
5. Is Burqa-Wearing Unjust to Women?
5.1 The burqa and social influence 
Finally, let  us test the practice of burqa-wearing against  Chambers’ two conditions. I shall take 
Social Influence first, for the nature of the social influence is necessary to explain the nature of the 
disadvantage. 
Thus  far,  much  of  my discussion  of  burqa-wearing  has  treated  it,  in  classically  liberal 
fashion,  as  the  choice  of  an  individual.  And  of  course  it  is  possible  for  a  strong-minded and 
autonomous  individual  to  choose  to  cover  up  as  a  purely  personal  choice,  perhaps  to  make a 
political statement, possibly in the teeth of disapproval from her own family. But such a choice is 
posterior to, and dependent on, burqa-wearing as an  institution. It is not typically or primarily an 
individual choice, but an adherence to a rule or ideal about how women should comport themselves 
in public. 
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5.2 Genealogy of the burqa
It is worth considering at this point the genealogy of the burqa, to show the extent to which it is a 
socially influenced practice. As Chambers says, following Foucault, 
...genealogy contributes to an understanding of how social and cultural practices limit individual autonomy, 
constraining our options, our self-understanding and our preferences
(2008: 38).  
A genealogical account reveals that the burqa is not the product of a liberal society or of a society in 
which women were considered to be the equals of men. Face-veiling for women is in fact a pre-
Islamic custom. According to Leila Ahmed (1992), the ancient Assyrians prescribed veiling for 
upper-class women while prostitutes and slave women were forbidden to veil (and subject to savage 
punishments if they veiled illegally). Ahmed says, citing Gerda Lerner, that:
...use of the veil classified women according to their sexual activity and signalled to men which women were 
under male protection and which were fair game.
(Ahmed 1992: 15) 
The significance of the veil in its early days, then, was to signal that those who wore it were the 
property of powerful men. They were untouchable not in virtue of their own rights but in virtue of 
the rights of the man who owned them. There was no choice for women about whether to wear it or 
not. The matter was determined by social coercion (influence is too weak a word). 
Women  under  the  protection  of  men  continued  to  wear  the  veil  under  Islam.  In  some 
respects, the spread of Islam improved the condition of women. It did at least give them some rights 
which were backed by the authority of a sacred text. As Ahmed states, however: 
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In establishment Islamic thought, women, like minorities, are defined as different from, and in their legal rights 
lesser than, Muslim men. Unlike non-Muslim men, who might join the master-class by converting, women's 
differences and inferiority within this system are immutable
(1992: 7). 
Wearing of the veil by women is a visible symbol of difference; and of inferiority, for it signifies 
that the woman wearing it is under the protection of a man and her person is to be respected for that 
reason only.
In more recent times, unveiling for women in Islam came to be seen as a sign of liberation. 
There was a movement in the nineteenth century for Islam to modernise and become more like 
western cultures. As noted earlier (Chapter Seven), in 1899 the Egyptian Qassim Amin published 
Tahrir Al-Mara (The Liberation of Woman) which advocated, amongst other things such as reform 
in education, polygamy and divorce laws, that women must unveil.
The need for a general social and cultural transformation is the central thesis of the book, and it is within this 
thesis that the arguments regarding women are embedded: changing customs regarding women and changing 
their costume, abolishing the veil in particular, were key, in the author’s thesis, to bringing about the desired 
social transformation 
(Ahmed 1992: 145). 
However, Ahmed argues that Amin had, at the least, a mixed agenda. In Ahmed’s view, Amin was 
convinced of the superiority of western civilisation, and so 
...his assault on the veil represented not reasoned reflection and analysis but rather the internalization and 
replication of the colonialist perspective
(1992: 160).
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Ahmed here equates being convinced of the superiority of western civilisation with a colonialist 
perspective. But they are not the same thing. It is possible to be convinced of the superiority of 
western  civilisation  in  certain  respects  (such  as  the  role,  status  and rights  of  women)  without 
supporting colonialism. But even supposing that Ahmed is right and Amin was a closet colonialist, 
that does not invalidate the case he makes for reform. That rests upon the reasons he gives, not his 
(assumed) agenda. Amin argued that the veil as worn in nineteenth century Egypt was a socially 
imposed form of oppression of women, and Ahmed gives no reasons to suggest that he was wrong 
about that. 
Throughout the twentieth century,  removal of the burqa was widely seen as linked with 
modernity, progress and the liberation of women. In his drive to create a modern, secular state in 
Turkey, Kemal Ataturk popularised western dress, and while he never banned the burqa, burqa-
wearing  declined  precipitously.  Burqas  were  also  cast  aside  in  Egypt,  Afghanistan  and  other 
Muslim countries. Without exploring in detail the reasons for this change, we can be clear on one 
point: such a sweeping change was not the chance aggregate of millions of unrelated free choices. It 
was a social change brought about by social influence. It ceased to be shameful for a woman to be 
seen in public seen with her face uncovered; it ceased to be seen as meritorious for her to cover up. 
Women responded to new expectations of how they should present themselves in public. 
In  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  burqa-wearing  began  to  return  in  Islamic 
countries, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This coincided with a much 
larger rise in hijab-wearing. The motivations may have been a rise in anti-western sentiment, and 
desire to display allegiance to political Islam. It is clear at any rate that such a mass change in 
behaviour has to be the result of social influence. A recent Pew research poll (2014) conducted for 
Michigan  University,  which  surveyed  a  number  of  Muslim  countries,  found  that  74%  of 
respondents in Saudi Arabia thought it most appropriate for a woman to wear either burqa or niqab 
in public. That was by far the highest figure, but it was still as high as 35% in Pakistan, 12% in Iraq 
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and 10% in Egypt. Further inferential evidence that the rise in burqa-wearing across the Muslim 
world was the result of social pressure on women comes from another question asked in the survey: 
“Should women be able to choose their own clothing?” Only 14% of people agreed with this in 
Egypt, 22% in Pakistan,  27% in Iraq, and 47% in Saudi Arabia. Even in Turkey, barely half (52%) 
thought women should be free to choose their own clothing (Pew Research Poll 2014)
Of course those are figures from countries with overwhelmingly Muslim populations, which 
seem, at this moment in history, to be moving in the direction of conservative rather than liberal 
interpretations of that faith. Perhaps the social pressure is less strong in polyethnic secular states 
like Great Britain. Figures are hard to come by for how many women wear the burqa or niqab in 
Britain and it is impossible to say whether the percentage of Muslim women wearing them matches 
the percentage in their country of origin.  Nevertheless, to whatever extent burqas  are  worn by 
women in Britain and other polyethnic states, this is likely to be the result of social influence in 
their families’ or communities’ countries of origin.
5.3 Cultural affirmation
The importance of cultural affirmation reinforces the  hypothesis that burqa-wearing is the result of 
social influence.  Human beings are powerfully inclined to seek cultural affirmation, and very few 
women would choose to cover their face if the practice was frowned on by their communities. This 
point  is made persuasively by Laurence Thomas in his essay, ‘Evil  and the Norms of Society’ 
(2012). He states that the need for affirmation by others is an intrinsic part of human nature: 
Proper human development is inextricably tied to being affirmed by others. From the parent-child relationship 
to the formation of ties of friendship and romance, human beings seek affirmation. It is also the case that our 
sense of self, from appearance to abilities, is tied to the ongoing affirmation that we receive from others – not 




Thomas goes on to provide a specific example relevant to the topic here: 
For example,  a  Muslim woman may not  particularly like  wearing the hijab.  However,  she  may do so on 
occasion because it affords her a standing that she would not otherwise have among various members of the 
Muslim community.
(2012: 94)
Against this background, it is implausible that a widespread habit of face-covering by women could 
be anything other  than the result  of  a  social  norm (or  of  coercion,  but  as  Thomas points  out, 
coercion itself would have to have its origin in a social norm: see 2012: 92). Burqa-wearing, then, 
meets the first of Chamber’s conditions. It is the result of social influence. 
5.4 The burqa and disadvantage
Since the condition of influence appears to be met in the case of the burqa, we must ask if the 
condition of disadvantage is also met. If so, then on Chambers’ argument burqa-wearing is unjust. It 
would not necessarily follow that a ban would be the most efficacious way of responding to the 
injustice. But it might be. 
In considering whether, or to what extent burqa-wearing brings disadvantages I focus only 
on disadvantage to the wearer, following the approach that Chambers takes. She is concerned to 
intervene on behalf of individuals who make socially influenced and personally disadvantageous 
choices. The disadvantage burqa-wearing might cause to others is a different and, for the liberal, 
less controversial question. I consider this question in detail in the next two chapters, on the effect 
of the burqa on others in the forms of Offence and Harm. Here I follow Chambers’ line in focusing 
on injustice suffered by the individual chooser. 
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That the burqa disadvantages the wearer in  relation to  men in a  variety of  ways seems 
uncontroversial. (At least it is uncontroversial if one accepts liberal norms of equality and liberty, as 
Chambers does and as I do.) The disadvantages could be itemised as follows: 1) the burqa conveys 
a symbolic message that the wearer is not equal to men; 2) the burqa restricts social intercourse; 3) 
it is an impediment to career and public life; and 4) it renders many pleasurable physical activities 
extremely difficult or impossible. 
That list may not be exhaustive but covers all the most important points. At the risk of being 
over-obvious let me briefly spell out why each is a disadvantage. 
1. The first of the disadvantages stems from the very fact  of burqa-wearing being socially 
influenced. It is influenced by the norms of a culture in which women are not considered to 
be equal to men. The symbolic message of the burqa is that its wearer is under the protection 
of a man. She is not respected in the same way that a man would be respected, as a person in 
her own right.  She is  respected as the property of a husband or male relative who will 
defend her honour (and perhaps more importantly his own) against the predations of other 
men. It is true that this is not the only symbolic message that the burqa carries. It might also 
be a  political  statement,  rejecting western values and proclaiming adherence to  political 
Islam. But that does not cancel out the older and more fundamental meaning. It is the older 
and  more  fundamental  meaning  which  disadvantages  the  wearer,  by  assigning  her 
subordinate status to men, who do not wear burqas.
2. That the burqa restricts social intercourse should not come as a surprise. It is designed to do 
so. It does not make all social intercourse impossible. Burqa-wearers can still communicate 
freely in private with husband and family. But it severely restricts social intercourse outside 
the family.  Facial communication is impaired. Burqa-wearers are unable to smile at people 
or even give an eyebrow flash of recognition. They are themselves harder to recognise than 
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non-burqa-wearers.  Not  only  does  the  burqa  impede  communication  in  this  way  but  it 
renders communication less likely to be attempted, operating as a barrier between the wearer 
and others. For a highly social species such as ourselves this must count as a disadvantage; 
especially in comparison to men, who do not wear burqas.
3. Wearing  a  burqa  restricts  career  options  and  public  life.  Any  career  which  involved 
communicating  with  the  public,  and/or  presenting  a  trustworthy  face  –  doctor,  teacher, 
police officer, barrister, manager, newsreader, lecturer, actor, singer, performer, TV presenter 
etc etc – would be highly problematic. Political office would also be, practically speaking, 
impossible: a mayoral or parliamentary candidate who only ever appeared in public with 
their  face covered would stand zero chance  of  getting elected (or  of  being selected for 
candidacy in the first place). It probably is not a coincidence that the careers from which a 
burqa-wearer would be effectively debarred tend to be high-status, high-paid jobs. Men are 
not debarred from them because men do not wear burqas. 
4. Wearing a burqa makes certain sports and pastimes hard if not impossible to pursue. Playing 
tennis or football, climbing, water-ski-ing, cross-country running, ice-skating, disco-dancing 
and so on are not realistic options. One might want to point out that high heels or tight skirts 
would also make playing tennis difficult. But high heels and tight skirts can be replaced by 
more suitable clothing. The point about the burqa is that it is worn all the time in public. It 
should be noted here that it is not the face-covering aspect of the burqa that is the main 
problem, however, but the bulkiness of the whole garment. A chador which left the face 
uncovered would cause the same problems. Although the burqa does cause this particular 
disadvantage,  then,  it  is  not  unique in  doing so.  Nevertheless,  not  being able  to  follow 
physical  recreational pursuits is a disadvantage,  and one from which men do not suffer, 
because men do not wear burqas (or chadors).
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The burqa, then, to some extent satisfies both of Chambers’ conditions. But the question is whether 
the disadvantage is severe enough, and the social influence irresistible enough, to justify a ban.
 I would argue that a burqa-ban would not currently be justified in a polyethnic liberal state 
such as Great Britain on the grounds of Social Influence and Disadvantage to the wearer. It may be 
justified on other grounds, to be explored in the next chapters. But whether the banning of an unjust 
custom, in Chambers’ terms, is justified depends on two empirical factors: how strong the social 
influence is, and how severe the disadvantage. Let us take the two factors separately.
1) Although burqa-wearing is undoubtedly the result of social influence, that influence is 
one  current  of  influence  among  many  for  Muslims  in  contemporary  Britain  and  other  liberal 
societies. The majority of Muslim women do not wear it. A Muslim woman who chose not to wear 
it might find herself lacking affirmation in her immediate community but not in the wider Muslim 
community as a whole. Many Muslims have argued publicly and vociferously against it (such as 
Yasmin  Alibhai-Brown:  see  Refusing  the  Veil,  2014).  The  social  influence  that  pushes  (some) 
Muslim women to wear it may be strong, but is not irresistible. 
2) The disadvantages outlined above are real,  but  none is  irrevocable.  Burqa-wearing is 
different  from  FGM,  which  is  irreversible  (at  least  given  current  medical  knowledge  and 
technology). A disadvantage which can be removed at any time – provided the individual is able to 
resist the social influence responsible for it, and as argued that ought not to be impossible in this 
case – does not seem severe enough to warrant a ban. 
5.5  Instead of a ban
This is not to argue that burqa-wearing is just on Chambers’ terms after all. It may be unjust, but not 
unjust enough to justify a state ban. The injustice is removable by other means. Liberal feminists 
might  disapprove  of  it.  They  may  seek  to  end  it.  But  since  burqa-wearing,  unlike  FGM,  is 
revocable,  then  in  true  liberal  style  feminists  can  seek  to  end it  by  persuasion,  argument  and 
234
example rather than legislation.
This approach has an important advantage over a state ban. What feminists oppose in cases 
of practices which are unjust to women is not just the disadvantage. It is the social influence too. A 
state ban would only address the disadvantage. But feminists want to address the social influence as 
well. They do not just want women to stop disadvantaging themselves; they want women to stop 
wanting to disadvantage themselves. Opposing burqa-wearing through persuasion, argument and 




THE EFFECT OF THE BURQA ON OTHERS: OFFENCE
The Argument
This chapter represents a departure from the line the argument has followed thus far. Instead of 
considering the effects of burqa-wearing upon the wearer, I  now consider the effects of burqa-
wearing on others. First, I summarise the argument to this point, to consolidate and emphasise the 
conclusion that the liberal position on voluntary habitual face-covering per se would not justify a 
burqa-ban on grounds of the effect on the wearer herself. 
I then begin to examine how burqa-wearing might impact upon others, starting with the 
question of offence (the following chapter will consider harm to others).  I consider Joel Feinberg’s 
Offence Principle, that if a practice causes severe, prolonged and unavoidable offence to the senses 
or sensibilities, there would be liberal grounds for banning it. I accept the argument in principle, and 
consider four ways in which the burqa might be thought offensive. I argue that none of them is 
severe enough to justify a ban. The liberal response to voluntary habitual face-covering per se need 
not be modified yet. 
1. Summary of Argument to this Point
Thus far I have considered the question of whether a liberal state would be justified in banning the 
burqa assuming  that all burqa-wearers in western states wear the burqa through personal choice. No 
doubt social influence is in part responsible for that choice, as it would be for any choice. But I have 
assumed that such influence is not irresistible. Burqa-wearing in liberal states, I have assumed, is 
not coerced, and any individual woman who chose not to wear the burqa would not be punished 
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with violence, ostracism or other sanctions. Moreover burqa-wearers in liberal states live within a 
culture where the possibility of women, including Muslim women, not wearing burqas is very easy 
to see. No woman in a liberal state should have reason to feel that there is no option but to wear a 
burqa. Additionally I have assumed that the choice to wear one, once made, is easily revocable. I 
have assumed that it is as easy to doff the burqa as to don it. 
On this model it is not possible for a liberal to justify banning the burqa for the sake of the 
burqa-wearers. They are exercising the free choice which liberals value. It is true that the burqa 
disadvantages the wearer in a number of ways.  It  is  also true that  I  have argued for a Liberal 
Paternalist  Principle  (see  Chapter  Five),  which  would  justify  state  restriction  of  liberty  on 
paternalist grounds when the restriction is small and the benefit, or harm avoided, great. However, 
such a principle would not seem to justify a ban on voluntary burqa-wearing, since the restriction of 
liberty would be considerable, and disadvantages incurred by burqa-wearing are neither permanent 
nor irrevocable. (It seems that anyone who did argue for a burqa-ban on paternalist grounds would 
also be committed to arguing for the abolition of convents and monasteries: a  reductio  that few 
liberals would be willing to embrace.)
I have argued that, assuming burqa-wearing to be voluntary, the liberal position on burqa-
wearing should be the same as the liberal position on habitual  face-covering  per se.  That is, it 
should not be banned, although temporary removal could legitimately be required for reasons of 
security or identification. The only foreseeable circumstances in which a ban on voluntary burqa-
wearing could be justified would be if malefactors took advantage of the disguise afforded by the 
burqa and used it to commit crimes and escape undetected, in sufficient numbers as to present a real 
increase in risk to the public. Under this slightly unlikely scenario (a small number of robberies 
have been committed under cover of the burqa in Britain, but they remain few and far between) a 
liberal state might be justified in banning the burqa; but then the ban would not be because the state 
objected  to  burqa-wearing  as  such,  but  rather  to  abuses  of  burqa-wearing  which  harmed  or 
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endangered citizens. 
Thus far I have concentrated on the effects of voluntary burqa-wearing upon the wearer 
herself. Apart from the scenario of the burqa being used by imposters as a criminal disguise I have 
not considered its effect on others. I now turn to consider how the practice of burqa-wearing might 
impact on others, starting with the possibility of its causing offence.
2. Feinberg’s Offence Principle 
As previously argued (Chapter Four), liberals must support some version of a Harm Principle: a 
principle by which it is sometimes legitimate to restrict the liberty of individuals in order to prevent 
harm to others. Joel Feinberg argues that liberals also need a principle which would justify state 
action to limit offence to others. He states that for a liberal state it is a good reason in support of a 
prohibition that it will (probably) prevent serious offence ( Feinberg 1985: 1). 
Note that this claim is modest in two ways: preventing offence is a good reason for banning 
a practice, but not an overriding reason. Other, opposing reasons may prevail over it. Moreover the 
offence has to be  serious;  one cannot demand that the state intervene to protect one from trivial 
annoyances. Feinberg also adds, using italics to emphasise the point, ‘offense is surely a less serious 
thing than harm’ (1985: 2). Therefore it is to be tackled by less severe sanctions. Tackling offence 
may not always best be done by the criminal law – perhaps milder methods of discouragement, such 
as ‘individual suits for injunctions’, or court orders issued by police, or revoking of licences will 
meet the needs of the case; and if the criminal justice is needed it should impose fines, or short 
prison sentences of days, for crimes of offence (1985: 3). 
What, then, does Feinberg mean by offence? He compares the feelings caused by offence to 
feelings caused by nuisance, such as barking dogs, loud music or nasty smells. He dramatises what 
he means by a thought-experiment, ‘A ride on the bus’, in which an unfortunate passenger, whom 
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you are asked to think of as yourself, is subjected to a nightmarish catalogue of six different types 
of offence: 
A. Affronts to the senses... B. Disgust and revulsion... C. Shock to moral, religious or patriotic sensibilities... D. 
Shame,  embarrassment  including  vicarious  embarrassment)  and  anxiety...  E.  Annoyance,  boredom, 
frustration... F Fear, resentment, humiliation, anger
(Feinberg 1985: 10-13). 
Each type of offence is illustrated by a selection of outlandish behaviours – for example, a man who 
sits next to you and deliberately scrapes his fingernails on a slate, refusing to desist when asked to 
do so (Affront to the Senses); a group of passengers who eat a picnic of live insects and pickled sex 
organs of animals, making themselves vomit and then starting again on the food, as well as eating 
each other’s vomit (Disgust and Revulsion); another group who pile on board with a coffin and 
proceed to abuse the corpse and hit its face with hammers (Shock to Moral/Religious Sensibilities); 
a  passenger  who has  oral  sex  with  a  dog (Shame,  Embarrassment);  a  couple  who conduct  an 
animated and inane conversation loudly enough to distract you from your thoughts (Annoyance, 
Boredom, Frustration); and a passenger who plays with a realistic model hand grenade and knife 
while laughing maniacally (Fear, Resentment, Humiliation, Anger). 
There is no escape from the bus. You have an unmissable appointment and there is no other 
way to get to it.
The  thought  experiment  is  effective  because rather  than relying on abstract  argument  it 
forces one to feel, viscerally, just how intolerable it would be to endure such relentlessly offensive 
acts. One would surely feel justified in demanding that these awful people be removed from the bus 
forthwith. I therefore accept the necessity of Feinberg’s Offence Principle.
 Feinberg also mixes in some trivial  offences with the more serious ones;  as well  as the 
corpse-abusers and vomit-eaters there is a passenger with a horrible shirt  of ‘violently clashing 
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orange and crimson’, offensive to one’s aesthetic sensibilities. That is irritating, but there is no need 
to throw him off the bus. This illustrates that the offence needs to be serious before the liberal state 
would be justified in intervening. 
Between the trivial and the serious there is a large amount of disputable ground, however. 
Having  an  Offence  Principle  may  encourage  people  to  claim  offence  simply  because  they 
disapprove of some practice and want to see it banned. And indeed Feinberg says his principle is as 
‘dangerous as it is necessary’ (1980: 74) and needs to be hedged about with qualifications. 
One qualification Feinberg suggests is that what is viewed as immoral conduct (e.g. sexually 
immoral) should not be banned on the Offence Principle, if conducted in private. The invasion of 
liberty would be too great. However, if it is blatantly displayed there might be grounds for banning 
it: 
...some conduct may be so offensive as to amount to a kind of ‘psychic aggression’, in which case, the private 
harm principle would allow its suppression on the same grounds as that of physical assault 
(Feinberg 1980: 76). 
Another qualification Feinberg offers to his Offence Principle is that the offence must satisfy a 
‘standard of universality’ (1980: 88). Feinberg imagines a mixed-race couple walking hand-in-hand 
through the streets of Jackson, Mississippi. No doubt this would offend many of the passers-by in 
that still very conservative and segregated state. But Feinberg would not want to ban  mixed-race 
couples appearing in public.  He suggests the following limitation of the principle:
...for ‘offense’ (repugnance, embarrassment, shame etc) to be sufficient to warrant coercion, it should be the 
reaction that could reasonably be expected from almost any person taken at random, taking the nation as a 
whole, and not because the individual belongs to some faction, clique or party.
(Feinberg 1980: 88)
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But  now another  problem  looms.  If  we  accept  this  qualification,  then  there  is  no  guaranteed 
protection against ‘abusive, mocking, insulting behaviour or speech attacking specific sub-groups of 
the population – especially ethnic, racial, or religious groups’ (1980: 88). If a majority of the nation 
do not mind such abusive behaviour towards minorities, ‘our amended offense principle will not 
justify the criminal proscription of such speech or conduct’ (1980: 88). 
Feinberg’s response is to patch up his principle ‘in an ad hoc fashion’: 
For that special class of offensive behaviour... that consists in the flaunting of abusive, mocking or insulting 
behaviour of a sort bound to alarm, anger, or irritate those whom it insults, I would allow the offense principle 
to apply, even though the behaviour would not offend the whole population
(1980:  88-89). 
This solution in its turn raises difficult questions.  Can we be sure it will not apply to the interracial 
couple in Jackson? Who is to say whether their intent is to anger and irritate and alarm rather than 
make a statement of principle? Conversely who is to say that those who mock or insult a religion 
are not also making a statement of principle? 
Ad hoc responses  have  the  inbuilt  weakness  that  they focus on eliminating  a  particular 
anomaly without bringing in the underlying principle in virtue of which the anomaly is objected to. 
In this case Feinberg’s ad hoc response seems to be based on the fact that he himself does not hold 
racist  views and is  opposed to racism. I  would suggest  that  if  called on to defend his  ad hoc 
exceptions Feinberg might reply that  they rely on another principle, that persons should not be 
discriminated against by reason of their race. The two principles could then operate side-by-side, 
and in case of conflict between them the Non-Discrimination-by-Race Principle would trump the 
Offence Principle. 
All of which shows that the application of the Offence Principle requires careful thought; but 
not  by any means that  we do not  require  one.  I  agree  with Feinberg  that  we do need such a 
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principle, to protect us against serious, sustained, persistent and intrusive offence; and I agree, too, 
that its use must be hedged about with qualifications. I turn now to the question of whether the 
Offence Principle could justify banning the burqa. 
3. The Burqa and Offence
3.1 Four types of offence
Burqa-wearing could cause offence by its symbolism: the values or messages it  presents to the 
world. There are at least four ways in which its symbolism might be offensive. I shall examine them 
one by one. 
3.2 The burqa and misogyny
Historically the burqa is associated with the oppression of women. Its asymmetry – women wear it, 
men do not – marks women out as different. It makes women non-individuated and denies them a 
place in public life. Moreover the fact that it is men – husbands, fathers, brothers – who control 
when women wear the burqa (she may remove it in the presence of an authorised man, or in his 
house, when no other unauthorised men are present) implies systematic male dominance, if not 
ownership. This is so even if the burqa-wearer herself denies that this is the case. She may say, ‘My 
burqa does not carry those meanings for me; I wear it to submit to Allah, not to men.’ She may be 
sincere  in  this  protestation.  But  other  people  cannot  be  prevented  from  drawing  their  own 
conclusions and interpreting its symbolism for themselves. One could not, for example, wear a tee-
shirt with a swastika on it and expect people to interpret it as a Buddhist symbol of good fortune 
and prosperity. For many the burqa symbolises misogyny, masculine control, a distrust and fear of 
women’s  sexuality,  and  a  double  standard  which  disfavours  women.  Given  other  misogynistic 
features of cultures where the burqa originated – such as FGM, forced marriage, honour killings – 
those  symbolic  meanings  seem  well-founded.  Such  meanings  are  offensive  to  anybody  with 
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feminist principles or sensibilities. 
3.3 The burqa and political Islam
Symbols change their significance over time and under new conditions. Increasingly, wearing the 
burqa in western liberal states has acquired an additional meaning: a statement of a rejection of 
western  liberal  values,  such  as  tolerance,  free  speech,  secularism  (and  one  might  also  add 
commercialism,  selfishness,  hedonism,  sexual  promiscuity)  in  favour  of  a  return  to  traditional 
Islamic  values.  It  signifies  a  deliberate  refusal  to  adopt  the  host  country’s  way  of  life,  and a 
commitment to political Islam. Such meanings could offend those who cherish liberal values. 
3.4 The burqa and its implied view of men
Historically  the  burqa  was  worn  as  a  protection  against  sexual  predation  by  men.  Today  its 
symbolism still suggests that, if female beauty were not hidden from sight, passing men might be 
unable to control their lust. As Yasmin Alibhai-Brown puts it:  
Veils cast all men as animalistic creatures with no control over their carnal natures, who are programmed to fall 
uninvited on bosoms and lips, and have their way with any passing female 
(2014:  95). 
Many would find this characterisation of male sexuality offensive. 
3.5 The bad taste objection 
Another way in which voluntary burqa-wearing could cause offence is on the grounds of bad taste. 
By this I mean that choosing to wear the burqa shows insensitivity towards the plight of the many 
women throughout the world who are forced to wear it. There is no doubt that such coercion is 
common in many countries, and is enforced by frightening violence. Phyllis Chesler, writing in the 
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Middle East Quarterly, notes: 
The Taliban, for example, flogged women on the street if their burqas showed too much ankle while Islamist 
vigilantes poured acid on the faces of Afghan and Pakistani schoolgirls who were not sufficiently covered 
(2010: 39). 
In such a context it seems peculiarly tasteless to wear a burqa through choice – like dressing up as a 
concentration camp inmate to go to a fancy dress party. It may also awaken unwelcome memories 
in others; as Chesler says, 
Many Westerners, including Muslims, ex-Muslims, and Christians, Jews and Hindus who have fled Muslim 
lands, may feel haunted or followed when they see burqas on Western streets 
(2010: 44-45). 
Here, then, is another way in which the burqa could cause offence. 
3.6  Offence caused by the burqa is not serious enough to warrant a ban
Although the burqa could cause offence in any or all of the ways described above, it is not the kind 
of high-impact, unavoidable and sustained offence that Feinberg argues makes an offence principle 
necessary.  The  kinds of  offence  the  burqa may cause  are  merely  communications of  symbolic 
messages  which  some people  may not  like.  But  that  is  free  speech.  That  is  what  liberals  are 
committed to defending. 
As Russell Blackford puts it: 
[W]earing a burqa may cause offense. Indeed, nobody has to react with approval when a burqa is worn in 
public, but the practice causes no significant harms to others. Nor does it cause the sort of high-impact offense 
244
to a captive audience that might reasonably justify bans on some kind of images, odors, noises and so on, in 
certain public spaces. Indeed, wearing a burqa can be interpreted, quite plausibly, as an exercise of free speech, 
since it communicates something of the wearer’s religious and moral commitments
(2012: 135)
Therefore although I accept Feinberg’s Feinberg’s Offence Principle for the kinds of extreme cases 
he describes, burqa-wearing should not be banned under it, because the offence is not so intolerable, 
unavoidable, intrusive or persistent as to meet his criterion of serious offence. In the context of the 
antics of the passengers on that bus, indeed, a burqa-clad woman boarding would probably come as 
something as a relief. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
 THE EFFECT OF THE BURQA ON OTHERS: HARM
The Argument
In this chapter I explore whether the prevention of harm to others could justify a liberal state’s 
banning of the burqa. I consider three possible cases of harm. First, I examine the French 
justification for its 2010 burqa-ban, to safeguard the requirement of ‘vivire ensemble’  (‘living 
together’). 
Second, I examine more closely the previously-discussed scenario of  the burqa being used 
as a criminal disguise. This would cause  harm to others and could therefore offer a justification for 
a ban. 
Third, suppose it to be the case that significant numbers of women are coerced into wearing 
the burqa. Coerced public face-covering would be a serious harm to the individual. I argue that if 
this is occurring or if it were to occur, then a ban would be justified; if there were no other way of 
preventing the coercion that was at least equally efficacious. 
In such cases of harm, the liberal response to habitual voluntary face-covering per se would 
not be adequate. Whether they really are occurring is an empirical question. 
1.  A Difference of Approach from Nussbaum 
I adopt a somewhat different approach from that taken by Martha Nussbaum in The New Religious 
Intolerance (2012). Her argument against a burqa-ban centres on the empirical question of whether 
wearing of the burqa does in fact cause harm to non-wearers in those European states that have 
banned it. She argues that it does not and therefore a ban is unjustified. However, even granting that 
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she is right about that, her case rests on a snapshot of the practice of burqa-wearing in particular 
European countries in the year 2012. But cultural practices are not static. They are dynamic. In the 
21st century they are more dynamic than ever before. Changes in populations brought about by 
migration and by birth-rate, as well as the greater exposure to ideas and images facilitated by the 
internet, mean that a cultural practice can grow and evolve quite rapidly, producing unexpected 
consequences. To argue that burqa-wearing is harmless to others in Europe in 2012 is not to argue 
that it will and always must remain so. I am therefore more interested in the question of whether, if  
it were to cause harm, at what point a liberal state should take action against it, and whether a ban 
would be the best means of doing so. 
2. The Burqa and Harm
2.1 The role of the Harm Principle
It seems clear, as argued in Chapter Four, that liberals must subscribe to some form of the Harm 
Principle. Without such a principle, the liberty of one individual could destroy the liberty of another, 
which rather removes the point of liberalism. Mill’s classic formulation, however, is too strict. Mill 
states that ‘...the only [my italics] purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (2000: 13). Mill 
rules out any other purpose for restricting people’s actions; but I have already argued for a Liberal 
Paternalist Principle as supplying an additional legitimate purpose, and accepted Feinberg’s 
argument that serious offence to others could also supply a legitimate reason for state restriction of 
liberty. Let us then employ the version of the Harm Principle formulated by Feinberg:  
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing 
(eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is 
probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values.
247
(1985:  26)
2.2 Elaborating the Harm Principle
We should note first that Feinberg’s Harm Principle does not entail that all or any harms require 
penal legislation for their elimination or reduction. That harm is caused or is at risk of being caused 
is a good reason for legislation but not an overriding one. The cost of prohibiting an activity in 
terms of loss of liberty or unwanted side-effects might offer a stronger reason against the legislation 
where the harm is slight or unlikely. In short, harm by itself does not supply a sufficient reason for 
penal legislation. Nor does it supply a necessary reason; evidence of harm is a good reason but not 
necessarily the only one. As explained above, both Feinberg’s Offence Principle and my Liberal 
Paternalist Principle supply alternative justifications for state intervention.
Feinberg points out that his Harm Principle could legitimise penal legislation against more 
than harm caused to specific individuals; it would also be legitimate to prohibit actions that cause 
‘the unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public institutions and practices’ (1985: 
11). Examples of harm against a specific individual would be murder or rape; an example of 
conduct that risked harm would be reckless driving; an example of public harm is tax-evasion. 
2.3  The problem of defining harm
Those examples are uncontroversial. But other cases might be less clear-cut; and indeed a standard 
objection to the Harm Principle is the difficulty of defining harm. B. Jennings, in an essay entitled 
‘Beyond the Harm Principle’, argues that the concept of harm is slippery and can be manipulated to 
suit the purposes of the law-maker (1996:  220). Jennings states:
The harm principle ought to give us a bright line to know when individual autonomy can be overridden. The 
line is not really so bright, however, because people don’t always know harm when they see it, or else see it too 
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readily when it is not reasonably there. 
(1996: 224-25) 
It is certainly true that harm cannot be defined with mathematical precision as long as we are 
talking about human beings as the objects of it. Harm to, say, trees can be defined uncontroversially. 
But then the tree does not have an opinion about whether it is has been harmed or not. Human 
beings can and do have differing views about what counts as harm. 
However, we can formulate a definition of harm that takes this into account, as Feinberg 
does: ‘A person is harmed when someone invades (blocks or thwarts) one of his interests’ (1980: 
45). This definition does not depend on all persons’ interests being the same. There is room for 
difference. My interest is, at least to a certain extent, what I take it to be. 
This taking-it-to-be must however be situated within normative limits. Interests are not 
identical with preferences. In the case of Chloe Jennings-White (considered in Chapter Five), an 
able-bodied woman who wishes to undergo an operation to render her a paraplegic, she is clearly 
mistaken about what her interests are. She thinks it is in her interests to be paralysed, but that is 
because she suffers from an extreme case of Body Integrity Disorder. Preventing her from carrying 
out her preference is not blocking her interests. It is serving them. 
Still, the normative limits can be quite wide. They need to be universal: i.e. based on an idea 
of what is good for all human beings. We can rule out serious, permanent and irrevocable damage to 
one’s body as being in somebody’s interests. But this still leaves a great deal ruled in. Within the 
normative limits there is considerable room for differing about interests. It may be in one person’s 
interests to worship in the Church of the Seventh-Day Adventists, and in another person’s interests 
to play football every Sunday, and in either case they would be harmed by having that interest 
blocked. 
We are still not out of the woods. An appeal to interest is not a sufficiently clear guide for 
legislative decisions. For interests may compete. We will need supplementary principles to help 
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weigh competing interests. 
Feinberg offers three indices to measure the weight of interests: i) their importance to the 
welfare of the possessor (their ‘vitality’ in the possessor’s general scheme of interests); 2) the 
degree to which they are reinforced by other interests, private and public; and 3) their moral quality 
(controversially) ( 1980: 32). 
Feinberg’s first index includes very basic conditions for welfare – health, vigour, emotional 
stability, minimal level of wealth, and  ‘the ability to engage normally in social intercourse’ (1980: 
32). These are all said to be ‘standard interests’; that is, they apply to everyone. 
Feinberg’s second index, the degree to which interests are reinforced by other interests (for 
example preventing me from driving might also prevent me from working) also rests on the notion 
of standard interests. Index 3) does not rest on the notion of standard interests, and for that reason 
would be harder to deploy in a debate about weighing interests. I therefore leave it out of account. 
But 1) and 2) alone are enough to give us a basis for debating rationally whether someone is harmed 
by someone else’s conduct. 
This does not mean of course that such questions will always be easy to settle. Both ‘harm’ 
and ‘interest’ have fuzzy edges. But we should note that  harm is an everyday term that we all 
understand: we at least have enough general agreement about what harm is to be able to argue about 
it. Indeed, its value as a principle for limiting criminal laws depends on this everyday usage; as 
Nina Persak says:
[I]t is important to realise, that the notion of ‘harm’, as represented in the criminal law, ought to be an extra-
legal term, or at least a term outside the black-letter criminal law. If it were – a positive law-term – then the 
harm principle could not perform its main limiting function, because once a criminal legal norm has been 
established,  the harm (in the  later  sense)  would necessarily  be assumed.  In other  words,  the  harm would 
necessarily always be present in the prohibited conduct (thus giving the impression it satisfies the requirement 
of the harm principle) by way of being the positive law. Like the saying, ‘The law has to be obeyed because the 
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law says so’, the thing would be entirely circular.
(2006: 63). 
All this is not to argue that  there can never be grey areas when we try to decide whether the 
consequences of an act are harmful. But it is to argue that there are clear cases. I shall examine three 
clear cases where burqa-wearing could bring about harm: that is, where the uncontroversial interests 
of others besides the voluntary burqa-wearer are uncontroversially invaded, thwarted or blocked. 
The first is the violation of the rights and freedoms of others in a liberal state (the vivre ensemble 
defence  of  a  ban).  The  second is  the  wearing of  the  burqa  as  a  disguise  to  facilitate  criminal 
activities. The third is where voluntary burqa-wearing makes possible coerced burqa-wearing. 
3. The vivre ensemble defence
3.1 The French republican tradition
French republicanism, though it has strong liberal elements (such as the equal rights and duties 
of all  citizens),  can also be seen as a form of communitarianism. It  imposes duties on its 
citizens which are owed not primarily to other individuals but to a republican conception of the 
common good. This conception depends on a social theory which, in the words of Peter Baehr 
and Daniel Gordon
can be seen as a specific inflection of democratic thought that we call the elongation of the political into 
the sociable. The concept of citizenship is the starting point. Citizenship in modern democratic regimes 
enshrines the idea of politico-legal equality.  According to [Richard] Bellamy, it ‘  is  through being a  
member of a political community and participating on equal terms in the framing of collective life that we 
enjoy rights’  (2008, pp. 16, 114). He also remarks that ‘ citizenship involves a degree of solidarity and 
reciprocity between citizens’  and that such citizens ‘ need to see each other as equal partners within a  
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collective enterprise’ .
   Full-face  coverings  such  as  the  burqa  and  niqab  raise  the  issue  of  whether  democratic  ‘  
solidarity’  is related to citizens being visible to one another. If I can see your face but you cannot see 
mine, is this a politically equal encounter? That a degree of mutual visibility is a prerequisite of political 
equality  is  strongly  implied  by  Western  democratic/republican  metaphors:  enlightenment,  openness,  
transparency,  illumination,  recognition,  legibility,  disclosure,  accountability,  publicity  and,  not  least,  
public.
     (Baehr and Gordon 2013: 257)
Baehr and Gordon argue that in modern democratic theory, particularly in France, the political 
has  an  inescapably  social  dimension.  Citizenship  does  not  merely  mean  participation  in 
political processes such as voting, but in accepting duties of reciprocity towards others, public 
civility:  in  short  the kind of  obligations stressed by communitarians.  And it  is  this  set  of 
requirements that formed the foundation for the ‘living together’ defence. 
3.2 Vivre ensemble part one: public order
The requirement of living together falls into two parts. The first is the protection of the public 
from harm by securing public order. That is not a uniquely liberal requirement. But it perhaps 
carries  particular  importance  for  liberal  states:  the  liberal  commitment  to  equal  rights  for 
citizens means that  all  citizens are to be protected equally from harm, which may not be the 
case with non-liberal states which recognise different levels of rights for different groups of 
inhabitants. The ECHR agreed that in principle the requirement of protecting citizens from 
harm by securing public order would be a legitimate aim of the state. However, they pointed 
out that this specific requirement was not mentioned in Paragraph 8 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which the French government had 
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used in support of the ban: and moreover, 
the Government did not refer to it either in their written observations or in their answer to the question put 
to them in that connection during the public hearing, preferring to refer solely to the “protection of the  
rights and freedoms of others”
(ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraph 117 ).
For this reason, the ECHR did not consider the public order requirement as a justification for 
the ban, and it is left unanswered whether in this case it is a legitimate justification or not. My 
own view is that this would certainly be a sound liberal justification for a ban  if there were 
evidence that face-covering did threaten harm to individuals by, for example, facilitating crime 
or terrorism. That is an empirical question. I consider the question of direct  harm to others by 
breaches  of  public  order  in  Section  4,  below;  but  to  anticipate,  I  do  not  believe  there  is 
evidence that burqa-wearing has led to increases in crime or terrorism or other public order 
offences in France or other western liberal states. 
3.3 Vivre ensemble part two: protection of rights and freedoms of others
Having put public order considerations to one side, the ECHR goes on to consider the other 
part of the vivre ensemble requirement: ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. And it 
is on this final point that they find in favour of the French state:
The Court takes into account the respondent State’s point that the face plays an important role in social  
interaction. It can understand the view that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish 
to see practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into question the possibility 
of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable 
element of community life within the society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching 
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the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier. 
(ECHR Judgement in the case of S.A.R. V. France 2014, Application 43835/11, paragraph 122 ).
The question is whether this counts as a specifically liberal reason. On the whole this seems a 
defence likelier to appeal to a communitarian than to a liberal. Communitarians such as Amitai 
Etzioni  stress that  the common good should,  at  least  in  some cases,  override the personal 
choices of the individual. Etzioni argues that usually the common good is taken care of by 
informal  social  forces.  But  ‘if  these forces  slacken, the government  must  step in’ (Etzioni 
2004: 2). Whether Etzioni himself would support a burqa-ban is a moot point. He sees the 
burqa as an extreme, almost pathological expression of privacy: 
One can see strong mandated and expected privacy in other eras and cultures, most readily in extreme and 
offensive forms, in societies in which rights are not respected and virtuous privacy is strenuously and even 
violently enforced. For instance, those Islamic societies that strictly follow the sharia (Islamic law) require 
women to conceal their hair, skin and the contours of their body – a dress code embodied in extreme form 
by the burqa.
(Etzioni 2004: 32)
Perhaps if the extreme privacy of burqa-wearing were shown to threaten the common good of 
an open society such as France, Etzioni would see merit in a ban.  But it is not the case that 
communitarian thinking commits one to a ban. Etzioni states that ‘a good society provides a 
careful balance between social order and liberty’ (2004: 55) and it is not a foregone conclusion 
that social order would always win. However, what one can say is that if a burqa-ban is upheld 
solely for the sake of living together/social order, then that is more of a communitarian reason 
than a liberal one. So the justification accepted by the ECHR turns out to be the least purely 
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liberal of the three justifications advanced. 
A more liberal view, with greater emphasis on the freedom of the individual, would note 
that many things are needed for people to live together, to form interpersonal relationships, and 
for strangers to meet in the public sphere and perform transactions together with ease and trust: 
politeness,  smiles,  good  manners,  handshakes,  expressions  of  thanks,  concealment  of  true 
feelings, a common language, etc etc. But these requirements would lose much of their value if 
legally enforced. Since liberals generally value personal autonomy, they would incline to the 
view that it is up to the individual how open they are to others in the public sphere: individuals 
must be legally allowed to be shy, private, uncommunicative, even rude and misanthropic in 
their daily dealings with others, or indeed to reject society altogether for the life of a hermit. 
There is also the issue of free speech, which is of greater importance to liberals (at any 
point  along the  PL-Perfectionist  spectrum) than it  is  to  communitarians.  Lori  Watson and 
Christie Hartley make the point that the burqa is not just a garment but a means of expression:
One reason for such proposals [of banning burqas] is that the burka can be thought to express the sentiment 
that  women should be invisible in public places. Even if this is true, under most conditions, banning the 
burka in public places would be an unacceptable violation of freedom of expression.
(Watson and Hartley, 2018: 159)
Obviously liberals would not accept the message that women should be invisible in public. But 
as Watson and Hartley point out, ‘the equal status of women as citizens... can be addressed by 
other social policy’ (2018: 159) rather than by suppressing the opposing view. 
On balance, then, I contend that the vivre ensemble defence fails as a liberal defence of a 
ban, insofar as it prioritises duty to the republic above individual freedoms. However, the fact 
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that the burqa could be adopted as a criminal disguise to facilitate public order offences which 
directly harm individuals still needs to be considered.
4. The Burqa as Criminal Disguise
4.1 Crime and terrorism
As was argued in Chapter Three, the face is the primary means by which human beings identify one 
another. Long before burqa-wearing was a phenomenon in western countries, people engaging in 
planned criminal activities often covered their faces (with scarves, masks, balaclavas, tights etc) to 
enable them to escape the scene without being identified. Institutions where criminal attacks were 
more than ordinarily likely, such as banks, adopted a policy of requiring customers and visitors not 
to cover their faces, insisting on the removal of motorcycle helmets, for example. 
This being so, one can see why the emergence of a group of people who habitually cover 
their faces in public might give rise to concerns over public security. Nor would those concerns 
necessarily be irrational; for the higher the number of people whose faces were covered, the higher 
the possibility that one or some of them could have criminal intentions. It is, after all, easier to 
commit a crime and escape undetected if  one’s face is  covered.  It  would not  be only,  or even 
mainly, regular burqa-wearers themselves who would fall under suspicion. An opportunist could 
imitate the burqa-wearers to commit a crime and get away with it and uncover after the deed. A 
relevant  feature  of  the  burqa,  as  compared to  other  forms of  face-covering,  is  that  people  are 
generally reluctant to challenge burqa-wearers. Wearing the burqa is viewed by many as a religious 
obligation, and most of us have some sensitivity about appearing to question or challenge religious 
obligations. The burqa-wearer is unapproachable in a way that a mask-wearer, or a motorcyclist 
who refused to remove their helmet, would not be. Those of nefarious intent could take advantage 
of this fact. In 2013, for example, a group of burqa-clad robbers (neither Muslims nor women) 
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conducted  a  smash-and-grab  raid  on  Selfridges,  Oxford  Street,  London  (BBC  News  website, 
19/08/14); although they were later apprehended.  
Such occurrences, however, remain few and far between. There is no evidence so far that the 
rise in burqa-wearing in the UK has contributed to an overall rise in crime. Whether it ever will do 
so is an empirical question. The reasonable position seems to be that  if  burqa-wearing led to an 
increase in masked crime, then the liberal state would have a  prima facie  case for banning it in 
order to protect its citizens, while regretting the loss of liberty this entailed. Whether that case was 
compelling would depend on just how serious the crime-rise was. It is simply a question of the 
numbers. The larger the number of such crimes, the stronger the case for a ban. So far, though, the 
numbers do not seem to be high enough to even begin to put together such a case, as far as the UK 
is concerned at any rate. 
As well as common-or-garden crime for personal gain, the burqa has also been linked with 
terrorism. Nussbaum puts this view (with which she strongly disagrees, at least in a North American 
or European context) as follows: ‘we are living in an era of terrorism and in the war against terror it 
is legitimate to suspect women wearing the burqa’ (2012: 107). 
Some  countries  have  indeed  taken  action  against  burqa-wearing  on  these  grounds.  For 
example, Chad banned the full-face veil in 2015, following a bombing attack by burqa-wearing 
Boko Haram militants, in which twenty people were killed; Congo Brazzaville also banned the full-
face veil in 2015 ‘to counter terrorism’ (BBC News website, 17/6/2015); Cameroon banned it later 
the  same  year  following  two  suicide  bomb  attacks  by  burqa-wearers  (BBC  News  website, 
16/07/15). 
Nussbaum accepts that ‘[in] the Middle East it might possibly be a clever strategy for a 
terrorist to don a burqa’ (2012: 107) and would presumably concede the same for areas of Africa 
where there is an appreciable Muslim population of the burqa-wearing persuasion. However she 
argues that it would be a stupid strategy for a terrorist to wear a burqa in North America or Europe 
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as this would be more likely to attract attention than escape it (2012: 107).  
I am not sure that this is true. A burqa-clad person boarding a bus in, say, East London 
would attract no attention whatsoever. Again, though, it is an empirical question whether a burqa 
would be an effective disguise in North America or Europe, and we need spend no time trying to 
settle it here. We can simply say that if no or hardly any terrorists in those countries ever adopt such 
camouflage, then we agree with Nussbaum that a ban is unnecessary; and if in future it were to turn 
out that they do, then a ban could become necessary. 
4.2 Nussbaum and ethical consistency
There is, though, another point on which I take issue with Nussbaum. She takes the view that burqa-
wearing raises no more problems than other types of face-covering; and ethical consistency requires 
that if we are not suspicious of other types of face-covering then we should not be suspicious of 
burqas either. Here is how she puts her case: 
It gets very cold in Chicago – as, indeed, in many parts of Europe. Along the streets we walk, hats pulled down 
over ears and brows, scarves wound tightly around noses and mouths.  No problem of either transparency or 
security is thought to exist, nor are we forbidden to enter public buildings so insulated....  Moreover, many 
beloved and trusted professionals  cover  their  faces  all  year  round:  surgeons,  dentists,  (American)  football 
players, skiers and skaters... In general, what inspires fear and mistrust in Europe, and, to some extent, in the 
United States, is not covering per se, but Muslim covering.
(Nussbaum 2012: 106-7). 
This section of the book is almost identical to a piece Nussbaum wrote for the New York Times’s 
Opinionator column in 2010, but there is one perhaps significant change. In the original piece she 
said that it was ‘clearly’ Muslim face covering which inspired fear and distrust, and she has now 
removed that word and replaced it with the phrase ‘in general’. That is a slight concession, but the 
charge in substance still stands. The only factor she is able to find to account for the difference 
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between reactions to the kind of everyday face-coverings she describes, and to the burqa, is fear and 
mistrust of Muslims. 
But there are other relevant factors, which she does not consider.  An obvious one is that 
hats,  scarves,  surgeons’ masks etc  are  removed when the occasion requires:  we would think it 
objectionable if someone persisted in wearing a scarf wound around their face, or a surgeon’s mask, 
in a bank, a classroom or a court of law, for example. A burqa is worn all the time in public; and, 
because it is thought of as a religious symbol, people are aware that asking for its removal might 
cause offence. Having a different reaction to the burqa than to a scarf wound around the face on a 
cold day is no evidence of a double standard, but of a consistent standard. I applaud Nussbaum’s 
principle of seeking consistency. But it seems to undermine her own case here. 
I do not, in any case, think it helpful in general to impugn the motivations or agenda of 
persons arguing either for or against a burqa-ban. There is always a chance that one might be wrong 
about the motivations or agenda, and even if one is right, one still has to answer the arguments 
advanced, so it is better to stick to those. 
But to end this section, I should say that on the current weight of evidence I agree with 
Nussbaum that there is not yet any justification for banning the burqa on grounds of security. There 
are insufficient instances of burqa-related crime or terrorism in the west to justify a general ban at 
this point. In certain settings, such as airports, international borders, law courts, banks and so on, 
the wearer might legitimately be obliged to temporarily remove it. That would seem to take care of 
security problems without recourse to a blanket ban. 
5. Coercion and the Burqa
5.1 What is coercion?
I take wearing a burqa under coerced conditions to be a clear case of harm. It is also a much likelier 
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harm than the harm of burqa as criminal disguise considered above.  
But  what  is  coercion?  There  has been considerable  philosophical  debate  about  whether 
coercion is a wrong in itself. There are three main positions: 
1) coercion is always wrong by definition;
2) coercion is prima facie wrong but may be justified in some circumstances (as in state 
coercion in punishing criminals); 
3) Coercion  is  morally  neutral,  and  wrongful  only  when  the  circumstances  of  a 
particular case make it wrongful 
(Anderson, SEP, Winter 2017).
For the purposes of my argument here, however, I can leave it open whether coercion in general is 
always or prima facie wrongful. I need show only that it is wrong in the particular case of forcing 
women to cover their faces habitually in public all the time. 
But what counts as coercion? Robert Nozick gives the following characterisation of coercion 
(which he attributes to Hart and Honore): 
person P coerces person Q if and only if
P threatens to do something if Q does A (and Q knows he’s making this threat).
This threat renders Q’s doing A substantially less eligible as a course of conduct than not
 doing  A.
P makes this threat in order to get Q not to do A, intending that Q realize he’s been threatened by A.
Q does not do A.
P’s words or deeds are part of Q’s reason for not doing A.
(1969: 441)
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Coercion therefore entails threatening a person with consequences they will not enjoy if they carry 
out a course of action that the threatener wishes to prevent. (The model works equally well for 
compulsion as for prevention: coercion entails threatening a person with consequences they will not 
enjoy if they do not carry out a course of action that the threatener wishes.) It is worth noting the 
parenthetical  condition  ‘(and  Q knows  he’s  making  this  threat’).  The  threat  could  not  operate 
successfully without Q’s knowledge of it. If Q did what P wanted while unaware of what would 
happen if they failed to do so, this would not be a  result  of the threat, and therefore Q’s action 
would not be coerced. 
Nozick’s  formulation  also  entails  that  coercion  must  be  successful  if  it  is  to  count  as 
coercion (see Condition 4, above). Presumably coercion that did not succeed – in the case where Q 
ignored or defied the threat –  could count only as attempted coercion. 
Nozick distinguishes between threats and offers:
Offers of inducements, incentives, rewards, bribes, consideration, remuneration, recompense, payment do not 
normally constitute threats, and the person who accepts them is not normally coerced.
(1969: 447)
The crucial  difference between a  threat  and an offer  is  that  a  threat,  if  carried  out,  makes the 
recipient worse off than before, while an offer, if carried out, makes one better off. Whether an 
overture is a threat or offer depends on what the baseline conditions are – i.e. what the normal state 
of affairs is, before the overture is made. Threats project a worsening of normal conditions; offers 
project an improvement of normal conditions. Nozick considers the case of a slave who is told: ‘If 
you do A, I won’t beat you tomorrow’, when normally the slave is beaten daily (1969: 450). Against 
those baseline conditions, the overture might be counted as an offer. But then one wants to object 
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that the true baseline condition is a free society where there are no slaves, and beating people for no 
reason is outlawed. It is coercion in the context of such a baseline in the first place that has placed 
the slave in the position where a one-day cessation of their daily beating appears as an offer. 
Anderson considers the question of ‘throffers’, that is to say overtures where doing what is 
demanded is rewarded by the carrying out of an offer, and not doing it is punished by the carrying 
out of a threat: 
Some  have  discussed  ‘throffers,’ which  are  proposals  that  make  one  better  off  than  normal  under  one 
conditional, worse off than normal under the alternative conditional. On the above analysis, throffers will be 
included among the threats because the conditional containing the less-preferred consequent makes one worse 
off than one normally would be.
(Anderson, SEP, Winter 2017)
Throffers therefore need not be distinguished from threats, except in the sense that they may be 
more likely to succeed. 
One final point is that threats need not be explicit. They may be implied. As Anderson puts 
it: ‘If one’s powers and wishes are well enough known through past demonstrations, one may even 
be able  to avoid making many overt  threats  while  still  getting one’s way’ (SEP, Winter 2017). 
Nevertheless,  for  coercion  to  occur,  as  argued  above,  Q must  be  aware  of  the  implied  threat. 
Coercion relies on a power imbalance that both parties know about. As Gideon Yaffe explains: 
The key to the explanation for the freedom-undermining force of coercion is that, as a general rule, coercers 
don’t merely produce, but also track, the compliance of their victims. … [T]he coercer is rarely attached to the 
particular  nasty  consequence  that  he  threatens;  with  some  limits,  he  is  ready  to  bring  about  whatever 
consequences would serve to bring the victim around to compliance. 
(Yaffe 2003)
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Coercion therefore relies on the coercer having dominance over the coercee, and the ability to make 
or imply whatever threats are deemed necessary to produce the desired behaviour.
5.2 When burqa-wearing is coerced
With regard to the burqa, then, I stipulate that coerced burqa-wearing should satisfy the following 
conditions: 
a) The husband, father or brother, or other person in position of power threatens a woman 
with hard treatment if she does not wear the burqa in public all the time (and she knows she is being 
threatened).
b) The hard treatment includes but is not limited to physical violence (other possibilities are 
withholding food, ostracism, or social shaming). 
c) The hard treatment would make the woman’s baseline position worse. 
d) The baseline position is freedom from violence, starving, ostracism or social shaming.
e) The woman wears the burqa in order to avoid the hard treatment.  
5.3 Why coerced burqa-wearing is a harm 
Coerced burqa-wearing is harmful because the woman’s autonomy is undermined. Suppose that it 
were the case that some burqa-wearing is in fact coerced – by actual violence or credible threats of 
violence, or by ostracism and social shaming. A double harm is involved. First, the means used for 
coercion – physical violence, or the threat of it, or other forms of abuse – would themselves count 
as harms. Second, and more importantly, having to wear a burqa to avoid the coercive measures is 
itself a serious harm. As argued in Chapter Three, wearing a burqa brings severe disadvantages to 
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the individual, cutting the wearer off from many social interactions, inhibiting the ethical responses 
of others towards her, rendering any position in public life difficult if not impossible, and cutting off 
the possibility of pursuing most professional careers, to name some of the most salient.
Such disadvantages do not count as harms when a woman freely chooses to wear the burqa, 
if one accepts the priority of Second Order Autonomy over First Order Autonomy, as Nussbaum 
does and I do (see Chapter Six); that is to say, loss of autonomy in the conditions of one’s daily life 
is not a harm if one has autonomously chosen those conditions, as long as that choice is revocable. 
If the disadvantages are freely embraced then the liberal has no more reason to object than they 
would have reason to object to a nun’s freely choosing to immure herself in an enclosed order. 
However it would be a grave harm to immure a woman in an enclosed order against her will. In the 
same way it would be a grave harm to force a woman into a veil against her will. 
5.4 Harm as blocking of interests
Coerced burqa-wearing is a clear case of blocking of interests. Applying Feinberg’s first two indices 
(see  p. 250, above) for measuring the weight of interests, we see that the interests involved weigh 
heavily in the scale. 
The first  index is  their  importance to the welfare of the possessor,  which includes such 
conditions as health,  vigour and emotional  stability.  Burqa-wearing could impact  negatively on 
health and vigour, and would be fairly certain, if coerced, to impact on emotional stability; being 
forced to shroud oneself against one’s will day after day is not likely to be conducive to emotional 
well-being. Feinberg also mentions ‘the ability to engage normally in social intercourse’ (1980: 
32), which would undeniably be affected adversely by burqa-wearing. 
Feinberg’s second index is the degree to which these standard interests are reinforced by 
other interests, private and public (1980: 32). It is clear that the interests threatened by coerced 
burqa-wearing are indeed reinforced by other interests. For example, the ability to engage in normal 
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social intercourse is connected to one’s interest in forming friendships, and also to one’s (possible) 
interest in pursuing a professional career.
I conclude that coerced burqa-wearing is a serious harm, compounded of a) the violence or 
other abuse which are the instruments of coercion, and b) the long-term blocking of interests that 
coerced burqa-wearing entails. Let us call a) the coercive measures and b) the blocking of interests. 
I hold that b) is a more serious harm than a), because the interests at stake are long-term, indeed 
life-long.
This is not to make the claim that coerced burqa-wearing is widespread in any particular 
liberal state at the present time. Possibly it is rare or non-existent. We need to acquire data on that 
before we can say whether action by the liberal state is required. Acquiring data that would show 
burqa-wearing to be coerced may be no easy task. I consider some possible approaches in Section 8, 
below.  But for now let us just ask,  if  coerced burqa-wearing were taking place, what should a 
liberal state do about it? 
6. Nussbaum, Coercion and the Burqa
6.1 Nussbaum’s arguments against a ban on grounds of coercion
Nussbaum considers the question of coercion and the burqa and argues trenchantly that coercion 
offers no justification for a ban, at least in current circumstances. In this section I aim to identify 
some problematic areas of her argument. 
She begins thus: 
A fourth argument [the previous ones being Security, Transparency and Civic Friendship, and Objectification] 
holds that many women wear the  burqa  because they are coerced. This is a rather implausible argument to 
make across the board, and it is typically made by people who have no idea of the circumstances of this or that 
individual woman. We should reply that of course all forms of violence and physical coercion in the home are 
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illegal already, and laws against all forms of violence and physical coercion should be enforced much more 
zealously than they are. Do the arguers really believe that domestic violence is a peculiarly Muslim problem? If 
so they are dead wrong.
(Nussbaum 2012: 122)
There seem to me to be two points at which this confident line of argument is open to question. 
First, Nussbaum’s claim that the argument from coercion is implausible ‘across the board’. I take it 
she means that it is implausible to assert that burqa-wearing actually is coerced in a large number of 
cases.  The  evidence  is  lacking,  we  do  not  know  what  kind  of  numbers  are  involved.  This 
interpretation is supported by Nussbaum’s follow-up statement that those who make the claim are 
ignorant of the circumstances of individual burqa-wearers. Nussbaum’s objection seems open to a 
tu quoque, though. Is she in possession of data which show that no or very little burqa-wearing is 
coerced? If so, she should produce the data; but if not, then like those she criticises she is speaking 
from a position of ignorance. 
The second point is that Nussbaum here responds to the accusation of coercion as though it 
were merely an accusation of violence. That is, she concentrates on the coercive measures but not 
on the blocking of interests which is their end. Nussbaum might respond that if you take care of the 
first the second will take care of itself. I lack her confidence about this. It may be harder to enforce 
the laws against violence than she assumes. A woman who is subject to physical abuse may well be 
too scared to report it. What is more, the coerced wearing of the burqa may itself conceal signs of 
violence which would otherwise arouse suspicion. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown writes, in a Guardian 
article: 
A fully burqaed woman once turned up at my house, a graduate, covered in cuts, burns, bruises and bites. Do 
we know how many wounded, veiled women walk around hidden among us? 
(Guardian 20/03/15). 
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This is not to make any claims about the  extent  of violence against Muslim women. Contrary to 
what Nussbaum appears to assume, arguing that in some cases burqa-wearing may be coerced does 
not commit one to any claim that violence against women is greater amongst Muslim families than 
the rest of the population. 
Besides,  actual  physical  violence is  not the most important issue here. It  is the credible 
threat  of  violence  that  makes  for  coercion.  Or  the  threat  of  sustained  hostility,  starvation  or 
ostracism. In such cases it is no good appealing to laws against physical violence and demanding 
their enforcement. 
Moreover, as I have argued it is not the coercive measures themselves which are the worst 
harms (although they are indeed harms). The worst harm is the blocking of interests at which they 
aim. Suppose we take the opposite approach from Nussbaum and think about tackling the blocking 
of interests rather than the coercive measures? In other words, suppose we made burqa-wearing 
illegal, so that the blocking of interests from which coerced burqa-wearers suffered was no longer 
possible. Breaking this law would not, of course, be susceptible of concealment.
Coerced burqa-wearing relies on the legality of burqa-wearing, in two senses. There is the 
obvious sense that there would be no point in forcing a woman to wear a garment which she would 
then be obliged to remove by the authorities (and penalised for wearing).  Furthermore, coerced 
burqa-wearing is  facilitated by the fact that other women can be seen to be wearing burqas. A 
husband who wishes to make his wife cover up can say ‘Why don’t you wear a burqa, like Mrs X?’ 
Note also that once a woman has been coerced into wearing a burqa she, too, can be presented as an 
example that non-burqa-wearing women should follow. The more Mrs X’s there are, the more force 
this manipulative appeal has. 
The issue of headscarf-wearing in French schools offers a useful parallel. Sarah Song, in her 
book  Justice,  Gender  and  the  Politics  of  Multiculturalism  (2007)  describes  the  case.  In  2003 
Jacques Chirac established a commission to report on the controversy over whether Muslim girls 
should  be  allowed  to  wear  headscarfs  to  school,  led  by  Bernard  Stasi.  The  commission 
recommended a ban. Patrick Weil, a member, was initially against a ban but changed his mind after 
hearing the evidence:
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‘[I]n the last two to three years, it has become clear that in schools where some Muslim girls wear the headscarf 
and others do not, there is strong pressure on the latter to “conform”. This daily pressure takes different forms, 
from insults to violence. In the view of the (mostly male) aggressors, these girls are “bad Muslims”, “whores” 
who should follow the example of their sisters who respect Koranic prescriptions’ 
(Weil in Song, 2007: 174). 
Song goes on to state: 
The public  hearings made  it  clear  that  the  issue  of  veiling  in  France  has  become more  than a  matter  of 
individual freedom to express religious belief or cultural identity; it has become, in Weil’s words:
‘a France-wide strategy pursued by fundamentalist groups who use public schools as their battleground’. If this 
is true, then a ban on headscarves may be the best way to protect the majority of Muslim girls who do not wish 
to wear the veil from the pressures to do so
(2007: 174).
The same argument could be advanced in favour of a burqa-ban, if  coerced burqa-wearing were 
occurring (note that I make no claims here about whether it is). A legal prohibition of the burqa 
makes coerced burqa-wearing impossible. At the same time, the reason for the coercive measures 
would be removed. 
In  other  words,  instead  of  trying  to  end  the  blocking  of  interests  by  stamping  out  the 
coercive  measures,  as  Nussbaum wants  to  do,  we  might  achieve  better  success  in  ending  the 
coercive measures by stamping out the blocking of interests. 
There  is,  however,  a  principled  objection  to  a  burqa-ban  which  deserves  serious 
consideration: the objection that such a ban would be unjust to the voluntary burqa-wearers, under 
the principle of fair imputation. In the next section I consider this objection and argue that it is not 
insuperable. 
7. The Problem of Unfair Imputation
The latter two cases of possible harm considered in this chapter have something in common. For 
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both in the case of harm caused by burqa-wearing criminals or terrorists, and in the case of harm 
caused by domestic tyrants who coerce women into wearing burqas, the proposed remedy of a ban 
impacts on  the innocent. That is, women who are involved in neither crime nor coercion and who 
would voluntarily choose to wear the burqa are prevented from so doing. Are they not, we might 
say, being punished for the crimes of others? 
Coerced burqa-wearing resulting from the legality of voluntary burqa-wearing is an instance 
of what Andrew von Hirsch calls ‘remote harms’ (1996: 260). A remote harm is one where the 
action or practice of an individual is not in itself harmful but makes possible or may ultimately lead 
to  harm.  Once  the  harm  principle  is  extended  to  take  remote  harms  into  account,  there  is  a 
possibility of limiting freedoms much more severely than a liberal might wish; as Hirsch says, ‘all 
sorts of seemingly innocent things I (or we) may do may ultimately have deleterious consequences’ 
(1996: 260).
Hirsch distinguishes three kinds of remote harm: 
1. Abstract Endangerment, where there is no certainty but ‘an unreasonable probability of 
hurting someone’ (Hirsch 1996:  263). Drink-driving is an example of this type of remote harm.
2. Intervening Choices, where something is criminalised not because it is harmful in itself, 
but because it makes possible a choice which would be harmful. Gun-ownership is an example of 
this type of remote harm.
3. Accumulative harm, where the individual action is too small in its effects to be harmful, 
but the aggregation of such acts would bring harm. Pollution would be an example of this type of 
remote harm. 
The remote harms hypothetically caused by burqa-wearing seem to be a cross between types 2) and 
3). Both crime and coercion are made possible by burqa wearing; but it takes the aggregation of lots 
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of women wearing burqas to make either at all likely. 
Hirsch argues that we do need to legislate to take account of remote harms; but that we must 
also take care to limit the extent of such legislation. Otherwise the application of the liberal Harm 
Principle could lead to illiberal outcomes. 
Hirsch claims that ‘An essential characteristic of the criminal law is that it conveys censure’ 
(1996:  265).  Therefore,  ‘Criminalizing conduct  should thus call  for  an explanation of  why the 
behaviour merits the condemnation of the criminal law’ (Hirsch 1996: 265). But with remote harms, 
‘The inference from causing harm to doing wrong is more tenuous’ (Hirsch 1996: 265). Should an 
agent be held accountable for consequences of choices that occur a long way down the line from 
their act?  A voluntary burqa-wearer who is told she can no longer wear the burqa in public because 
some other women are being forced to do so might reasonably respond that that is not her fault, and 
should not be made her business. 
Hirsch’s  position  is  that  activities  ought  not,  in  general,  to  be  criminalised  unless  their 
consequences can be  fairly imputed to the agent:  that  is,  unless  the agent  could reasonably be 
expected to  accept  some responsibility  for  those consequences.  (He terms such an approach to 
limiting criminalisation the  imputation principle). One basis on which fair  imputation could be 
made is that of ‘co-operative obligations’ (Hirsch 1996: 269). As members of the same society we 
have joint responsibilities to co-operate for the good of all. In such matters as speed limits, for 
instance, though some good drivers in modern cars may safely exceed them, if  everyone sticks to 
them then accidents are reduced. So it is fair to criminalise breaches of speed limits, which break 
the obligation to socially co-operate for the good of everyone (Hirsch 1996: 268). The same would 
go for laws about accumulative harms such as littering or pollution. 
That seems unexceptionable. But it is not so easy to justify a burqa-ban on grounds of co-
operative obligation. The obligation we owe each other as road-users is not strictly analogous to any 
hypothetical obligation a voluntary burqa-wearer might owe to a coerced burqa-wearer. In the case 
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of speeding, the good driver and the bad driver who exceed the speed limit are  doing the same 
thing. But the voluntary burqa-wearing woman and the man who forces his wife or daughter to wear 
one are not doing the same thing at all.  It makes sense to say to any individual driver, ‘We can’t 
allow  you  to  speed,  because  then  we’d  have  to  allow  others  to  speed  (and  that  would  be 
dangerous).’ It does not make the same kind of sense at all to say ‘We can’t allow you to voluntarily 
wear your burqa, because then we’d have to allow others to force their wives or daughters to wear 
burqas’.  The voluntary burqa-wearer could simply reply, ‘No you wouldn’t. The man who forces a 
woman to wear a burqa against her will is doing something that’s already illegal. Punish him, not 
me. (And if you can’t, that is not my fault.)’
It looks as if we have a dilemma here. On the one hand, if the consequences of burqa-
wearing are the harms of crime and/or coercion, the liberal state has good reasons to ban it. On the 
other hand, those harms cannot fairly be imputed to the voluntary burqa-wearer, so her behaviour 
should not be criminalised by a liberal state. 
8. Solution to the Problem of Unfair Imputation
There is a way out of the dilemma. The liberal state ought first to consider all conceivable means of 
preventing those harms which burqa-wearing facilitates,  short of a ban.  If it were possible to use 
other policies to target only the harmful versions of burqa-wearing, then no ban would be necessary 
and no unfair imputations need be made. I am not able to say what such policies might be, but with 
continuing advances in technology and in understanding of human psychology it is not implausible 
that some such might be devised. 
But suppose that no such policies can be found. Suppose it really is the case that to stop 
burqa-related crime or coerced burqa-wearing nothing is as efficacious as a general ban. Now we 
are thrown back on our dilemma. But with a difference. The principle of fair imputation has done its 
work in obliging the liberal state to seek other options. None were found. The option of a ban is the 
only one left – a last resort, not a first resort. 
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In this case, I hold, the liberal state could be justified in enacting a general burqa-ban. And 
indeed Hirsch himself argues that ‘Important as imputation principles are, they can only serve as 
prima facie side-constraints that might sometimes have to be superceded (sic)’ (1996: 271) – that is 
to say, the imputation principle could be overridden ‘on grounds that the potential injuriousness is 
so grave and widespread as to trump ordinary concerns about imputability’ (1996, p. 271).
I hope I have established that coerced burqa-wearing is a grave harm to the women affected. 
Whether it is widespread, or on the verge of becoming so, is something we do not know. But if the 
numbers affected were significant (in the next section I consider what that means) then a general 
burqa-ban would be justified.
That would be hard on the voluntary burqa-wearers. But the liberal state could and should 
do its best to soften the effect. In announcing the new law it could make clear the reasons for the 
ban and stress that the intention was not to censure burqa-wearing per se; moreover the law could 
make deliberate provision for allowing occasions or venues (such as mosques) where burqa-wearing 
would be permitted. 
9. What About the Numbers?
In this section I consider what function the numbers serve in justifying a ban. I confine myself to the 
harm of  coerced  burqa-wearing,  without  considering  the  harm of  burqa-related  crime.  That  is 
because I consider coerced burqa-wearing much the more likely of the two harms.  But my overall 
point, that the greater the numbers affected the stronger would be the justification for a ban, applies 
to both types of harm.
Data on how much burqa-wearing is coerced is extremely hard to come by. The very nature 
of the question ensures this. If women are coerced into wearing the burqa they are unlikely to reveal 
the fact for fear of reprisals by the coercer. Women who wear it voluntarily, of course, can say so 
without fear. 
Two points might lead us to hypothesise that at least some coercion is occurring. The first is 
the history of the burqa globally: we know that it has been enforced in some countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia and the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan. It is possible that no such coercion 
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occurs among Western Muslims whose families originated from those areas, or who attend Saudi-
funded mosques; but there is no reason to be sure of that. The second point is that the number of 
Muslim women who wear the burqa seems to be on the rise. This is anecdotal, as no figures seem to 
be available. A Guardian report of 2013 says that neither the Muslim Council of Great Britain nor 
the Muslim Women’s Network UK has statistics on how many British Muslim women currently 
wear the burqa or niqab (Guardian, 20/09/13). However, observation suggests that the number of 
burqa-wearing women is increasing quite rapidly. That is a phenomenon which requires explaining. 
Coercion could be at least part of the explanation. 
Finding out whether coerced burqa-wearing actually is occurring would be a research task 
for social scientists. One important factor in their favour is that, on the above analysis of coercion, 
any women coerced into wearing the burqa would know that they were being coerced. So the social 
scientists would not be trying to ascertain facts that nobody knew.  The information would be in 
principle  accessible.  Getting  women  to  report  coercion  would  still  not  be  easy,  but  research 
techniques for this kind of thing do exist.  It  is possible to conduct field studies sampling large 
numbers of interviewees, using interviewers of appropriate background who have gained the trust 
of participants, using batteries of questions and scaled questions,  with anonymity guaranteed.  
As I have already emphasised, however, the data is lacking. We simply don’t know. Until the 
social scientists can ascertain the facts (and keep on ascertaining them, since this is a dynamic, not a 
static situation), we can only say, hypothetically, what a liberal state should do if certain empirical 
claims turn out to be true. 
Let us hypothesise that it turns out to be true that significant numbers of women are being 
coerced into wearing the burqa in Great Britain. Let us be more precise: let us hypothesise that half 
of all women who wear the burqa do so voluntarily, and the other half are coerced to do so. How 
should a liberal state respond? (We shall assume it has already responded to the fair imputation 
problem by seeking alternative policies to a ban, and finding none.)
If the liberal state bans the burqa, the interests of those who wear it voluntarily are blocked. 
If the liberal state does not ban the burqa, the interests of those who wear it under coercion are 
blocked. The numbers on either side are equal. The liberal state must make its decision, then, on the 
basis of which group is harmed most by the blocking of its interests. In other words it must weigh 
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the interests involved. 
I contend that being coerced to wear a burqa is a more severe blocking of interests than 
being prevented from wearing one. I have already indicated above how the interests blocked by 
being coerced into covering one’s face on a daily and permanent basis would weigh according to 
Feinberg’s first two indices, but let us reprise: health, vigour, emotional stability and ‘the ability to 
engage the ability  to  engage  normally in  social  intercourse’ (1980:  32)  would all  be  seriously, 
adversely affected. A burqa-clad woman is prevented even from smiling at people, which sounds 
rather like a curse from a fairy tale. Moreover (Feinberg’s second index) those standard interests are 
tied to other interests such as forming friendships or pursuing a career, so those other interests are 
also adversely affected. A crucial point is that there do not seem to be any available alternative ways 
to satisfy those interests. An interest in engaging normally in social intercourse cannot be satisfied 
by doing something else instead. 
Turning to the case of a woman who wishes to wear the burqa but is prevented from doing 
so by a state ban, it is clear that her interests are blocked too. She has an interest in following what 
she takes to be the dictates of her religion; for her the burqa is a declaration of modesty, submission 
and piety, which are important values for her. One might argue that  being able to follow one’s 
religion in the way one wishes is as important to standard welfare as is the ability to engage in 
normal social intercourse. I am not sure I agree. But I see no way to settle that question. What 
seems conclusive,  though,  is  that  the  woman who wishes to  wear  the  burqa  can  satisfy  those 
interests in other ways. She can express her religious beliefs and values by wearing modest clothes 
which proclaim her religious identity (there is no question here of banning the hijab), by attending 
mosque regularly, by praying and observing other religious obligations, by refraining from entering 
any sort of profession or career in public life, and by being obedient and submissive to her husband 
if that is what she wants to do. Her interests may have been blocked, but they can find another 
course. In her community she will be known as a modest, submissive and pious woman. No one 
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will think she is any less of a good Muslim for not wearing the burqa on the streets, because they 
will know she is not allowed to and she would if she could. 
Martha Nussbaum in Women and Human Development (2001) provides a good example of a 
Muslim woman who was no longer able to express her devotion to her religion in the manner she 
had been accustomed to but found alternative means of doing so. Hamida Khala was a North Indian 
Muslim, of very conservative views, who got married at fifteen and went to Calcutta with Civil 
Servant husband, who was older than her and of modern views. At first  she kept purdah – i.e. 
staying in women’s quarters at home and allowing herself to be seen by no men; but this caused a 
strain as her husband wanted her to socialise with his colleagues and their wives. One evening she 
and her husband attended a dinner party where she sat in a separate room which was then invaded 
by the male guests – she felt distraught at this and with regret decided to give up purdah, since it 
had been broken. Her father advised her that purdah was not intrinsic to Islam and she could still 
live with reticence and modesty without it. Nussbaum recounts that: 
After reading sacred texts on her own, she came to the conclusion that there was a way of living as a devout 
Muslim outside of strict purdah. She worked out her own rules of modest dress and demeanor – long-sleeved 
blouses, downcast eyes, no makeup or jewelry – and followed them the rest of her life, while going outside and 
learning how to conduct daily business and social affairs
 (2001: 237). 
This example demonstrates that it is possible to remain true to the values symbolised by burqa-
wearing without actually wearing a burqa. But no such alternative course is open to the woman who 
is  coerced  into  wearing  a  burqa:  the  things  she  values,  such  as  free  and  open  face-to-face 
communication, a range of social interactions and friendships or a career in public life are fatally 
compromised if her face has to be covered at all times in public.
If the numbers involved are equal, then, I contend that the liberal state has a duty to support 
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the women who are being coerced into burqa-wearing. And clearly if the number of women coerced 
into wearing it is greater than the number of those who wear it voluntarily, then a fortiori the state 
must side with the coerced women. 
What, though, if the voluntary burqa-wearers outnumber the coerced? Let us suppose there 
were 75% voluntary burqa-wearers and 25% coerced burqa-wearers. In such a case I still contend 
that the state should support the coerced burqa-wearers, because the blocking of their interests is 
that much more severe, and because there is no alternative course for their interests to take. 
But if the ration of voluntary to coerced burqa-wearers was 90:10? 95:5? 99:1? Here it gets 
difficult.  As  the  number  of  women  being  coerced  to  wear  the  burqa  gets  smaller  then  the 
justification for a ban gets weaker. A great number of voluntary burqa-wearers would be having 
their  interests blocked and at  a certain point  this would outweigh the fact  that  the blocking of 
interests of the smaller number was more severe. One cannot state exactly what that point is. It is 
like being asked how many hairs are necessary to form a beard. 
All I wish to establish here is that a) being forced to wear a burqa is a more serious harm 
than being prevented from wearing one; and b) the greater the number of women being forced to 
wear one, the stronger is the liberal case for a ban. 
10. Summary of the Argument
To sum up: a liberal state would be justified in banning the burqa if  it were used as a criminal or 
terrorist disguise to such an extent that this appreciably increased the risk of harm to citizens (this 
seems unlikely at present); or if significant numbers of women were being coerced into wearing it 
(this seems possible or even plausible, but we do not yet have the necessary data); and if no other 




My answer to the question, ‘Should a liberal state ban the burqa?’, then, amounts to this: 
A liberal  state should not ban the burqa (though temporary removal  may legitimately be 
required in certain institutional contexts, where security, identification or communication are 
at  issue,  and  there  is  no  alternative  method  of  ensuring  security,  identification  or 
communication that is a) equally effective and b) does not impose an unreasonable burden on 
the  institution);  with  two  provisos,  viz.  1)  unless  burqa-wearing  is  shown  to  cause  an 
unacceptable rise in masked crime or terrorism which could be countered in no other way; 
and 2) unless a significant number of women turn out to be wearing the burqa under coercion, 
and  there  is  no  equally  efficacious  method,  other  than  a  general  ban,  of  preventing  the 
coercion. 
1. The Question of Efficacy
The  final  condition  of  the  final  proviso  –  the  question  of  efficacy  –  requires  a  little  further 
discussion.  After  all,  if  coerced  burqa-wearing  is  occurring,  the  liberal  state  is  committed  to 
preventing it, but that does not mean the liberal state is committed to a general ban. The liberal state 
is committed to whatever are the most efficacious means of ending the coercion. That might indeed 
be a ban, if only because allowing burqa-wearing is necessary for coercion to occur. If no burqa-
wearing is allowed then no coerced burqa-wearing is possible. 
However, a general ban on burqa-wearing could lead to undesired consequences, leaving the 
coerced women worse off. Suppose a woman is oppressed by her husband and/or male relatives to 
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the extent that they refuse to let her out in public if her face is uncovered. In that case she finds 
herself under effective house arrest. She is then more oppressed than before. 
Such cases would, of course, prove the existence of coercion. They would prove the liberal 
state were right that there was a problem to be tackled. But they would suggest that a general burqa-
ban might not be the best way of tackling it. 
Other  undesirable  consequences  are  conceivable.  Suppose  that  the  portion  of  Muslim 
(Wahhabist) women who voluntarily wear the burqa resent the ban as an attack on their religion. 
(They would  be  mistaken about  the  motivation  behind the  ban,  but  after  all,  people  do  make 
mistakes.) They resolve to continue to wear it in public and accept the fines or imprisonment that 
result,  martyrising themselves.  (Such a  degree  of  martyrisation is  after  all  mild in  a  historical 
context; it pales besides Cranmer’s, Latimer’s and Ridley’s willingness to be burned alive rather 
than accept the truth of transubstantiation.) Moreover, other Muslim women who did not previously 
wear the burqa now take to doing so, in order to demonstrate support for the martyrs. The number 
of burqa-wearers actually grows; so does the number of Muslim women in prison. This is clearly 
not the outcome intended or desired by the liberal state. 
1.1 A softer approach
It is possible that a softer or more tactical approach would prove more efficacious in ending coerced 
burqa-wearing. A general ban would have justice on its side if its aim were to end the injustice of 
coercion, but justice is not necessarily enough. John Rawls’ thoughts on tolerating the intolerant 
seem relevant here: 
The question of tolerating the intolerant is directly related to that of the principle of the stability of a well-
ordered society regulated by the two principles [of justice]. We can see this as follows. It is from the position of 
equal citizenship that persons join the various religious associations, and it is from this position that they should 
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conduct their discussion with one another. Citizens in a free society should not think one another incapable of 
justice unless this is necessary for the sake of equal liberty itself. If an intolerant sect appears in a well-ordered 
society, the others should keep in mind the inherent stability of their institutions. The liberties of the intolerant  
may persuade them to a belief in freedom [my italics]. This persuasion works on the psychological principle 
that those whose liberties are protected by and who benefit from a just constitution will, other things equal, 
acquire an allegiance to it over a period of time (§ 72). So even if an intolerant sect should arise, provided that 
it  is  not so strong initially that it  can impose its  will  straight away, or does not grow so rapidly that the  
psychological principle  has no time to take hold,  it  will  tend to  lose its  intolerance and accept  liberty of 
conscience.
(1971: 219)
Rawls’ point is that even though the intolerant sect would have no title to complain if their activities 
were  suppressed,  this  may  not  be  the  most  efficacious  way  of  dealing  with  them.  Rather,  by 
embodying  the  virtue  of  tolerance  the  liberal  state  has  a  chance  of  converting,  rather  than 
suppressing them. 
I am reminded of Aesop’s fable about the Sun and the Wind arguing about who is the more 
powerful; to put the matter to the test they decide to see who can force a traveller to remove his 
cloak. The Wind tries first and furiously buffets the man about, trying to rip the cloak off him. But 
the man simply clutches his cloak tighter. Then it is the Sun’s turn. The Sun beams down, warming 
the man until he voluntarily takes off his cloak. 
The analogy is not exact, for in the case of coerced burqa-wearing it  is not the women 
themselves who can voluntarily choose to remove their burqa, but their husbands or male relatives 
who must permit them to do so. Nevertheless, the gentle sun of tolerance might turn out to be the 
most effective way of getting those husbands and male relatives to relent – or at least it might form 
a crucial part of the solution. 
Other approaches which a liberal state might pursue in tandem with tolerance could include 
nudge-style policies designed to diminish the appeal of the burqa to men who follow a conservative, 
279
patriarchal version of Islam. I am not able to specify what such policies might be, but they would 
need  somehow  to  facilitate  a  cultural  change,  so  that  the  burqa’s  positive  associations  for 
conservative  Islam (modesty,  piety,  virtue)  were  weakened.  Perhaps  the  idea  that  the  burqa  is 
unIslamic, urged by liberal Muslims, might have some purchase here. 
At the same time the liberal state could be strict in insisting on temporary removal of the 
burqa when the situation demanded (in schools, airports, banks, law courts etc). In this way the 
burqa could come to be seen as a garment one slips on and off rather than a permanent barrier 
between the wearer and the world; and the task of dissuading men from forcing their wives or 
daughters to wear one might become easier, as the stakes would be less high. 
Finally the liberal state could also try to ensure that exit routes were in place for women in 
relationships where they continued to be forced to cover their faces in public. This would entail 
making it publicly clear that coercion need not be tolerated, and providing refuges for women in 
flight from such oppressive relationships. 
1.2 Summing up
Note that I am not recommending any particular policy. If a general ban were the most efficacious 
means of ending coerced burqa-wearing – supposing it to occur – then the liberal state would be 
justified in  imposing such a  ban.  But  if  a  concerted set  of  policies  aimed at  ending coercion, 
stopping short of a ban, were to prove more efficacious, then the liberal state ought to pursue those 
policies instead.  The real goal of the liberal state is to protect the rights of all its citizens as free and 
equal persons; and it can be flexible about the means it uses to do so. 
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